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Abstract 
Retributive attitudes are deeply held and widespread in the general population and 
most legal systems incorporate retributive elements. It is probably also the dominant 
theory of punishment among contemporary philosophers of criminal justice. 
However, retributivism relies on conceptions of free will and responsibility that 
have, for millennia, fundamentally divided those who have thought seriously about 
the subject.  
 
Our legal system upholds the principle that the responsibility of the offender has to 
be proven beyond reasonable doubt, before the accused can be punished. In view of 
the intractable doubts surrounding the soundness of retributivism’s very conception 
of responsibility, my thesis argues that it is ethically dubious to punish individuals 
for solely retributive reasons. Instead, my thesis proposes that a person should only 
be punished if the main theories of punishment agree that punishing that person is 
appropriate – I call this ‘the convergence requirement’. This approach, I argue, is in 
accordance with the considerations underlying the beyond reasonable doubt standard.  
 
In addition to considering the question of ‘whom to punish’ my thesis considers what 
methods of responding to criminal behaviour are acceptable. In particular, it attempts 
to explain, without appealing to the contested notions of free will or retributive 
desert, what is problematic about ‘manipulative’ methods of dealing with criminal 
offenders (focussing in particular on the possibility of modifying their behaviour 
through neurological interventions). The final part of this thesis also gives an 
overview of some of the practical implications for Scots criminal law of taking 
doubts about free will and retributivism seriously. Given the severe treatment that 
offenders undergo within the Scottish penal system (e.g. deprivation of liberty, 
stigma) and the high rate of recidivism, it is important to consider whether our 
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current penal practices are justified, what alternatives are available and what goals 
and values should guide attempts at reforming the system. 
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Retributive attitudes are deeply held and widespread in the general population and 
most legal systems incorporate retributive elements.1 Victor Tadros observes that, 
‘Retributivism is probably the most popular theory of punishment amongst those 
people working on the range of issues within the philosophy of criminal justice, and 
amongst criminal justice academics more generally.’2 However, this theory relies on  
conceptions of free will and responsibility that have, for millennia, fundamentally 
divided those who have thought seriously about the subject. 3 
Our legal system upholds the principle that the responsibility of the offender has to 
be proven beyond reasonable doubt, before the accused can be punished. In view of 
the intractable doubts surrounding the soundness of retributivism’s very conception 
of responsibility, my thesis argues that it is ethically dubious to punish individuals 
for solely retributive reasons. Instead, my thesis proposes that a person should only 
be punished if the main theories of punishment agree that punishing that person is 
appropriate – I call this ‘the convergence requirement’. This approach, it is argued, is 
in accordance with the considerations underlying the beyond reasonable doubt 
standard. In addition to considering the question of ‘whom to punish’ my thesis 
considers what methods of responding to criminal behaviour are acceptable. In 
particular, it attempts to explain, without appealing to the contested notions of ‘free 
will’ or ‘retributive desert’, what is problematic about ‘manipulative’ methods of 
dealing with criminal offenders (focussing in particular on the possibility of 
                                                
1 See, e.g., K Carlsmith, ‘The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Punishment’ (2006) 42 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 437. 
2 V Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of the Criminal Law (OUP, Oxford 2011), 
p44. 
3 Belief in this contested conception of free will is also widespread across cultures. See, e.g.: H 
Sarkissian et al, ‘Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal’ (2010) 25(3) Mind and Language 346. 
Like retributivism, free will also figures prominently in religious discourse: Pereboom D, ‘Free Will, 
Evil, and Divine Providence’, in Chignell A and Dole A (eds) God and the Ethics of Belief: New 
Essays in Philosophy of Religion (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 77. 
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modifying their behaviour through neurological interventions). The final part of this 
thesis also gives an overview of some of the practical implications for Scots criminal 
law of taking doubts about free will and retributivism seriously. Given the severe 
treatment that offenders undergo within the Scottish penal system (e.g. deprivation of 
liberty, stigma) and the high rate of recidivism, it is important to consider whether 
our current penal practices are justified, what alternatives are available and what 
goals and values should guide attempts at reforming the system.4 
Key Terms 
I will now make some remarks on the terminology used in this thesis.  
Retributivism 
This thesis will focus on an influential version of retributivism, which holds that 
punishing the guilty is intrinsically good.5 According to this version of retributivism, 
the state is not merely entitled to punish the guilty. Rather, the state has a moral duty 
to punish offenders, purely because they deserve to suffer, even if punishing them 
serves no further purpose. 6 For the retributivist, the judgement that someone is 
morally responsible for committing a criminal offence means that the criminal action 
belongs to the offender in such a way that she deserves to be punished for it, 
irrespective of the consequences of imposing punishment. (In this thesis, the term 
‘retributive responsibility’ will be used to refer to this kind of moral responsibility.) 7 
                                                
4 Reconviction figures in some UK prisons are over seventy per cent:  
Ministry of Justice, Compendium of re-offending statistics and analysis (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/compendium-of-reoffending-statistics-and-analysis.pdf  
Effective rehabilitation could also lead to considerable savings. The average cost of keeping one 
offender in prison for a single year is £40,000: Adebowale V, ‘Diversion Not Detention’ (2010) 17 (2) 
Public Policy Research 71. 
5 For a defence of this view see Michael Moore, Placing Blame (1997) (Henceforth: Moore, Placing 
Blame). For criticisms of other versions of retributivism see: John Mackie, ‘Morality and the 
Retributive Emotions’ 1982 Criminal Justice Ethics 3; Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed 
Justifications (1984)  
6 Reform and deterrence are examples of purposes punishment might serve, which form no part of the 
retributive theory of justice. 
7This definition of retributive responsibility is based on definitions given by Derk Pereboom in 
“Reasons-Responsiveness, Alternative Possibililities, and Manipulation Arguments Against 
Compatibilism:  Reflections on John Martin Fischer’s My Way,” (2006) 47 Philosophical Books 198, 
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The principle that the guilty should receive the punishment that they deserve is 
known as ‘positive retributivism’, since it is meant to provide a positive reason in 
favour of punishment. In contrast, the idea that those who are not guilty should be 
spared punishment (and that the guilty should receive no more punishment than they 
deserve) is known as ‘negative retributivism’. Those who endorse ‘negative 
retributivism’ insist that this principle should constrain the state’s power to punish. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the term ‘retributivism’ will refer to theories that include 
both the positive and the negative retributive principle. 
Free Will 
I will use the term ‘free will’ to refer to the ability to control one’s actions in a way 
that could make one an appropriate candidate for judgements of retributive 
responsibility. 
Determinism 
The truth of determinism, as I will argue in Chapter Two, would pose a serious 
challenge for free will and thus for retributive responsibility. Determinism, as it 
applies to human behaviour, is the theory that the deliberations, choices and conduct 
of every individual are causally necessitated by factors that are ultimately beyond the 
individual’s control. Determinism does not imply that our psychological states, such 
                                                                                                                                     
at pp211-212 (henceforth: Pereboom, “Reasons-Responsiveness”); and in “Living Without Free Will: 
The Case for Hard Incompatibilism”, in Kane (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2002), 478, at 
p479, (henceforth: Pereboom, “Living Without Free Will”). Richard Double uses the term “retributive 
moral responsibility” in “Metaethics, Metaphilosophy and Free Will Subjectivism”, in Kane (ed) The 
Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2002), 506, at p516. The connection between retributivism and 
responsibility is also discussed  by Ted Honderich in How Free Are You?, 2nd edn. (2002) 
(Henceforth, Honderich, How Free are You).  At p101-2 and p139, Honderich argues that retributive 
judgements depend on “holding people responsible in a certain way…a way that is inconsistent with 
determinism”. See also H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, (1968).  See also Galen 
Strawson, “The Bounds of Freedom”, in Kane (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2002), 442 
(Henceforth, Strawson, “The Bounds of Freedom”). At p442 Strawson asks “Are [people] ever 
responsible for the their actions in such a way that they are, without any sort of qualification, morally 
deserving of …punishment…for them?”. Honderich argues for an alternative, non-retributive 
conception of responsibility in How Free Are You?, chapters 8-11. Pereboom also advocates a non-
retributive conception of moral responsibility in “Reasons-Responsiveness”, p211-212. This thesis 
does not argue that that there is no sense of responsibility which is compatible with determinism.  
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as our intentions, desires and beliefs, make no difference to our actions. Rather, 
determinism implies that, if our actions are to be explained by reference to such 
psychological phenomena as mentioned above, then these phenomena were 
themselves produced by prior events that were causally sufficient for the occurrence 
of those psychological phenomena and that those prior events were themselves 
produced in the same manner by even earlier events etc. in an unbroken chain of 
cause and effect that can be traced back to before the person was even born. Nor 
does determinism imply that people will fail to modify their behaviour in response to 
good reasons for doing so. It merely implies that whether a person recognises and 
responds to one particular reason for action rather than another at any given time is 
determined by prior events in the manner described above. This thesis aims to cast 
doubt on the idea that determinism is compatible with retributive responsibility. 
However, it maintains that determinism is compatible with rationality.8 
 
In this thesis, the term ‘determinism’ will be used to mean the theory that human 
behaviour is determined. The proposition that all events are caused has been 
contested by physicists. On one theory, indeterminism exists at the quantum level of 
subatomic phenomena. Some theorists have claimed that quantum physics may lend 
support to the idea that human actions are undetermined.9 This claim will be 
discussed in Chapter One below, where it will be argued that, even if quantum events 
affect human behaviour, it is unlikely that this could provide a satisfactory basis for 
retributive responsibility. 
Indeterminism 
‘Indeterminism’ is the idea that determinism is false. 
                                                
8 See Chapter One, the section entitled “The Conceptual Coherence of Determinism”. 
9 E.g. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd ed (2004) pp169-170. 
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Compatibilism 
‘Compatibilism’ is the view that free will and retributive responsibility are 
compatible with determinism and that people can have free will. Most compatibilists 
believe that free will and retributive responsibility are also compatible with 
indeterminism. 
Incompatibilism 
This is the idea that determinism is incompatible with free will and retributive 
responsibility. There are two types of incompatibilism – ‘libertarianism’ and ‘hard 
incompatibilism’. 
Libertarianism 
‘Libertarianism’ is the belief that free will and determinism are incompatible (thus 
libertarianism is a variety of ‘incompatibilism’) and that people can be free, because 
determinism is false. 
Hard Incompatibilism 
‘Hard incompatibilists’ believe that people lack free will and are not retributively 
responsible for their actions. Hard incompatibilists believe this either because they 
think determinism is true and that it is incompatible with free will and retributive 
responsibility, or because they think that free will and retributive responsibility are 
incompatible with both determinism and with indeterminism. Hard incompatibilism 
is also known as ‘free will scepticism’. 
Punishment 
When I refer to ‘theories of punishment’ I intend this phrase to be construed in a 
broad sense. My use of the word ‘punishment’ is not restricted by definition to the 
notion of retributive punishment. Nor is it restricted to theories that inflict hardship 
on offenders in order to make offenders suffer (such a definition would include 
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retributivism as well as special and general deterrence theories that intend 
punishment to make offenders suffer, so that they or others will not offend/reoffend). 
Instead, when I refer to ‘theories of punishment’ I intend to include theories that 
recommend the use of state coercion in response to criminal behaviour. This broad 
definition includes incapacitation theories, such as that defended by Derk Pereboom, 
which attempt to justify subjecting dangerous offenders to various coercive measures 
to prevent them from being a threat to society, but do not require that these measures 
be imposed in order to make offenders suffer.10  The reader should bear my 
stipulative definition of theories of punishment in mind when reading this text. I have 
opted for this interpretation of the term ‘theories of punishment’ partly for ease of 
exposition and partly because it encompasses theories which resemble central cases 
of theories of punishment in important respects. For instance, the incapacitation 
theories that it encompasses resemble central cases of punishment theories in that 1) 
they recommend significant interference with the offenders’ liberty by the state and 
2) this interference is imposed in response to a criminal offence.11  
Structure of the Thesis 
My Thesis has the following structure: In Part One I will argue that there is at least a 
reasonable doubt about the soundness of retributivism. This doubt arises from 
retributivism’s reliance on a hotly contested conception of free will. Chapter One 
will provide reasons for doubting that retributivism could justifiably rely on the 
assumption of libertarian free will. Chapter Two will provide reasons for doubting 
the adequacy of compatibilist retributivism. Chapter Three will respond to an 
argument for retributivism, based on the implications of that theory for our practices: 
the argument that we need retributivism because it is the only theory that implies that 
                                                
10 Pereboom D, Living without Free Will (CUP, Cambridge 2001), pp174-186. 
11 But see chapter 6 for discussion of the possibility that incapacitation theories might allow for pre-
emptive detention of those who have committed no crime. Readers who are reluctant to accept my 
stipulative definition of ‘theories of punishment’ should construe references to such theories as 
referring to ‘coercive state responses to criminal behaviour’. 
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accused people and offenders should be protected by considerations of justice. I will 
argue that in fact there are good reasons for thinking that our practice of upholding 
these principles of justice could be defended on non-retributive grounds. 
 
In Part Two I will relate the doubts about the soundness of retributivism that I raised 
in Part One to the literature on ‘moral uncertainty’ (i.e. uncertainty about which 
moral theory should guide our conduct). I will point out that, in the light of this 
literature, adopting a purely consequentialist theory of punishment would not be a 
rational response to the doubts about the soundness of retributivism since there is 
also uncertainty about the soundness of consequentialism. Chapter Four will present 
an overview of some of the main theories of moral uncertainty and will highlight 
some of their key shortcomings (at least in relation to dealing with uncertainty about 
theories of punishment). Chapters Five and Six will defend my own approach to 
moral uncertainty about theories of punishment. On my approach, the entire moral 
argument for punishing a person should be held to a high standard of credibility. I 
call this the ‘cautious approach to punishment’. In Chapter Five I will argue that one 
reason for adopting a cautious approach to punishment stems from the underlying 
rationale for the beyond reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials – a standard that 
has widespread support. In Chapter Six, I will argue that in order to minimise the risk 
of punishing someone unjustifiably, we should only punish that person if the main 
punishment theories agree that doing so is justifiable. I will call this ‘the convergence 
requirement’. If the convergence requirement is satisfied, then the state’s argument 
for punishing a person has met the required standard of credibility. I will 
acknowledge in Chapter Six that, notwithstanding the arguments against 
retributivism presented in Part One, when we survey the state of the free will debate, 
there is a strong argument for ‘free will agnosticism’ rather than for certainty that we 
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lack free will in the sense required for retributive responsibility.12 Given that the 
cautious approach recommends giving people who may be liable to punishment ‘the 
benefit of the doubt’, such people should only be punished if retributive theories (as 
well as forward-looking theories) would recommend this; i.e. in effect this means 
that punishment should be constrained by negative retributivism. The possibility that 
negative retributivism might be sound therefore provides a reason against such 
intuitively unjust practices such as punishment of the innocent – a reason in addition 
to those non-retributive reasons outlined in Chapter Three. Chapter Six will also give 
some reasons why theorists from different philosophical perspectives should endorse 
the convergence requirement and will defend this requirement against certain 
potential objections. 
 
The convergence requirement assumes that punishment infringes the interests of the 
individuals who are punished – in particular their interest in not being seriously 
harmed - and therefore requires strong justification. Part Two focuses primarily on 
which individuals should be punished at all. Part Three will address the question of 
which method of responding to an individual’s criminal behaviour should be 
preferred, once it is determined that some response is required, in situations where 
several possible alternatives are available. This question is complicated by the fact 
that offenders have a number of different interests that should be protected, but these 
interests can sometimes pull in different directions. In general, offenders have an 
interest in not being deprived of liberty. Therefore, where one mainstream theory 
recommends a sentence that involves less interference with liberty, that sentence 
should usually be preferred. However, I will also maintain that offenders have an 
interest in being treated as rational agents. Certain rehabilitative interventions might 
allow offenders to be released earlier into society, but may fail to respect the 
                                                
12 S. Kearns, ‘Free Will Agnosticism’ (2013) Nous (Online First). DOI: 10.1111/nous.12032 
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offender as a rational agent. This problem arises most acutely in connection with the 
possibility of using direct brain interventions to modify criminal behaviour. 
Therefore, Part Three will be devoted to examining this example in detail. It is also 
important to explore this topic, since it is of particular relevance to the arguments for 
free will scepticism which I advanced in Part One, when raising doubts about the 
justifiability of relying solely on a retributive theory punishment. It is tempting to 
explain the troubling nature of certain direct brain interventions by claiming that they 
threaten free will. If free will scepticism implied an acceptance of these troubling 
interventions then this could undermine free will scepticism and could possibly 
strengthen the case for a retributive system that stressed the importance of free will. 
However, in Chapter Seven, I will argue that, in fact, the objectionable nature of 
certain direct brain interventions has very little to do with free will. In Chapter Eight, 
I will argue that there are in fact non-retributive reasons for opposing the most 
intuitively-objectionable interventions. I will identify certain forms of biomedical 
intervention that are genuinely objectionable and that should not be used within the 
criminal justice system. In Chapter Nine, I will argue that, in principle, it would be 
morally permissible for the state to employ certain types of biomedical intervention 
(such as ‘cognitive enhancements’) in a limited way within the criminal justice 
system, provided that effective enhancements can be developed in the future that 
have minimal side-effects. Chapter Nine will then consider how we can distinguish 
interventions that enhance rational capacities from interventions that fundamentally 
change the person's character, and the extent to which this distinction matters. 
 
In Part Four, I will discuss some of the practical implications of my approach for the 
criminal law. Chapter Ten will examine the criminal law’s current position on the 
questions of free will and retributive responsibility. It will argue that the dominant 
view among criminal law theorists  - that the criminal law is thoroughly compatibilist 
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- rests on dubious arguments. There is at least as much reason for thinking that 
principles of criminal law embody libertarian, incompatibilist assumptions as there is 
for thinking that they make only compatibilist assumptions. Chapter Eleven will 
examine what revisions to criminal law doctrines would enable these doctrines to be 
justifiable even if retributivism (and the notion of free will on which it depends) were 
regarded as unsound. It will suggest several changes to our understanding of the 
rationale for the provocation defence, self-defence and mental disorder defences; and 
for the overall structure of criminal defences. My intention in Part Four is to give a 
general overview of directions for future work in this area and not to give a 











Part One: Overview 
In Part One I will argue that the truth of determinism would seriously undermine the 
retributivist justification of punishment. Furthermore, I will argue that retributivists 
cannot successfully defend their view by dismissing determinism as empirically false 
or conceptually incoherent.  
 
Retributivism can seem intuitively appealing. To take an example suggested by Ted 
Honderich, imagine that a man injures someone you care about, “or defrauds her in a 
financial transaction, or concocts evidence against her in a court… [you may well] 
have a retributive desire…[You may] want it to come about that [the man] suffers at 
least some unhappiness….. The desire may go a lot further than that.”13 People who 
have this kind of retributive attitude may well demand that wrongdoers are punished, 
without even considering the deterrent or reformatory effects such  punishment may 
or may not have. Furthermore, such people may insist that their retributive attitudes 
are different from mere vengeance, because the former are based on moral 
indignation, involving a belief about the requirements of justice, whereas the latter 
involve purely personal feelings, such as hurt pride, anger, or vindictiveness.14 The 
arguments presented in Part One aims to cast serious doubt on whether these 
retributive attitudes can be justified. If the institution of punishment is to be 
preserved, there are good reasons for seeking a non-retributive justification for it. 
 
Chapter One will critique ‘libertarian’ defences of retributivism. Libertarian 
retributivists deny that human behaviour is determined and maintain that 
indeterminism enables us to be retributively responsible. Chapter One begins by 
citing evidence from neuroscience that supports the theory that the mental processes 
                                                
13 Honderich, How Free Are You?,p101. 
14 For an attempt to distinguish retributivism from vengeance see: Moore, Placing Blame, chapters 3 
and 4. 
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that lead to action are determined. Libertarians have not shown that quantum events 
affect such processes in a way that could provide a basis for retributive 
responsibility. Furthermore, even if they could show this, it is extremely doubtful 
whether quantum indeterminacy could in any way enhance human freedom and 
responsibility. Finally, Chapter One will respond to a prominent libertarian argument 
against determinism – that it is conceptually incoherent and self-refuting. 
 
Chapter Two will argue against the view that retributivism and determinism are 
compatible. Unlike libertarians, ‘compatibilists’ need make no claims about the 
actual truth or falsity of determinism. Hence ‘compatibilist responsibility’ is not a 
hostage to empirical fortune. This may partly explain why the majority of 
philosophers seem to favour compatibilism.15 Since compatibilism is the dominant 
view, my critique of this theory will be longer than my critique of libertarianism. I 
will argue that the truth of determinism would seriously undermine retributivism. 
This is because determinism entails that human actions are inevitable, whereas 
retributive responsibility requires that the agent had the ability to avoid performing 
the wrongful action. Determinism also entails that the agent is not the ultimate source 
of her action; rather, ultimately, her action is a product of luck. This is also 
incompatible with retributive responsibility. Finally, Chapter Two will argue that 
attempts to rescue retributivism from these metaphysical difficulties by appealing to 
our ‘moral experience taken as a whole’ are unsuccessful.16 
 
Chapter Three will then argue that a ‘hard incompatibilist’ approach to punishment 
(i.e. one that rejects libertarian and compatibilist retributivism) could be fair and 
humane. It is possible to have justice without retributive desert. 
                                                
15  Bourget D and Chalmers D (eds.) The Philpapers Survey 2009, available at 
http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl Accessed 31st May 2011. 
 
16 Moore, Placing Blame, p543. 
 22 
 
Punishment is the deliberate infliction of suffering in the name of justice. The serious 
nature of legal sanctions is reflected in the requirement that the guilt of an accused 
person must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, before he can be punished. In Part 
Two, I will argue at length that the entire moral argument for punishing a person 
should be held to a similarly high standard of credibility, before it is fair to rely on it. 
Part One attempts to cast serious doubt on the idea that retributivism has met this 
standard.  
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Chapter One: Libertarian Retributivism 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will argue that the retributivist is unable successfully to defend his 
theory against the problem of determinism by simply dismissing determinism as 
empirically or conceptually flawed. Firstly, evidence from neuroscience provides 
some support for the idea that mental processes that lead to action are determined. 
Secondly, it will be argued that libertarians have not shown that quantum events 
affect such processes in a way that could provide a basis for retributive 
responsibility. Thirdly, this chapter will argue that determinism is conceptually 
coherent. 
Empirical Support for Determinism 
In order to avoid confusion, it is important at the outset to distinguish between two 
ways in which people use the word “cause”. Firstly, “cause” is often used to indicate 
a causal factor which contributes to bringing about an effect. For example, fuel, 
kindling temperature and the presence of oxygen are all required in order to light a 
fire. Any one of these conditions could be described as a cause of the fire, in the 
sense of “causal factor”.17 In contrast, a necessitating cause (which Ted Honderich 
calls a “causal circumstance”18) is a set of conditions such that, if those conditions 
are present, a certain effect will always follow, whatever else is the case. For 
example, the presence of fuel, oxygen and kindling temperature together constitute a 
necessitating cause of combustion. It is the latter sense of “cause” which is central to 
                                                
17 Usually, the factor referred to as “the cause” is a new event e.g. the striking of the match, where 
fuel and oxygen are already present, or the application of fuel to a flame, where the oxygen is already 
present. Michael Moore, whose ideas will be discussed at greater length in chapter five, sometimes 
seems to imply that determinism relies solely on the concept of causal factor. See, for example 
Placing Blame, pp532-533 and p543. 
18 Honderich, How Free Are You?  
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the theory of determinism. (Throughout this thesis the term “cause” will be used to 
mean “necessitating cause”, unless otherwise indicated. Sometimes, for emphasis, 
the full term “necessitating cause” will be used.) 
 
Michael Moore accepts determinism because he believes that the alternative, 
indeterminism, is highly implausible. Moore asks, “ is it not extraordinary to think 
that part of our most basic metaphysical picture of what the universe is like  - in 
terms of causal relations – should have no application to persons? Is it not 
extraordinary to think that agents who clearly cause changes to occur in the world are 
themselves uncaused?”19  
 
Indeed, scientists are generally agreed that neural processes in the human brain 
operate causally (e.g. in response to internal or to external (i.e. environmental) 
stimuli).20 Furthermore, there is a large body of evidence to support the claim that 
conscious mental phenomena (including memories, emotions, imagination and, most  
importantly in this context, rational deliberation) necessarily go together with certain 
brain processes. For example, experiments have shown that when a particular area of 
a patient’s brain is electrically stimulated, that patient will have the subjective 
experience of a particular “flashback” memory. Studies of stroke victims have 
established that specific areas of the brain relate to specific cognitive functions such 
that if those areas of the brain are damaged the associated cognitive functions will be 
lost or impaired.21  
 
This evidence has been interpreted in various ways by determinists. One plausible 
view has been put forward by Ted Honderich. He argues that there is a nomic (law-
                                                
19 Moore, Placing Blame, p504. 
20 For a lucid summary of some of the key evidence from neuroscience and its relevance to 
determinism see Honderich, A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience and Life-Hopes 
(1988)  
21 See Wilder Penfield, The Mystery of the Mind (1975) N.R. Carlson, Physiology of behaviour (1994) 
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like) connection between mental events and neural events, such that “if or since one 
occurred, whatever else had been the case, the other would still have occurred”.22 In 
contrast, Libertarians, such as C.A. Campbell, believe that, in the case of genuinely 
“free” actions, the self brings about the action in a way that is not causally 
necessitated by brain processes, by nomic pairs of brain process and mental states, or 
by anything else.23 Honderich makes a convincing case for thinking that the most 
plausible interpretation of the evidence of brain science does not support such an 
indeterminist view. 24  He argues that the findings of an intimate, necessary 
connection between neural phenomena and mental phenomena, rule out  “what is 
fundamental to the [indeterminist’s] free-floating self… Whatever, else was 
supposed to be true of the self…, it was supposed to be above and beyond the 
brain.”25 
 
Furthermore, one of the main “methods” which libertarians (such as C.A. Campbell26 
and John Searle27) have used to try to establish that mental processes are not 
necessitated does not seem capable of establishing any such thing. These theorists 
claim that we can discover such facts about the mind and brain through introspection 
on the activity of choosing. This involves examining what it is like to make a choice, 
from the perspective of the person actually making that choice, rather than from the 
viewpoint of an external observer. This introspection, libertarians claim, reveals 
“gaps” in the causation of human actions. However, introspecting on a particular 
experience of choosing cannot possibly establish whether that choice was 
determined. The Proposition “this choice was determined” refers to something 
                                                
22 Honderich, How Free Are You?. Some other interpretations of the mind-brain relationship which 
are consistent with determinism include Functionalism, Physicalism and Epiphenomenalism. For a 
critical discussion of some of these theories see John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992) 
23 C.A. Campbell, In Defence of Free Will (1967). 
24 Honderich, On Determinism and Freedom (2005), chapter 5. 
25 Honderich, How Free Are You?, p69. 
26 C.A. Campbell, In Defence of Free Will (1967). 
27 John Searle, “Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2000, 
cited in Honderich, On Determinism and Freedom (2005), chapter 5. 
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outside the experience of choosing, presumably prior to it, i.e. its cause. Furthermore, 
even if the libertarian (after reflecting on the experience of choosing) somehow gets 
a powerful feeling that no necessitating cause preceded the choice, the libertarian 
cannot show that this powerful feeling is not an illusion, itself causally determined. 
Empirical support for the truth or otherwise of determinism can only be provided by 
wide-ranging studies of the causation of human behaviour, not by introspective 
reports about what the experience of choosing is like for particular agents.28  
 
The Retributivist Cannot Rely on Quantum 
Indeterminism 
On one interpretation of quantum theory, quantum events at the microlevel of atomic 
and subatomic particles are undetermined.29 However, even if this theory is correct, 
the idea that quantum indeterminism may result in indeterminism at the macro-level 
(in particular at the level of neuron firings in the human brain) is speculative.30 J.J.C. 
Smart argues that quantum effects are unlikely to be substantial enough to have any 
significant effect on deliberative processes. He says, “even a single neuron is a huge 
macroscopic object by the standards of quantum mechanics and furthermore, the 
                                                
28 For criticism of the “introspection method” along the lines given in this thesis, see Honderich, On 
Determinism and Freedom (2005), chapter 5. 
29  However, some writers have disputed this interpretation of quantum theory. According to 
Honderich, for example, a quantum “event” may not actually be an “event” in the ordinary sense of 
that term i.e. something that happens in space and time, such as an action, or the firing of a neuron. 
Rather, Honderich suggests, quantum “events” may be purely theoretical entities of the nature of 
propositions or numbers. For a full discussion see, Honderich, A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, 
Neuroscience and Life-Hopes (1988) pp304-334. Robert Bishop, points out that some theorists believe 
quantum indeterminism is merely epistemic (i.e. the appearance of indeterminism is just due to our 
ignorance of the actual causes), see Bishop, “Chaos, Indeterminism and Free Will”, in Kane (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of Free Will, (2002), 110, at p118 and p120 (henceforth: Bishop, “Chaos, 
Indeterminism and Free Will”).  
30  Even supporters of the view that quantum mechanics may provide a basis for retributive 
responsibility are extremely cautious in the way they express their views, e.g. Robert Kane writes, “It 
is conceivable that …indeterminacy could arise at macrolevels” [emphasis added], in “Some 
Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth”, in Kane (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 
(2002), 406 at p434 (henceforth, Kane, “The Free Will Labyrinth”). 
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failure to fire of an odd neuron is unlikely to affect behaviour….any thought or 
action almost certainly depends on a large number of neurons.”31 
 
Even supposing, contrary to fact, there were strong evidence suggesting that 
quantum events have noticeable effects on human thoughts and actions, the 
libertarian would have to show that they affect the causal chain leading to action at 
just the point required for retributive responsibility. He would have to show for 
example that quantum events occur during the deliberative process so that the 
decision the agent comes to is not determined. However, he would also have to 
explain why quantum events do not intervene between the decision stage and the 
action. (If they did  intervene between decisions and actions people would constantly 
be performing actions they never intended and failing to perform ones they did 
intend!)32 As Honderich says, “how can [the libertarian] consistently do this? Does 
quantum theory as interpreted have some clause, hitherto unheard of, that its random 
events occur only in such places as to make us morally responsible in a certain 
sense?”33 
 
It also seems highly unlikely that quantum events could provide a basis for 
retributive responsibility even if they did occur in the “right place” in the causal 
chain and only in the right place. For it seems that this would just introduce 
randomness into our deliberative processes. This situation creates a dilemma for the 
retributivist. As A.J. Ayer argues, either it is a matter of chance “that [an agent 
chooses] to act as [he does] or it is not. If it is a matter of chance, then it is surely 
                                                
31 J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (1963) p123. More recently there has been 
speculation that chaos may amplify quantum events and thereby introduce indeterminism in the 
workings of the brain. However, the presence of chaos in the brain is “currently hotly debated and 
inconclusive”, and furthermore, as noted above fn 20, some theorists doubt whether quantum events 
are genuinely undetermined – Bishop, “Chaos, Indeterminism and Free Will”, at p119 
32 Honderich, “Determinism as True, both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real 
Problem”, in Kane (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, (2002) 461, at p467.  
33 Ibid. 
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irrational to hold [him retributively] responsible for choosing as [he] did;…If it is not 
a matter of chance, then presumably there is some causal explanation of [his] choice: 
and in that case we are led back to determinism.” 34 
 
The Libertarian may respond that an agent’s choice is not a matter of chance but 
depends on something for which he is responsible, namely his character. He may 
argue that quantum events might provide a “window of opportunity” (i.e. a gap in the 
causal chain) for the agent’s character to assert itself.35 However, the claim that an 
agent is responsible for his character entails that he has made himself what he is. 
This seems to lead to an infinite regress for it raises the question: “who was the ‘he’ 
that made the character and how was he made?”.36 
 
To summarise the argument so far: evidence from neuroscience supports the theory 
that the mental processes that lead to action are determined. Libertarians have not 
shown that quantum events affect such processes in a way that could provide a basis 
for retributive responsibility. Therefore, the retributivist is unable successfully to 
defend his theory against the problem of determinism by simply dismissing 
determinism as empirically flawed. 
 
The Conceptual Coherence of Determinism 
Determinism is an empirical theory. Its truth depends on certain facts about the 
world. However, empirical theories must also be conceptually sound. Various 
philosophers have maintained that, whatever the facts may be, they can still show 
that determinism is necessarily unjustifiable. The objection that shall be discussed in 
this section was first formulated by the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus and is 
                                                
34 A.J. Ayer, Philosophical Essays (1954) pp275-276. For a similar line of argument, see also: J.J.C. 
Smart, ‘Free Will, Praise and Blame’ 1961, Mind, 291. 
35 For a similar line of argument, see Kane, “The Free Will Labyrinth”. 
36 For further elaboration of this last point, see G Strawson, “The Bounds of Freedom”. 
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still influential in the contemporary debate about determinism and responsibility.37 
The objection states that determinism is self-defeating. Epicurus argued that, for 
determinism to be an intellectually respectable theory, it must be in accordance with 
reason, and reasoning is not a causal process. Therefore, the objection runs, a 
determinist cannot coherently argue for her position, because she admits that her own 
“arguments” are themselves merely a matter of cause and effect, rather than 
rationality. In this chapter, it will be argued that determinism does not imply that 
humans generally do not have the ability to engage in rational deliberation, nor does 
it imply that it is impossible to have a justified true belief (e.g. the belief that 
determinism is supported by scientific evidence.)  
 
Stimulus-response versus rational deliberation 
The statement that reasoning is not a causal process has seemed plausible to some 
critics of determinism because they take ‘causal process’ to indicate a simple, largely 
automatic stimulus-response mechanism. Indeed, some determinists have left 
themselves open to Epicurian-style objections by characterising the causal process in 
this way. For example, Hans Eysenck argued that the behaviour of human adults can 
be explained in terms of the conditioning they underwent in early childhood, as well 
as their biological make-up. This theory does not explain why people alter their 
behaviour (often rejecting the life-styles they were brought up with) in response to 
cogent reasons for doing so.  Eysenck’s account leaves no room for reasoned 
deliberation.38 
 
                                                
37 More recent discussions of versions of this objection include: A.C. MacIntyre, ‘Determinism’, in 
Bernard Berofsky (ed), Free Will and Determinism (1966), 240; Peter Westen, “Getting the Fly out of 
the Bottle: The False Problem of Free Will and Determinism” (2004) 8 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 
599. 
 
38 For a critical discussion of Eysenck’s view see Taylor, Walton and Young, The New Criminology 
(1973), pp 47-61. 
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However, M.C. Bradley has persuasively argued that there is a great difference 
between a simple, conditioned reflex “action” and a complex deliberative action, but 
insists that both actions can be explained in terms of causes. To illustrate his point, 
Bradley draws the following analogy: “There is a great difference between the 
machine which shoots out a chocolate when a sixpence is put in it, and the machine 
which calculates on the basis of range, direction and velocity of target, velocity of 
gun, wind-speed and direction, barometric pressure, etc., etc., where a shell must fall, 
fired from a moving gun to strike a moving target. But this vast difference in 
complexity has no bearing whatsoever on the question whether in each case the end-
product is or is not strictly determined by a series of steps, themselves all strictly 
determined.” 39  
 
It might be objected that human deliberation is not analogous to Bradley’s “gun-
laying machine”, because no computer or robot could take into account the vast 
range of information which human beings are capable of taking into consideration. In 
reply to this point, it can be said that Bradley’s analogy does not depend on the 
actual existence of such a complex machine or the practical possibility of making 
one. All that matters is that it is possible in principle to make one. The operation of 
some sophisticated machines is relevantly similar to deliberation in humans, because 
both these machines and individuals have the ability to modify their 
behaviour/operations in the light of  logically relevant data. Bradley’s example 
shows that the complexity of this data is irrelevant to the question of whether the 
mind/machine evaluating it is operating causally. 
 
Flexibility – the ability to adapt one’s behaviour in an appropriate way to changes in 
circumstances – is  generally agreed to be a hallmark of  rationality. A critic of 
                                                
39 M.C. Bradley, ‘A Note on Mr MacIntyre’s Determinism’, in Bernard Berofsky (ed), Free Will and 
Determinism (1966), 256, at p260. 
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Bradley’s example might concede that a being whose behaviour was determined 
could exhibit flexibility in response to a wide range of stimuli. Nevertheless, the 
critic might insist, if the being’s behaviour is determined, then the being’s flexibility 
will have limits, i.e. there will always be some stimuli to which the being will be 
unable to respond appropriately. For example, the sophisticated gun-laying machine 
might not be able to detect the difference between an enemy aircraft and a decoy, nor 
will the chess-playing machine (which is good enough to beat the human 
grandmaster) be able to play chequers or bridge and “input appropriate to these other 
games would reveal the system to be as non-rational and unresponsive as any 
stone”.40 Indeed, these facts should be acknowledged. However, it is submitted that 
they do not show that rationality and determinism are incompatible. For, it seems 
implausible to demand that a being must have infinite flexibility in its responses to 
stimuli, (i.e. perfect rationality) before one can say that its behaviour in general is 
rational. For what human being would satisfy such a demanding criterion? As Daniel 
Dennett puts it, “For every awe-inspiring stroke of genius…(of the Einstein-
Shakespeare gambit), there are a thousand evidences of lapses, foibles, bumbling and 
bullheadedness to suggest to the contrary that man is only imperfectly rational.”41 If 
the critic were to stipulate that infinite flexibility is a necessary condition for 
rationality, it would seem that no-one is rational, irrespective of the truth of 
determinism.  
 
Another critic of Bradley’s example might point out that humans are different from 
machines in an important respect. Unlike a machine, a human can be consciously 
aware of taking on board and evaluating the relevant data and may have feelings and 
attitudes of pleasure/pain or moral approval/disapproval in connection with the data 
                                                
40 Daniel Dennett, “Mechanism and Responsibility”, in Gary Watson (ed), Free Will (1982), 150, at 
p161. 
41 ibid, at p163. 
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being examined. Again this fact should be acknowledged. However, the fact that our 
mental processes have a subjective conscious dimension does not mean that those 
processes do not operate causally.  
 
In the next chapter, it will be argued that retributivism is incompatible with 
determinism, because determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise, which is a 
necessary condition for retributive responsibility. However, it should be noted that a 
parallel argument cannot be constructed to show that rationality is incompatible with 
determinism. It is not necessary to be able to respond differently to a given stimulus 
in order for that response to be rational.  The ability to reason soundly does not 
require the ability to reason otherwise, i.e. to reason fallaciously. As Dennett puts it: 
“the mere fact that [a certain] response had to follow, given its causal antecedents 
casts no more doubt on its rationality than the fact that the computer had to answer 
‘108’ casts doubts on the arithmetical correctness of its answer.”42 
  
In chapter four, it will be argued that a person cannot be morally responsible in the 
retributive sense if the fact that she made an immoral choice, or has a corrupt value-
system is, as determinism implies, ultimately a matter of luck. However, again, it is 
submitted that a parallel argument cannot be made to show that rationality and 
determinism are incompatible. Ultimately, the fact that a person can respond 
appropriately to certain data (e.g. a theorist’s arguments) may be explained by 
environmental factors (e.g. being taught by good teachers) and by genetic factors. If 
the presence of these factors were outwith the control of a given individual (and were 
therefore matters of luck), this would in no way detract from the rationality of the 
individual who would benefit from them. 
 
                                                
42 Ibid, at p164. 
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It might be objected that flexibility is not necessary for free will or rationality, 
because a person who is thoroughly committed to acting in accordance with a certain 
moral principle might not behave differently under any circumstances. For instance, 
a committed pacifist might never resort to violence, and yet would be considered free 
and rational. However, it is possible to distinguish the offender with an irresistible 
aversion to violence from a person with a firm moral commitment. If a person’s non-
violent conduct is genuinely a response to a moral reason, then one of the causal 
factors bringing about her behaviour is the perception that violence is morally wrong. 
She has the capacity to alter her behaviour if she revised her moral position in the 
light of new arguments or evidence. This capacity to alter one’s behaviour in 
response to a change in one’s values is an important kind of flexibility.43  
 
Knowledge 
Given that causally determined “deliberation” need not be of the crude stimulus-
response variety, the Epicurian might still object that such deliberation could not lead 
to knowledge. He will urge that we could have no confidence in the truth of our 
beliefs if those beliefs are necessitated effects. Such beliefs might be true, but, the 
Epicurian will insist, we could have no confidence that they were true because, given 
that they were caused, we would have had them any way, even if they had been false. 
Ted Honderich makes the following persuasive reply to this kind of objection:  The 
objection depends on “supposing that if my [belief] were false I would still have 
been caused to have it. But why should that be the case? If my [belief] were false, I 
might not have been caused to have it. I now think there is a keyboard in front of me. 
Would I still be caused to think that if there wasn’t one?”44  The Epicurian might 
                                                
43 Compatibilists differ over whether the flexibility possessed by rational agents in a deterministic 
world genuinely amounts to a capacity to behave differently from the way that one in fact behaves. 
The following theorists argue that it does: Fara, 2008; Vihvelin, 2004. The following theorists 
disagree, maintaining that the disposition to respond differently if different reasons were present is 
simply a feature of the way in which the agent actually behaves: Fischer and Ravizza, 1998. 
44 Honderich, How Free Are You?, pp 88-89. 
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concede the point in the case of Honderich’s keyboard, but might still argue that 
causation cannot provide one with a comprehensive guarantee of the correctness of 
one’s beliefs on every occasion. However, as Honderich points out “Nothing can give 




This chapter aimed to undermine indeterminist, libertarian defences of retributivism. 
I began by citing evidence from neuroscience that lends some support to the theory 
that human actions are determined. I then argued that quantum indeterminism has not 
been shown to affect mental processes in a way that could provide a basis for 
retributive responsibility. Next, I argued that determinism is compatible with 
reasoned deliberation and knowledge and is not self-refuting.  
 
Any attempt to justify punishment must meet a fairly high standard. It cannot be 
based on wishful thinking or speculation (e.g. speculation about the possibility that 
someday science might show that mental processes are undetermined in a way that 
could leave room for retributive responsibility, assuming that this idea is even 
coherent). The retributivist would be on firmer ground, therefore, if she could show 
that her theory is compatible with determinism. In Chapter Two, it will be argued 




                                                
45 Honderich, How Free Are You?, pp 88-89. 
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Chapter Two: Compatibilist Retributivism 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that reasoning can be characterised as a causal 
process.  A retributivist might then claim that if reasoning is compatible with 
determinism, it follows that retributive responsibility is also compatible with 
determinism. In other words, the retributivist might make the following claim: If a 
person who can reason, knowingly and voluntarily performs a wrongful action then 
she deserves to be punished even if her wrongful action were determined and 
irrespective of the consequences of punishing her. The chapter will argue that if a 
wrongdoer’s action was determined, she is not morally responsible in the retributive 
sense for that action, even if she has the ability to reason. This is because 
determinism entails that human actions are inevitable, whereas retributive 
responsibility requires that the agent had the ability to avoid performing the wrongful 
action. Determinism also entails that the agent is not the ultimate source of her 
action; rather, ultimately, her action is a product of luck. This is also incompatible 
with retributive responsibility. Finally, this chapter will argue that attempts to rescue 
retributivism from these metaphysical difficulties by appealing to our ‘moral 
experience taken as a whole46’ are unsuccessful. 
 
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities 
Firstly, it is important to distinguish between two different kinds of reasoning – 
theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning. The former involves reasoning about 
what is the case. In the previous section, in the context of theoretical reasoning, it 
was argued that it is possible to have a justified true belief (e.g. the belief that 
determinism is strongly supported by scientific evidence) even if one is caused to 
                                                
46 Moore, Placing Blame (OUP 1997). 
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have that belief. This section will focus on practical reasoning. This kind of 
reasoning involves deliberating about what to do.  
 
The arguments against retributivism that will be put forward in this section are based 
on “the principle of alternative possibilities” (henceforth: PAP).47 This principle 
states that in order for someone to be morally responsible in the retributive sense for 
doing a wrongful action it must have been possible for her to have done otherwise.48 
It is not, however, being argued that the existence of alternative possibilities is a 
sufficient condition for retributive responsibility. There may well be other 
considerations which undermine retributive responsibility. Rather, it is submitted that 
PAP is a necessary condition for retributive responsibility.  
 
In the first part of this chapter, it will be demonstrated that the principle of alternative 
possibilities is intuitively plausible. The second part of this chapter will focus on 
thought-experiments that are designed to refute the principle of alternative 
possibilities. It will be argued that these thought experiments are flawed. The final 
part of this chapter will criticise attempts to produce a version of PAP that is 
compatible with determinism. 
 
                                                
47 Carl Ginet, “In Defence of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s 
Argument Convincing”(1996) 10 Philosophical Perspectives 404 (henceforth: Ginet, “In Defence of 
Alternative Possibilities”). 
48 Ginet argues that a person needs to have the ability to do otherwise right up until the moment the 
action is performed in order to be responsible for that action. However, this is a debatable point. If the 
action flows inevitably from a choice the agent made and the agent had the ability to avoid making 
that choice, then, arguably, this is enough to render the agent responsible for the action. Both of these 
positions are incompatible with determinism since determinism renders all actions and choices 
inevitable. Therefore, the subtle differences between these positions will not be discussed in the text: 
In favour of the former position see Ginet, “In Defence of Alternative Possibilities”. In favour of the 
position that one needs alternative possibilities when making a “self-forming choice” see Kane, “The 
Free Will Labyrinth”. 
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The Intuitive Plausibility of PAP 
Consider the following example of practical reasoning: Jane is choosing whether to 
give in to a temptation to steal John’s bicycle. She is capable of grasping all the 
reasons in favour of refraining from stealing the bicycle and weighing them against 
the satisfaction she expects to derive from stealing it. In the end, Jane decides to steal 
the bicycle. Why does Jane decide to steal the bicycle? If determinism is true, the 
causes of Jane’s decision can be traced back to factors ultimately beyond her control 
(such as the biological and environmental factors which formed her character). These 
determining causes would have rendered her decision to  steal the bicycle inevitable. 
If determinism is true, she could not have done otherwise than steal it.  
 
Imagine Jane is convicted of theft. Imagine the judge who heard Jane’s case believes 
that determinism is true, but nevertheless believes that Jane is morally responsible in 
the retributive sense. After all, he thinks, Jane was not mad when she stole the 
bicycle. She knew what she was doing. Nor did anyone force her to steal it. Rather, 
she acted on reasons which seemed appropriate to her in the light of her character 
and value-system. The judge condemns Jane in the strongest terms. Consistent with 
his retributivism, he maintains that Jane deserves to be punished purely because of 
the nature of her deed, and irrespective of other considerations, eg whether 
punishment is likely to reform her, reduce the likelihood of her reoffending, deter 
other potential bicycle thieves etc. Yet, consistent with his determinism, in the next 
breath he acknowledges that, if he himself had the misfortune to be subject to the 
same determining causes which necessitated Jane’s action, he would inevitably have 
done exactly the same thing as she did.  
 
The judge’s position is paradoxical to say the least. Surely, if judges were regularly 
to come out with statements like that, then respect for the law would be undermined. 
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Yet, the pronouncements made by the hypothetical judge are entailed by accepting 
that retributive responsibility is compatible with determinism.  Jane could put the 
following challenge to anyone who endorses the position adopted by the judge: 
“since you wish to punish me purely because of the wrong that I have knowingly 
done, please tell me what, in your view, I should have done instead? You cannot 
claim that I should have decided not to steal the bicycle, because, given that you 
believe in determinism, that was not something I was able to do.”49  Jane’s challenge 
is intuitively appealing as it is based on the widely accepted idea that ought implies 
can.  
 
In real life, most people who express retributive sentiments do not endorse the kind 
of counter-intuitive position adopted by the imaginary judge. They simply do not 
accept determinism.50 Imagine, for example, that Anne has retributive feelings 
towards Bryony, who has injured Anne. Clarence, in defence of Bryony, pleads the 
story of Bryony’s disadvantaged background. A person who, like Anne, wishes to 
persist in her retributive feelings,  typically responds by saying that Bryony could 
have resisted and overcome the pressures of her upbringing. Anne will claim that 
Bryony’s upbringing did not necessitate her wrong-doing, that it did not make her 
wrong-doing inevitable. Anne may point to other cases of people who had 
disadvantaged backgrounds and yet remained morally upright citizens, who would 
not injure anybody. Furthermore, Anne does not believe that anything necessitated 
                                                
49 This kind of challenge was formulated by David Widerker and is known as the “W-defence”. See 
Widerker, “Frankfurt’s Attack on Alternative Possibilities” (2002) 14 Philosophical Perpectives 181, 
at p191. 
50 This is either because they have never thought about it or because, having thought about it, they 
reject it. In real life, judges typically do not accept determinism. For example, a Canadian court  
recently stated that “[The] criminal law rejects a determinist theory of crime.…The blunt fact is that a 
wide variety of societal ills ….are part of the causal soup that leads some individuals to commit 
crimes. If those ills are given prominence in assessing personal culpability, an individual’s 
responsibility for his or her actions will be lost.” R v Hamilton, [2004] 186 C.C.C. (3d) 129,  per 
Justice David Doherty at 140. 
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Bryony’s wrong-doing. Anne thinks that in some fundamental sense Bryony’s 
wrong-doing was ultimately and absolutely up to Bryony. 
 
Frankfurt-Style Cases 
A retributivist might attempt to refute PAP by suggesting  the following thought-
experiment of the type originated by Harry Frankfurt51: Again, imagine that Jane is 
deciding whether or not to steal John’s bicycle. Let us assume that Jane does not live 
in a deterministic universe, so in the normal course of events, she would be able to 
refrain from stealing the bicycle. 52  However, on this occasion, a demonic 
neuroscientist (who really wants Jane to steal) is monitoring Jane’s thoughts. If he 
sees that Jane is about to refrain from stealing, the neuroscientist has the power to 
intervene to make her steal. However, in the event, Jane decides on her own to steal 
and so the scientist does not intervene. (In this scenario the neuroscientist can be 
referred to as a “counterfactual intervener”, because he would only have intervened 
if the  sequence of events which actually did occur had not occurred.)  
 
This example is meant to illicit the intuition that Jane could be retributively 
responsible for stealing the bicycle, even though the presence of the neuroscientist 
meant that Jane could not have done otherwise. However, this example is flawed 
because, in a sense, Jane could have done otherwise. The scientist monitoring Jane’s 
thoughts needs some sign which indicates that, unless he intervenes, Jane will not 
steal. It seems that this sign must be some mental event in Jane’s brain such as the 
formation of an intention not to steal. Therefore,  at some point in time prior to her 
theft, Jane did have an alternative possibility open to her. She could have formed the 
                                                
51  Harry Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’ (1969) 66 Journal of 
Philosophy, 829. 
52 In this example it is being assumed for the sake of the argument that, in the normal course of events 
(i.e. when neuroscientists are not interfering with Jane’s actions) she is retributively responsible for 
her actions, although, as noted above, there are difficulties with the notion of retributive responsibility 
itself and how it could be reconciled with indeterminism. 
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intention to refrain from stealing. It is plausible to say that Jane is blameworthy 
because she did not form this intention. 53 The thought-experiment is presented in 
diagrammatic form on the next page. (The arrow indicates temporal succession i.e. 





Actual sequence of events:  
Jane forms an intention to steal               Jane steals  
Counterfactual sequence of events: 
Jane forms an intention not to steal                       scientist intervenes         Jane 
steals54 
  
John Martin Fischer, attempts to refute PAP by producing a modified version of 
Frankfurt’s thought-experiment.55 In Fischer’s version, the neuroscientist knows that 
Jane will only form an intention to steal if she blushes beforehand. Jane’s failure to 
blush by a certain time is the sign which would trigger the neuroscientist’s 
intervention. However, in the actual sequence Jane blushes, the neuroscientist does 
not intervene and Jane forms an intention to steal which she then carries out. Fischer 
then concludes that it is plausible to hold Jane morally responsible in the retributive 
sense 56  even though the neuroscientist ensured that she could not have done 
                                                
53 Ted Honderich, How Free Are You?, p117 
54 It is implied that, in the actual sequence, after she forms the intention to steal, that intention persists 
throughout her action. 
55 John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (1994), pp131-159. 
56 In this thesis it will be assumed that the sense of moral responsibility that Fischer is working with is 
retributive moral responsibility. He quotes Galen Strawson’s conception of responsibility  - 
“ultimately, truly and without qualification responsible and deserving of praise or blame or 
punishment or reward”- and comments, “I find it easier…simply to employ the term , ‘morally 
responsible’, where we keep it in mind that this involves genuine, robust moral responsibility (and not 
a revised or watered down version..).” Fischer, “The Cards that are Dealt You”(2006) 10 The Journal 
of Ethics 107, at p 111. 
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otherwise and could not have formed an intention to do otherwise. (We are also 
meant to assume that Jane was not in control of whether or not she blushed.) 
Fischer’s thought-experiment is represented in diagrammatic form below. 
 
Actual Sequence of events: 
Blush   Jane forms an intention to steal   Jane 
steals  
Counterfactual sequence of events: 
Absence of blush    scientist intervenes   Jane 
steals 
 
Fischer’s example is flawed for the following reason. The blush which occurs in the 
actual sequence, indicating to the neuroscientist that his intervention is unnecessary, 
must causally determine Jane’s decision to steal (or be associated with some other 
factor that causally determines her decision to steal). Otherwise, it would still be 
possible for Jane to form an intention not to steal, even after the blush. Yet, if Jane’s 
action in the actual sequence is determined, then the thought-experiment is question-
begging. One of the questions at issue in the debate over retributive responsibility is 
whether retributive responsibility and determinism are compatible. A person who is 
not already persuaded that they are compatible will not have the intuition Fischer 
wants us to have, i.e. such a person will not find it plausible that, given the actual 
sequence of events (in which Jane’s actions are determined), Jane is morally 
responsible in the retributive sense.57  
 
In response, Fischer argues that his thought-experiment can still show that alternative 
possibilities are unnecessary for retributive responsibility, even though some readers 
                                                
57 Ginet makes the objection that such modified Frankfurt cases beg the question. See,  “In Defence of 
Alternative Possibilities”. 
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may not have the intuition that Jane is responsible in the actual sequence.58 
According to Fischer, the thought-experiment defeats PAP as long as readers have 
the following intuition: If there is some factor in this thought-experiment that rules 
out retributive responsibility, that factor cannot merely be the absence of alternative 
possibilities.  
 
Fischer, argues that if the thought-experiment is analysed correctly, the above 
intuition can be elicited. Fischer claims that there are two factors which make it 
inevitable that Jane will steal and that these factors can be analysed separately. One 
factor is causal determinism in the actual sequence of events. The other factor is the 
counterfactual intervener. If one focuses only on the counterfactual intervener, one 
has the intuition that his potential intervention is irrelevant to whether Jane is 
morally responsible in the retributive sense. Yet, the counterfactual intervener is one 
factor that rules out alternative possibilities. Therefore, Fischer argues, if  some 
people have the intuition that determinism in the actual sequence means Jane is not 
responsible in the retributive sense, their intuition cannot be based solely on the fact 
that determinism rules out alternative possibilities. 59 
 
However, Fisher’s way of defending his thought-experiment is questionable. It is 
possible to challenge his claim that the counterfactual intervener is one of the factors 
which removes alternative possibilities. The intuitive force of the Frankfurt example 
depends on the counterfactual intervener actually removing the ability to do 
otherwise. But, given that the blush occurs (indicating that Jane’s action is 
determined), there is no ability to do otherwise and hence no ability for the 
intervener to remove. There is only the potential for the intervener to remove 
alternative possibilities if, counterfactually, the blush does not occur. The only 
                                                
58 John Martin Fischer, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (2006), pp199-200. 
59 Ibid. 
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feature of the thought-experiment that was meant to be counterfactual was the 
intervention, not the removal of alternative possibilities by the intervener. For the 
thought-experiment to prove its point Jane’s alternative must actually be removed by 
the intervener. Otherwise, our intuition that the counterfactual intervener is irrelevant 
could be explained by the fact that he does not actually exclude alternative 
possibilities, rather than it being explained by the irrelevance of alternative 
possibilities.60 
 
Even if Fischer could modify his thought experiment yet again in response to these 
criticisms it is doubtful whether thought experiments of this kind can generate 
intuitions powerful enough to outweigh the intuitive force of PAP. In their most 
heavily defended versions these Frankfurt-style cases become so convoluted that 
they baffle our intuitions. In their simpler forms, thought-experiments designed to 
counter PAP do not succeed in excluding alternative possibilities, are question-
begging, or just amount to a slightly more colourful way of asserting that PAP is 
irrelevant, which cannot hope to convince those who are do not already lean towards 
the view that PAP is irrelevant to retributive responsibility.61 
 
Revising PAP 
Another approach a retributivist could adopt, in order to defend the thesis that 
retributive responsibility is compatible with determinism, does not involve denying 
the relevance of a person’s ability to do otherwise. Instead, on this approach, the 
retributivist claims that the phrase “could have done otherwise” should be given a 
particular meaning – a meaning which is compatible with determinism. G.E. Moore 
argued that when we say a person “could have done otherwise” we mean that she 
                                                
60  A related objection to Fischer’s thought experiment is discussed in Pereboom, “Reasons-
Responsiveness”. 
61 This kind of objection to Frankfurt-style cases is made by David Copp, “Defending the Principle of 
Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility” (1997) 31 Nous 441. 
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could have done otherwise if she had chosen otherwise. 62 If this analysis were 
correct, it would follow that a person could have done otherwise even if her choice to 
do what she did were causally necessitated. 
 
Writers such as C.A. Campbell have persuasively criticised this view. Campbell 
gives an example where one could meaningfully and reasonably ask whether a 
person could have done otherwise, but where the meaning of that question could not 
be given in terms of Moore’s analysis: 
 
“Take lying, for example. Only in some very abnormal situation could it occur to one 
to doubt whether A, whose power of speech was evinced by his telling a lie, was in a 
position to tell what he took to be the truth if he had chosen. Of course he was. Yet it 
still makes good sense for one’s moral thinking to ask whether A, when lying, ‘could 
have acted otherwise’….It seems apparent, therefore, that in this class of cases at any 
rate one does not mean by ‘A could have done otherwise’, ‘ A could have acted 
otherwise if  he had so chosen’.”63 
 
Michael McKenna discusses another example. 64  Imagine that Danielle is 
psychologically incapable of wanting to touch a blonde-haired dog. Unaware of her 
condition, her father shows her two Labrador puppies on her birthday – one black 
and one blonde. He asks her to pick up the one that she wants to keep. She picks up 
the black lab. Now, Moore’s account implies that she could have picked up the 
blonde dog instead, because she would have done this if she had wanted to. But, this 
seems wrong, because her psychological condition made her incapable of wanting to 
touch the blonde dog. 
                                                
62 G.E. Moore, Ethics (1912). 
63 C.A. Campbell, “Is Free Will a Pseudo-Problem”, Free Will and Determinism, in Bernard Berofsky 
(ed), Free Will and Determinism (1966), p112.  
64Michael McKenna, ‘Compatibilism’ in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2009), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatilism/. (Henceforth: McKenna, ‘Compatibilism’). 
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Moore himself recognised that it is often legitimate to ask not only whether a person 
could have acted otherwise if she had chosen, but, further, whether that person could 
have chosen differently. In connection with the latter point, he contended that when 
we ask whether a person could have chosen differently, we are simply asking 
whether she would have chosen differently if she had made a different prior choice. 
However, Bernard Berofsky points out that “the latter strategy…falls prey to an 
infinite regress argument…[for] it is possible to raise the question ‘But could the 
person have chosen differently?’ at any level.”65 
 
In recent years, a number of theorists (sometimes called ‘the new dispositionalists’66) 
have attempted to produce more sophisticated compatibilist accounts of the capacity 
to do otherwise.67 For instance, consider the following definition of ‘capacity’: An 
individual has a capacity to perform an action, if she possesses certain intrinsic 
properties (including properties of her brain) which would be (non-deviantly) 
causally operative in her performing the action if she chose (tried, decided or 
intended) to exercise this capacity and if the circumstances were favourable to the 
exercise of this capacity.68  
 
Like Moore’s account, this is a conditional analysis of capacity. It defines capacity in 
terms of what would happen if certain conditions obtained. It states that the ability to 
                                                
65 Bernard Berofsky, “Ifs, Cans and Free Will: The Issues”, in Kane (ed), The Oxford Handbook on 
Free Will (2002), 181, at p182. 
66  This term is used by, e.g. Michael McKenna, ‘Compatibilism’; and by Randolph Clarke, 
‘Dispositions, Abilities to Act and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism’ (2008) 118 Mind 323-351. 
(Henceforth: Clarke, ‘Dispositions’).  
67 New dispositionalist accounts include: Michael Smith, ‘Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish 
Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion’, in Stroud S and Tappolet C (eds), Weakness of Will and 
Practical Irrationality (OUP, New York 2003) 17; Michael Fara, Masked Abilities and Compatibilism 
(2008) 117 Mind, 843; Kadri Vihvelin, ‘Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account’ (2004) 32 
Philosophical Topics 427. I will refer to this last article as: Vihvelin ‘Free Will Demystified’. 
68The account of capacity in the text is based on the account given in Vihvelin ‘Free Will 
Demystified’. I have added the qualification that ‘the circumstances must be favourable’ in an attempt 
to take into account an objection raised in Clark, ‘Dispositions’. 
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do otherwise is a matter of having certain dispositions to act under certain 
circumstances. The new dispositionalism improves on Moore’s account because it 
attends to the causal base or underlying structure of the agent’s dispositions. 
Consider Danielle’s psychological condition again. New dispositionalists could 
explain her inability to do otherwise than choose the black lab by pointing out that 
she lacks the intrinsic causal brain properties necessary to perform the action of 
picking up the blonde dog.69 
 
However, new dispositionalist accounts of capacity do have some very 
counterintuitive implications. For instance, they seem to prove too much when 
applied to agents like Jane in Frankfurt-style cases (discussed above). I argued that, 
intuitively, Jane could have tried to behave differently, or could have formed 
different intentions from the ones she in fact formed. However, according to the new 
dispositionalists, Jane could actually have behaved differently to how the 
neuroscientist wished her to behave. In the actual scenario, Jane’s brain still 
possesses the intrinsic properties that would be causally operative in her action of 
walking past John’s bicycle, without touching it if she wanted to act in that way, and 
if the evil neuroscientist were not present. That, according to the new 
dispositionalists, shows that she can, in the actual scenario, walk by and ignore the 
bicycle. But given that the neuroscientist is present and will definitely intervene and 
ensure that she takes the bicycle, if he senses that she might wish to refrain, it seems 
odd to think that she still has the ability to leave the bicycle alone.70 
 
However, there is an even more serious problem with new dispositionalism. Whether 
or not one’s intrinsic properties will be causally operative in performing an action on 
a particular occasion depends on whether one wanted or intended to perform that 
                                                
69 McKenna, ‘Compatibilism’, section 5.1.5. 
70 See McKenna, ‘Compatibilism’, section 5.1.5. 
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action on that occasion. However, if determinism is true, the fact that one has or 
lacks that desire or intention on that occasion is the inevitable result of factors 
beyond one’s control. Given the actual absence of such a desire or intention, it is 
impossible for the action to take place on that occasion. At most, the new 
dispositionalists succeed in describing what it means to have a general capacity to do 
something, e.g. the capacity to swim. They do not provide a convincing account of 
what it means to be able to exercise a capacity on a particular occasion.71 But the 
retributive justification for punishing the wrong-doer for her specific wrongful 
action, is based on the idea that she could have refrained from that action on the 
occasion.  
 
To summarise the argument that this chapter has presented so far: The principle that 
a person is not retributively responsible for a wrongful action unless she has the 
ability to do otherwise (PAP) has powerful intuitive force. Thought-experiments that 
are designed to refute this principle are unsuccessful and revised versions of PAP are 
inadequate. If determinism is true, no-one has the ability to do otherwise than they 
do. Therefore, if true, determinism would seriously undermine the retributive 
justification of punishment. Not only would determinism exclude alternative 
possibilities, but it also entails that the agent is not the ultimate source of her action. 
In the next section, it will be argued that this provides a further reason for thinking 
that retributive responsibility and determinism are incompatible. 
 
Source Incompatibilism 
Theorists like Frankfurt, and Victor Tadros invite us to focus on the desires that 
actually motivated the agent and to hold her responsible on that basis. In response to 
this approach, it is submitted that an agent’s desires/values cannot provide an 
                                                
71 See Clark, ‘Dispositions’, pp338-339. 
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adequate basis for retributive responsibility unless the agent is the ultimate source of 
those values/desires.72 If determinism is true, then, ultimately, factors beyond the 
agent’s control fully account for her having the values/desires that she has. This 
“source argument” provides a further reason for holding that determinism and 
retributive moral responsibility are incompatible. The first part of this section on 
source incompatibilism will demonstrate the intuitive plausibility of the source 
argument. In the second part of this section, it will be argued that the fact that an 
agent whose actions are determined is not the ultimate source of her values, desires 
and choices means that, in an important sense, these values, desires and choices are 
products of luck and things for which she cannot be held retributively responsible.  
A Manipulation  Case 
Like Frankfurt, Tadros argues that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to 
responsibility.73 Tadros argues that, if an agent acts from a desire, she can be held 
responsible for her action as long as her desire to perform the action reflects on her  
qua agent. According to Tadros, in order for a desire to reflect on the agent qua 
agent, it must be accepted by her in the light of her value system. Tadros claims that 
it is not reasonable to ask whether this value system  reflects on the agent, because a 
value system is constitutive of agency.  
 
It is submitted that a retributivist could not rely on this kind of account. Imagine the 
following scenario: An artificial intelligence engineer of the future builds a 
conscious robot, called Professor Plum, with human-like powers of deliberation and 
action.  The engineer programs this robot with a warped value system. Professor 
Plum perpetrates wrongful acts which he accepts in the light of his value system and 
                                                
72 Writers who accept the ‘source argument’ include Pereboom, Living without Free Will (2001); Saul 
Smilansky, “Free Will, Fundamental Dualism and the Centrality of Illusion” in Kane (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of Free Will (2002) 489. 
73 Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (2005), pp31-43, pp69-70. 
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which would therefore (according to Tadros) reflect on him qua agent. Given the full 
explanation of Professor Plum’s behaviour, it seems highly counter-intuitive to 
suppose that it would be intrinsically good to inflict suffering on him only because of 
the nature of his actions (leaving aside consequentialist considerations). Yet, it is 
hard to see any difference between Professor Plum and an ordinary person (who is 
subject to causal determinism), which could exempt the robot from retributive 
responsibility, but would justify holding the ordinary person morally responsible in 
the retributive sense for her wrongful actions.74 
 
It could be pointed out that, unlike ordinary people, the robot was programmed by a 
rational agent - the artificial intelligence engineer. It could be stipulated that, if a 
rational agent intentionally determines someone else’s actions, the former agent is 
morally responsible for those actions, not the latter. In the normal case, it could be 
argued, responsibility lies with the rational agent who actually performs the action, 
as there is no other agent in the causal chain who could take the blame. But this 
would be an ad hoc manoevre. The example could easily be modified in response to 
this criticism. We could suppose that Professor Plum’s creator is mad and so is not 
morally responsible, or that she created the Professor Plum by accident. It would still 
be counterintuitive to hold the robot morally responsible in the retributive sense. 
 
Fischer responds to a similar thought-experiment by saying that the robot is indeed 
morally responsible, but is not blameworthy.75 However, this kind of argument 
cannot help the defender of retributive responsibility. This is because the statement 
that X  is morally responsible in the retributive sense for performing a wrongful 
action entails that X is blameworthy for it. As Pereboom puts it:  
                                                
74 This is based on Derk Pereboom’s ‘Professor Plum’ thought-experiment in Living Without Free 
Will (2001), pp110-125.  
75 John Martin Fischer, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (2006), pp230-234. 
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‘…for an agent to be morally responsible for an action in the 
sense at issue is for it to belong to him in such a way that he 
would deserve blame [or punishment] if he understood that it 
was morally wrong, and he would deserve credit or perhaps 
praise if he understood that it was morally exemplary, 
supposing that this desert is basic in the sense that the agent 
would deserve the [blame/punishment] or credit just because 
he has performed the action (given understanding of its moral 
status), and not by virtue of consequentialist considerations.’76 
 
Fischer's response is especially puzzling as, in other passages of his work, he seems 
to assume that an agent who is morally responsible for a wrongful action is also 
blameworthy for it.77 He does not give another example, apart from the case of the 
robot, where an agent is morally responsible for a wrongful action and yet is not 
blameworthy for it and he does not say precisely which features of the robot's 
situation should exempt him from blame/punishment. (In the remainder of this thesis 
it will be assumed that Fischer's main view is that an agent who commits a wrongful 
action is also blameworthy for it and that Fischer's position on the robot case is an 
aberration.)78 
 
The Problem of ‘Ultimate Luck’ 
Some retributivists might be willing to embrace the conclusion that it is intrinsically 
good to blame and punish the robot. Such retributivists might demand that the 
intuition that the robot is not responsible in the retributive sense stands in need of 
further justification. An answer to this objection is that the robot had the misfortune 
to be programmed with a warped value system, by an evil scientist. If he had been 
lucky enough to have been programmed with a virtuous value-system, by a good 
                                                
76 Pereboom, “Reasons-Responsiveness”, p210. 
77 E.g., John Martin Fischer, “The Cards that are Dealt You”(2006) 10 The Journal of Ethics 107 
78 For further discussion of Fischer’s response to the robot case, see Derk Pereboom, “Reasons-
Responsiveness”. 
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scientist, then he would not have committed the wrongful acts. It seems arbitrary for 
a moral judgement about the intrinsic goodness of punishing a particular offender to 
be based on something which is wholly fortuitous and outwith the offender’s control. 
If determinism is true, ordinary human beings are relevantly analogous to the robot, 
because the fact that we have one value-system rather than another is also ultimately 
a matter of luck. If determinism is true, these arbitrarily given factors inevitably 
result in our behaviour, so that all our behaviour was “in the cards” before we were 
born.79 
 
Although Fischer accepts that luck plays this fundamental role in human behaviour, 
he denies that this is relevant to moral responsibility. He points out that innumerable 
conditions which are necessary for an agent’s behaviour are outwith the control of 
the agent and are therefore matters of luck. For example, it is necessary for the 
performance of any particular action that an asteroid does not hit earth, that the air 
remains breathable, that the agent is not struck by a bolt of lightning etc and the 
agent cannot control these things. Yet, Fischer argues, these facts are obviously 
completely irrelevant to the question of moral responsibility. He then asks: If it does 
not matter to us that there are an infinite number of necessary conditions for our 
behaviour that are wholly outwith our control, why should it matter that there is a set 
of sufficient conditions for our behaviour which is wholly outwith our control? He 
concludes:  “Our behaviour may well be ‘in the cards’ in the sense that we simply 
have to play the cards that are dealt us… Yet we can still be responsible for playing 
the cards that are dealt us, even if we did not manufacture the cards, write the rules 
of the game and so forth.”80 
 
                                                
79 Derk Pereboom, Living without Free Will, (2001) p6. 




In reply, it should be acknowledged that the agent does not need to be in control of 
all the conditions which are necessary for the performance of an action in order for 
her to be morally responsible for that action; but it does not follow from this that the 
agent does not need to be in control of any of these conditions. The agent does not 
need to be in control of factors which merely enable the performance of her action, 
e.g. the presence of breathable air. After all, such factors enable the performance of a 
whole range of actions. However, the act of will that brings about the particular 
action at issue seems to be qualitatively different from background conditions such 
as the presence of breathable air. If the agent was not ultimately in control of this act 
of will (because it was causally determined by factors outwith her control), it seems 
unjustifiable to hold her retributively responsible for the action which is brought 
about by the act of will. To come back to the card-playing analogy, the fact that the 
agent did not manufacture the cards is indeed irrelevant to whether she is morally 
responsible for the way she plays them. Yet, it still seems reasonable to maintain that 
she must have been be ultimately in control of the moves she made before she can be 
held retributively responsible for these. 
 
To summarise: for the retributivist, punishment is justified purely because of the 
nature of the agent’s deed and not even partly because of factors outside the agent 
(such as the need to protect society). This kind of ultimate responsibility seems to 
require that the agent had ultimate control of the action. The retributivist focuses 
narrowly on the corrupt values that motivated the action (or on the wrongful choice 
of that action) and demands that the agent must “pay” for this. But if these values (or 
this choice) were determined by factors outwith the agent’s control, the retributivist 
is basically demanding that the agent “pays” for her bad luck.81 
 
                                                
81 See Saul Smilansky, “Compatibilism: The Argument from Shallowness”, (2003) 115 Philosophical 
Studies 257, at 268 
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‘Owning’ Actions: A Reply to the Manipulation 
Challenge 
I will now attempt to rebut an influential compatibilist response to examples like the 
manipulation case discussed above. According to this compatibilist line of argument, 
manipulated beings appear to lack free will because they do not truly ‘own’ their 
actions in the way that ordinary human beings do.  
 
Before discussing this issue further, it is important to note that examples similar to 
the manipulation thought-experiment can be found outside of science-fiction. There 
are real-life cases where people’s behaviour seems clearly to be caused by factors 
outwith their control, even though they are not ‘insane’ in the traditional sense. Such 
individuals seem to be unfit candidates for retributive responsibility and punishment.  
For instance, brain dysfunction due to head injury or disease can radically alter an 
individual’s character traits and motivations.82   
 
Or consider the following case:83 During the year two thousand, a forty year old 
school teacher from Virginia appeared to undergo a disturbing personality change. 
He began to engage in highly inappropriate sexual behaviour, culminating in making 
advances towards his twelve year old step daughter. He was convicted of child 
molestation. Given that this was his first offence he was sentenced to a diversion 
programme. He failed this programme because he repeatedly propositioned staff and 
                                                
82 See e.g., C Grady, ‘Neuroimaging and Activation of the Frontal Lobes’ in B Miller and J 
Cummings (eds), The Human Frontal Lobes: Functions and Disorders (The Guilford Press, London 
1999), discussing the famous case of Phineas Gage. Frontal lobe damage can also be caused by 
vascular disease, see, e.g., H Chui and L Willis, ‘Vascular Diseases of the Frontal Lobes’ in Miller 
and Cummings (above). Antonio Damasio has done extensive work on the personality changes that 
can be caused by frontal lobe damage. See, e.g., A Damasio, Descarte’s Error: Emotion, Reason and 
the Human Brain (Putnam, New York 1994) 
83 The case was reported in J Burns et al, ‘Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with Pedophilia Symptom and 
Constructional Apraxia Sign’ 60 (2003) Archives of Neurology 437. For discussion of this case by 
legal commentators see, e.g.,  H Greely, ‘Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look at 
the Field’ 42 (2009) Akron Law Review 687; J Seiden, ‘The Criminal Brain: Frontal Lobe 
Dysfunction Evidence in Capital Proceedings’ 16 (2004) Capital Defense Journal  395. 
 54 
other patients at the rehabilitation centre. He was then admitted to hospital after 
complaining of severe headaches. It was discovered that he had a brain tumour the 
size of an egg. It seems that the tumour was interfering with the functioning of his 
frontal lobes – an area of the brain associated with regulating socially appropriate 
behaviour. The tumour was removed and his deviant behaviour ceased. A year later, 
however, his headaches returned and he began once again to engage in inappropriate 
behaviour. The tumour had re-grown. As before, the tumour was removed and the 
deviant behaviour ceased. His doctors concluded that the tumour both caused his 
deviant sexual inclinations and caused his failure to refrain from acting on those 
inclinations. 
 
 Precisely how the tumour caused his failure to resist his impulses is still somewhat 
unclear. It seems it did not do so by altering his understanding of what he was doing 
or his knowledge of the wrongfulness of his conduct. Indeed he told doctors that he 
was aware that his actions were both illegal and immoral and he went to considerable 
lengths to try to conceal some of his unlawful behaviour. The neurologists who 
examined him concluded that the brain tumour made him incapable of resisting his 
urges.84 However, it is far from clear that the impulses of all people with frontal lobe 
dysfunction are strictly speaking irresistible, in the sense that there is no possible 
incentive that would induce the individual to resist them. However, damage to the 
brain might determine which incentives an individual will act upon. It is certainly 
possible to imagine a case where all the psychological states that are relevant to 
bringing about the agent’s action arise from a source (such as a brain tumour) that is 
outwith the agent’s control – a source which is not a creation of the individual’s 
agency, but which is ‘alien’ to her. Provided that these alien motivations cause the 
agent’s behaviour in a deterministic fashion, i.e. they render it inevitable that the 
                                                
84 J Burns et al, ibid, p440. 
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agent behaves as she does, given the situation she is in, then it seems unfair to hold 
her retributively responsible for her behaviour. This presents a challenge to 
compatibilists. Either they must insist (counterintuitively) that such agents deserve 
retributive punishment, or alternatively they must point to some relevant difference 
between behaviour that is determined by ordinary factors (e.g. the agent’s genes and 
environment) and determination by the kind of alien source considered above. 
 
John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza argue that motivations arising from sources 
such as brain tumours do not belong to the agent because the agent has not made 
them her own.  Their  theory of responsibility has had a huge influence on the current 
free will literature.85  According to Fischer and Ravizza, there are two prerequisites 
for retributive responsibility. The first prerequisite states that a person’s action must 
result from a ‘reasons-responsive mechanism’. The second prerequisite states that the 
agent must ‘own’ the relevant mechanisms. On Fischer and Ravizza’s account, the 
particular mechanism (or thought/brain processes) that plays a role in producing any 
particular action need only be moderately responsive to reasons, in order for the 
agent to be held responsible for that specific action. There are two criteria for 
moderate reasons-responsiveness – moderate receptivity and weak reactivity. 
Moderate receptivity to reason does not require that an agent recognises all the 
reasons that exist for and against a particular action. It only requires that the agent 
recognises a pattern of reasons that is intuitively rational. The agent must also rank 
the relative strength of different reasons in an objectively rational way, given her 
value system and preferences. For instance if the agent considers a reward of £100 to 
be a sufficient incentive for performing a particular action then, intuitively, if she is 
rational she will also recognise that rewards of £200 and £300 are also sufficient 
incentives for performing that action. The agent must recognise the existence of 
                                                
85 Fischer and Ravizza, note 2 (above). 
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some moral reasons – the agent cannot be a psychopath. Weak reactivity to reason 
means that there is at least one possible incentive which, if it were available to the 
agent, would cause the agent’s mechanism to react differently from the way in which 
the mechanism actually reacts. Fischer and Ravizza include the weak reactivity 
requirement to ensure that agents who suffer from irresistible impulses are not held 
responsible. If an impulse is truly irresistible, they claim, there will be no possible 
incentive that would induce the agent to act differently. They do not require that the 
agent reacts to every reason that she recognises as a sufficient reason for action, 
because they do not wish weak willed agents to be excused. Weak willed agents may 
be able to recognise a large number of reasons for action, but fail to act on them due 
to weakness of will. (Of course, it might be wondered why Fischer and Ravizza 
stipulate that the fact that a mechanism reacts to one reason for acting differently is 
sufficient for responsibility. Why not two, or three, or more? This is an area of their 
theory that has provoked much debate.) 
 
If an agent fulfils this first requirement then, according to Fischer and Ravizza, her 
action is not the product of an irresistible impulse. The problem, however, is that a 
reasons-responsive mechanism could have arisen from a disease process or could 
have been implanted by a manipulator (the problem of ‘alien mechanisms’).86 In 
response to this problem, Fischer and Ravizza developed their second prerequisite 
for responsibility - the agent must take responsibility for her mechanisms.87 Taking 
responsibility, they claim, involves the agent adopting a certain subjective stance 
toward her own conduct. The agent must, they argue, view herself as an appropriate 
target for the reactive attitudes and must recognise that her actions have causal 
effects on the world. They claim that agents typically come to adopt this view of 
                                                
86 The terminology of ‘alien mechanisms’ is drawn from: M McKenna, ‘Assessing Reasons - 
Responsive Compatibilism’ 8 (1) (2000) Internatonal Journal of Philosophical Studies 89. 
87 Ibid, chapters 7 and 8. 
 57 
themselves as they progress from childhood to adulthood. According to Fischer and 
Ravizza, coming to view one’s actions in this way during this developmental stage 
makes one’s subsequent motivations (and the actions that flow from them) one’s 
own. However, (as discussed in detail below) they argue that agents do not make 
actions that flow from alien mechanisms their own. 
 
Fischer and Ravizza claim that there are independent reasons for adopting their 
‘taking responsibility requirement’, quite apart from its (supposed) advantages in 
dealing with the alien mechanisms problem. They claim that it captures important 
intuitions about the fundamental nature of responsibility. They write:  
 
 ‘A theory of moral responsibility is supposed to give 
expression to (and more concrete content to) our inchoate, 
intuitive conceptions of ourselves as active and in control; and 
it is highly plausible to think that our having a certain sort of 
view of ourselves is required in order for us to be active and in 
control.’88 
 
They say that a person who fails to ‘take responsibility’ (in their sense of the term) is 
like a sailor on a boat with no rudder, simply tossed in different directions by the 
changing winds. 89 
 
This section will argue that Fischer and Ravizza’s theory fails to provide sufficient 
conditions for retributive responsibility and should be rejected. Firstly, any intuitive 
appeal their idea of ‘taking responsibility’ has as a precondition for being responsible 
is lost when they try to refine it in order to deal with the alien mechanism challenge. 
Secondly, their theory when taken to its logical conclusion produces absurd results. 
Thirdly, even if their counterintuitive interpretation of ‘taking responsibility’ were 
accepted it would not be able to deal with all cases of alien mechanisms. Finally, 
                                                
88 Ibid, p223 
89 Ibid, chapter 8. 
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they fail to point to a relevant difference between actions which are determined by 
ordinary factors (e.g. our genes and environment) and actions that arise from sources 
such as brain tumours or manipulation. 
 
What Does an Agent Take Responsibility For? 
Fischer and Ravizza’s first task is to explain what the agent takes responsibility for. 
They claim that agents only take responsibility for behaviour that comes about in a 
certain way – or, in their terminology, behaviour that arises from a certain kind of 
‘mechanism’.  For instance, an epileptic may take responsibility for behaviour that 
results from his desires, beliefs and intentions etc. (his ordinary ‘mechanisms’ of 
practical reasoning) but not for behaviour produced by epileptic seizures.90 The agent 
himself need not consciously think about these matters in exactly these terms, but 
Fischer and Ravizza’s account (at this stage) captures something that seems to be 
implicit in ordinary thought – that when an agent ‘takes responsibility’, he is not 
‘accepting responsibility for all his actions whatever their source’.91 According to 
Fischer and Ravizza, when an agent, at a particular time, comes to take responsibility 
for behaviour that flows from a certain type of mechanism, he thereby takes 
responsibility for his future behaviour that results from the same kind of source. They 
write: 
 
‘Having taken responsibility for behaviour that issues from a 
kind of mechanism, it is almost as if the agent has some sort of 
“standing policy” with respect to that kind of mechanism. 
Thus when the agent subsequently acts from a mechanism of 
that kind, that mechanism is his own insofar as he has already 
taken responsibility for acting from that kind of mechanism.’92 
 
                                                
90 Ibid, p215. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid, p215. 
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The problem arises when Fischer and Ravizza try to explain what makes a 
mechanism belong to one ‘kind’ rather than another. They do not simply maintain 
that actions which flow from psychological states like ‘desires’, ’beliefs’ and 
‘intentions’ arise from one type of mechanism and actions that have nothing to do 
with such psychological states (such as epileptic seizures) belong in a different 
category. If they settled for this simple account then it would not help them to deal 
with the ‘alien mechanisms’ challenge. For instance, a neuroscientist could cause an 
agent to act in a certain way by implanting all the psychological states (desires, 
beliefs etc) that are sufficient to bring about the agent’s behaviour. However, Fischer 
and Ravizza would not want to say that the agent’s ‘standing policy’ of taking 
responsibility for his practical reasoning covers stretches of practical reasoning that 
were implanted by a neuroscientist. To meet this challenge, Fischer and Ravizza 
stipulate that when an agent takes responsibility for a mechanism underlying his 
action, he takes responsibility for the neurological details of that mechanism and the 
origins of those neurological details. Thus he does not take responsibility for 
subsequent acts that result from mechanisms with different neurological details (e.g. 
motivations that are entirely caused by brain tumours) or where the neurological 
details have a different causal history (e.g. they were implanted by a neuroscientist). 
They write: 
‘...in taking responsibility for this mechanism, we take responsibility for all its details 
(even if we are unaware of them): we take responsibility for the mechanism in its full 
reality. If causal determinism is true, our mechanisms of practical reasoning have 
always been deterministic; thus, in taking responsibility for ordinary practical 
reasoning, we take responsibility for its deterministic character (just as we take 
responsibility for its neural details.) We take responsibility for the entire iceberg, in 
virtue of seeing its tip. But in taking responsibility for ordinary practical reasoning, 
[the agent] does not thereby take responsibility for a different kind of mechanism – 
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one that involves direct stimulation of brain (or hypnosis, subliminal advertising, and 
so forth).’93 
Fischer and Ravizza’s interpretation of the notion of ‘taking responsibility’ certainly 
provides them with a response to the alien mechanisms challenge.  But it does so at a 
very high price. Their interpretation has become so far removed from normal uses of 
the phrase ‘taking responsibility’ that it is hard to think of any reason why we should 
adopt their interpretation – any reason, that is, apart from a desire to rescue their 
theory. It is highly counterintuitive to insist that ordinary agents typically ‘take 
responsibility’ for complex neurological mechanisms that most of them do not even 
know about. Indeed, many of these agents may take responsibility for their 
motivations on the basis of assumptions about the fundamental ‘reality’ of these 
mechanisms that (if determinism is true) are profoundly mistaken. For instance, 
many agents may assume that their motivations are not the inevitable product of 
factors wholly outwith their control. Are we to think that when an agent takes 
responsibility for her motivations partly in virtue of the assumption that they are not 
entirely determined by factors outwith her control, she thereby ‘takes responsibility’ 
for mechanisms that are entirely determined by factors outwith her control? This 
seems to stretch the ordinary concept of ‘taking responsibility’ implausibly far; and 
the further Fischer and Ravizza depart from this ordinary concept, the less they are 
entitled to rely on the original intuitive picture of ‘taking responsibility’ which made 
it appealing to adopt this aspect of their theory in the first place.  
 
Fischer and Ravizza might reply that although their interpretation of ‘taking 
responsibility’ is more technical than the ordinary way that notion is used, their 
account is still based on widespread intuitions, but just makes those intuitive ideas 
more ‘precise’. They write: ‘Of course, the non-philosopher would not characterize 
                                                
93 Ibid, p234. 
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his taking responsibility in quite [the way our theory characterizes it], but this 
theoretical characterization merely makes more precise the intuitive idea that one 
takes responsibility for actions that spring from certain sources (and not from 
others).’94 In response, there is a very big difference between making an everyday 
intuitive idea ‘more precise’ and simply contradicting it. Fischer and Ravizza’s 
account jars with the ordinary idea of taking responsibility.  Furthermore, if they are 
to modify the notion of taking responsibility in the way they propose, then they need 
to justify this modification, by pointing to some independent reason for it (besides 
the fact that it helps them to meet a certain objection from their critics). Otherwise, 
their modification seems ad hoc. 
 
As noted above, it is genuinely intuitive to think that agents take responsibility for 
behaviour that springs from certain sources and not from others; and it is not 
implausible to think that once an agent has come to take responsibility for some of 
his behaviour and the desires, beliefs etc that motivated it, his act of taking 
ownership also extends to relevantly similar motivations underlying his subsequent 
actions in such a way that those motivations also count as the agent’s own. But 
which similarities should count as relevant? Fischer and Ravizza stipulate that it is 
crucially relevant whether the agent’s psychological states have the same kind of 
neurological underpinnings. This is implausible. Consider the following example. An 
agent engages in some practical reasoning that feels subjectively exactly the same as 
deliberations that she engaged in previously (and for which she had previously taken 
responsibility). Her current deliberations were not the result of a mechanism 
implanted by a manipulator, nor were they caused by disease. However, it happens 
that this current stretch of practical reasoning involved totally different neural 
pathways from the pathways that were activated during her previous deliberations. 
                                                
94 Ibid, p215. 
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Fischer and Ravizza’s theory seems to commit them to the view that the agent’s act 
of taking responsibility for her earlier deliberations does not transfer to the later 
stretch of practical reasoning (in virtue of the difference in the underlying neural 
mechanisms). This seems arbitrary.  
 
In What Sense of ‘Responsibility’ Do Agents ‘Take Responsibility’? 
According to Fischer and Ravizza, taking responsibility has the following features –  
A: The agent must realise that her actions have a causal effect on the world. 
B: The agent must see herself as an appropriate target for the reactive attitudes. 
The first element of this account is clearly a necessary condition for taking 
responsibility (and for being responsible). Someone who genuinely cannot 
understand that her actions have practical consequences is so cut off from reality that 
she does not qualify as a moral agent. However, this element does not help Fischer 
and Ravizza deal with alien mechanism cases. An agent’s behaviour can still have 
causal effects on the world (of which the agent can be aware) even if that behaviour 
is due to an alien mechanism.  
 
Fischer and Ravizza rely on the second element of their account to deal with such 
cases. One problem with their approach stems from ambiguity surrounding the term 
‘responsibility’. Several theorists have argued that the term ‘responsibility’ can be 
used in retributive and non-retributive senses.95 To say that someone is responsible in 
the retributive sense for a wrongful action implies that she deserves to be 
blamed/punished for it regardless of the consequences. In contrast, there are non-
retributive (e.g. consequentialist) senses of responsibility. For instance, Derk 
Pereboom writes: 
                                                
95 E.g., T Honderich, On Determinism and Freedom (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2005); G 
Strawson, Freedom and Belief (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986); D Pereboom, Living without Free 
Will (CUP, Cambridge 2001). 
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‘...[T]here are [non-retributive] senses of ‘moral 
responsibility’. One might say that an agent is morally 
responsible when it is legitimate to demand of her that she 
explain how her decisions accord with morality...Making these 
demands of agents might be justified by its effectiveness in 
improving the agent morally—we humans are indeed 
susceptible to causal influence by challenge and counsel of 
this kind....[I]ncompatibilists would not find our being morally 
responsible in this sense to be even prima facie incompatible 
with determinism. The notion that incompatibilists do claim to 
be incompatible with determinism is rather the one defined in 
terms of basic desert [i.e. retributive responsibility].’96 
 
Fischer and Ravizza’s reference to the ‘reactive attitudes’ suggest that their notion of 
‘taking responsibility’ involves the agent seeing herself as an appropriate candidate 
for attributions of retributive responsibility. PF Strawson, who first developed a form 
of compatibilism based on the reactive attitudes, advanced his view partly in 
response to non-retributive, forward-looking accounts of responsibility and 
punishment. Strawson observed that ‘Some optimists about determinism point to the 
efficacy of the practices of punishment, and of moral condemnation and approval, in 
regulating behaviour in socially desirable ways.’ He condemned this approach for 
‘over-intellectualizing the facts’ in a manner characteristic of ‘a one-eyed 
utilitarianism’.97 He argued that our practices of responsibility and punishment are 
the expression of certain attitudes which themselves stand in need of no further 
justification. These attitudes seem to be essentially retributive. According to 
Strawson: 
 
‘Indignation and disapprobation, like resentment, tend to 
inhibit or at least to limit our goodwill towards the object of 
these attitudes, tend to promote an at least partial and 
                                                
96 D Pereboom, ‘Reasons-Responsiveness, Alternative Possibilities and Manipulation Arguments 
Against Compatibilism: Reflections on John Martin Fischer’s My Way’ (2006) 47 Philosophical 
Books 198, p14. 
 
97 P Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’ in G Watson (ed) Free Will (OUP, Oxford 2003), p73. 
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temporary withdrawal of goodwill; they do so in proportion as 
they are strong; and their strength is in general proportioned to 
what is felt to be the magnitude of the injury and the degree to 
which the agent’s will is identified with, or indifferent to, it.... 
The partial withdrawal of goodwill which these attitudes 
entail, the modification they entail of the general demand that 
another should, if possible, be spared suffering, is... the 
consequence of continuing to view [the wrongdoer] as a 
member of the moral community; only as one who has 
offended against its demands. So the preparedness to 
acquiesce in that infliction of suffering on the offender which 
is an essential part of punishment is all of a piece with this 
whole range of attitudes of which I have been speaking.’98  
 
Now, it may be that many people do view themselves as appropriate targets for the 
reactive attitudes (interpreted as essentially retributive). In other words, many people 
may think that if they were to commit a crime it would be appropriate for the rest of 
the moral community to react by expressing attitudes of indignation and resentment 
and by inflicting the suffering which such attitudes ‘entail’ must be inflicted. They 
may also consider it appropriate for the offender to experience the first-person 
reactive attitude of guilt, together with the willingness to suffer which that emotion 
supposedly entails. Many people may feel that the appropriateness of all this is not 
contingent on whether expressing these attitudes and inflicting such suffering is 
likely to produce any further good consequences. However, many other people do 
not seem to view matters in quite this way. Those who take a more forward-looking, 
non-retributive approach to the issues of responsibility and punishment apparently do 
not ‘take responsibility’ for their behaviour in the sense of viewing themselves as 
appropriate targets for the (retributive) reactive attitudes. Taking responsibility in 
this retributive sense seems to be, according to Fischer and Ravizza, a precondition 
for being responsible. But surely Fischer and Ravizza cannot allow agents to evade 
retributive responsibility merely because the agents are not themselves retributivists. 
                                                
98 Ibid, p90. 
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Fischer and Ravizza’s approach is flawed, because they fail to recognise, at this point 
in their argument, that there are different senses in which agents can see themselves 
as ‘responsible’. They simply assume that there is only one relevant sense of 
responsibility, that either an agent views herself as responsible, or she does not, and 
that very few agents will fail to view themselves as responsible. It is plausible, they 
claim, that the vast majority of agents regard themselves as responsible, because the 
consequences of failing to do so are dire. True, agents who view themselves as non-
responsible may escape being held responsible (at least if Fischer and Ravizza’s 
ideas were put into practice). But, Fischer and Ravizza claim, such agents would be 
locked up on the basis that the way in which they view themselves makes them 
dangerous to society.  They write: 
 
‘...there are strong incentives not to opt out of moral 
responsibility. Agents who genuinely fail to take responsibility 
– and thus view themselves as lacking control – are 
legitimately sequestered from society, and are deprived of the 
opportunity to participate in the moral community.’99 
 
Once we recognise that there are both retributive and non-retributive ways in which a 
person can view herself as responsible, it seems that Fischer and Ravizza face 
considerable difficulties. If they persist with the idea that a person must see herself as 
an appropriate target for the retributive reactive attitudes, then it can be objected that 
there may well be many people who do not view themselves in this way. Fischer and 
Ravizza cannot get round this problem by saying that such people should 
automatically be ‘sequestered’ from society. Otherwise a large number of 
philosophers (and some non-philosophers) with anti-retributive leanings would end 
up being sequestered!  
 
                                                
99 Fischer and Ravizza (fn2, above), P229. 
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Alfred Mele has raised a related point.100 He describes a hypothetical philosopher, 
Phil, who is a committed hard determinist. Mele correctly notes that Fischer and 
Ravizza’s theory implies that Phil is not responsible. Mele also notes that real-life 
hard incompatibilists (e.g. Derk Pereboom, Ted Honderich and Galen Strawson) will 
also, in virtue of their philosophical beliefs, be relieved from responsibility according 
to Fischer and Ravizza’s theory (assuming of course that these hard incompatibilists 
are not secretly compatibilists in their personal lives). My argument differs from 
Mele’s in two significant respects. Firstly, Mele’s critique seems to assume a unitary 
concept of responsibility and, accordingly, states that philosophers like Phil do not 
consider themselves to be responsible. In contrast, I argue that such philosophers 
may in fact view themselves as responsible in a non-retributive sense. Secondly, my 
argument is not restricted to the minority of philosophers who are firmly committed 
to hard determinism. Rather, it extends to all those individuals who reject retributive 
attitudes for whatever reason. My argument therefore has much wider application. In 
a reply to Mele, Fischer has suggested that Mele’s objection is not decisive because 
it only applies to a very small number of cases. It is harder to dismiss my argument 
in this way. Furthermore, Fischer’s response to Mele’s critique is itself dubious. 
Fischer writes: 
 
‘My general methodological disposition is to seek to capture 
the clear cases by appealing and intuitively natural principles, 
but to admit that these principles may well have jarring 
consequences in certain cases.... After all, the phenomena of 
moral responsibility are themselves messy around the edges, 
and it would be unreasonable to suppose that a largely 
successful and plausible approach would yield entirely 
comfortable results along all its perimeters.’101 
 
                                                
100 A Mele, ‘Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility’, 10 (2006) The Journal of Ethics 283; A 
Mele, ‘Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions’61 (2) (2000) Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 447. 
101 J  Fischer, ‘The Free Will Revolution (Continued)’ 10 (2006) The Journal of Ethics 315, p326. 
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Fischer raises a very important point here. Life is complicated and messy. We have 
good reason to be suspicious of any moral theory which claims that all these 
complications can be neatly resolved. Moral theories that attempt conclusively to 
‘tidy up’ all the difficult cases that have been worrying people for centuries risk 
discarding important aspects of our moral experience. However, it is submitted that 
theorists should try to avoid generating completely new areas of mess. Prior to the 
development of Fischer and Ravizza’s theory, people did not worry about whether 
hard incompatibilists like Galen Strawson should be completely relieved from 
responsibility (or, alternatively, sequestered to protect society) merely because of 
their philosophical views. People did not worry about this because it is obvious that 
the fact that someone subscribes to hard incompatibilism tells us nothing about 
whether that person is in fact responsible (or dangerous). A theory that implies the 
opposite has a serious flaw. It does not merely fail to yield ‘entirely comfortable’ 
results. It yields absurd results.  
 
Fischer and Ravizza might try to avoid these problems by revising their position. 
They might allow that viewing oneself as responsible in a non-retributive (e.g. 
consequentialist) sense will suffice for being responsible. However, this manoeuvre 
would be extremely paradoxical. For Fischer and Ravizza ultimately aim to show 
that the kind of responsibility which can provide a basis for retributivism is 
compatible with determinism. It would be very odd to stipulate that viewing oneself 
as responsible in a non-retributive sense is a necessary condition for being 
responsible in the retributive sense. This seems like a non sequitur.  
 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that one of the supposed merits of the notion 
of ‘taking responsibility’ was that it provided an answer to the ‘alien mechanisms’ 
challenge. Fischer and Ravizza claimed that agents do not take responsibility for 
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behaviour that is predetermined by ‘alien’ influences (e.g. hypnosis, brain 
manipulation etc). However, if they broadened their definition of ‘taking 
responsibility’ to cover consequentialist conceptions of responsibility, then certain 
agents with consequentialist leanings might judge themselves to be responsible even 
for behaviour that arose from alien mechanisms. This is because holding a wrong-
doer responsible may help to produce good consequences, even if the wrong-doer’s 
behaviour was due to an alien mechanism. Therefore, broadening the definition of 
‘taking responsibility’ would not allow Fischer and Ravizza to deal with the alien 
mechanisms challenge (even if it would help them to overcome some of the other 
objections mentioned above). The alien mechanisms challenge is one that Fischer 
and Ravizza need to deal with because it is highly counterintuitive to say that an 
agent is morally deserving of retributive punishment if the agent’s behaviour was 
entirely attributable to an alien mechanism; and Fischer and Ravizza wish ultimately 
to defend a retributive conception of moral desert. 
  
Taking Responsibility for Alien Mechanisms 
Imagine that the alien mechanism itself causes the agent to view himself as 
responsible (in the retributive sense) for actions that flow from that mechanism.  Has 
this agent satisfied Fischer and Ravizza’s requirements for being responsible 
(assuming that the alien mechanism is also reasons-responsive)?  Fischer and 
Ravizza maintain that he has not. This is because a further element of their account 
has not been fulfilled - the agent’s view of himself must, they maintain, be based ‘on 
his evidence in an appropriate way’.102 They assert that an agent whose view of 
himself is induced by the alien mechanism (e.g. it is caused by the brain tumour, or 
by hypnotic suggestion, or by a neuroscientist electrically stimulating his brain) does 
not form his beliefs in an ‘appropriate’ way. They state that ‘the relevant notion of 
                                                
102 Fischer and Ravizza (fn 2 above), P236. 
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appropriateness must remain unanalysed’.103 They tentatively suggest, however, that 
a belief is only formed in an appropriate way if it is produced by a mechanism that 
tracks truth. ‘This implies (among other things) that, holding fixed the actual 
mechanism of belief production, the agent would not believe P if P were false’. 104 
 
One problem with this approach is that it is question-begging. Fischer and Ravizza 
maintain that the vast majority of agents who view themselves as retributively 
responsible and whose behaviour is determined by ‘ordinary’ factors (and not by 
alien mechanisms) are indeed retributively responsible. According to Fischer and 
Ravizza, such agents are retributively responsible partly because their view of 
themselves is based in an appropriate way on the evidence. But this assumes that 
their view of themselves tracks truth – i.e. it assumes that agents can in fact be 
retributively responsible for determined behaviour. This is the very question at issue 
in the free will debate.105 
 
Another problem concerns an agent who believes (in a way not caused by the alien 
mechanism itself) that she would be retributively responsible even if her action is 
entirely determined by an alien mechanism. Imagine, for instance, that the agent is 
convinced by the arguments of Harry Frankfurt who holds precisely that position.106 
Fischer and Ravizza claim that such an agent might well be responsible on this basis. 
This seems highly counterintuitive. For it is plausible to think that this agent is 
simply mistaken about her responsibility status. 
 
                                                
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid, p237. 
105 Fischer and Ravizza briefly mention another possible option (which they do not elaborate on). The 
truth-tracking requirement might be watered down. An agent, they claim, might still form a belief in 
an appropriate way even if she would still hold that belief in certain situations in which the belief was 
false. In response, it may be possible to envisage an alien mechanism that generates beliefs in this 
manner. 
106 H Frankfurt, ‘Reply to John Martin Fischer,’ in S Buss and L Overton (eds), Contours of Agency: 
Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, (MIT Press, Massachusetts 2002). 
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What is Special about Alien Mechanisms? 
It is useful at this point to recall exactly what the alien mechanism challenge amounts 
to. The argument goes as follows: 
1) If the motivational states that bring about the agent’s wrongful behaviour arise 
from an intuitively ‘alien’ source (e.g. they have been implanted by a neuroscientist) 
then the agent does not deserve retributive punishment, provided that the implanted 
motivations cause the agent’s behaviour in a deterministic fashion, i.e. they render it 
inevitable that the agent behaves as she does. 
2) There is no relevant difference between behaviour that is determined by ordinary 
factors (e.g. the agent’s genes and environment) and determination by the kind of 
alien source considered above. 
3) Therefore, people whose wrongful behaviour is determined by ordinary factors do 
not deserve retributive punishment. 
 
Fischer and Ravizza maintain that people generally are responsible (in the retributive 
sense) for behaviour that is determined by ordinary factors. However, they think that 
there is something particularly troubling about behaviour that is determined by alien 
sources. One reason they give for this is that the agent is presumably unaware of the 
alien origins of her motivations.  For instance, they say:  
 
 ‘Given that [the agent] does not know about the manipulation 
of the scientist, and has not explicitly considered such 
manipulation, it is plausible to say that [the agent] has not 
taken responsibility for the kind of mechanism that actually 
issues in the action…’107 
 
However, it can be objected that people are also often unaware of (or have mistaken 
beliefs about) the causal origins of motivations that are determined by ordinary 
factors. Fischer and Ravizza seem to acknowledge this fact. As noted above, they 
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 71 
stipulate that an agent whose behaviour is determined in the ordinary way can be said 
to have taken responsibility for her motivations even if she is unaware of (or 
mistaken about) the origins (or the deterministic nature) of those motivations. This 
renders their theory strikingly asymmetrical. The requirements that must be satisfied 
before agents can be said to ‘take responsibility’ for their mechanisms differ 
dramatically depending on the source of those mechanisms. When it comes to 
determinism by ordinary factors, it is not necessary for the typical agent to know that 
his mechanisms are determined, or which factors determined them. In contrast, 
according to Fischer and Ravizza, an agent cannot take responsibility for 
mechanisms that have been, e.g., implanted by a neuroscientist unless the agent is 
aware of the source of those mechanisms. What could justify this asymmetry? 
 
Fischer and Ravizza appear to suggest that if an agent knows that her motivations 
have been implanted by a neuroscientist then the agent is in a position to refrain from 
doing what the neuroscientist wishes her to do, provided the implanted mechanism is 
reasons-responsive. (Of course, if the mechanism is not reasons-responsive then this 
case poses no difficulty for Fischer and Ravizza. This is because they argue that 
acting on a reasons-responsive mechanism is a necessary condition for responsibility. 
If the implanted mechanism is not reasons-responsive then there is clearly an 
important difference between the implanted mechanism and ordinary deterministic 
mechanisms, which can explain why agents can be held responsible for acting on the 
latter but not on the former.) They stress that ‘if the scientist’s manipulation of the 
brain induces a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, then this mechanism has 
the general capacity to resist the reasons for the agent’s actual behaviour’.108 Fischer 
and Ravizza’s suggestion is misleading. For one thing, it should be remembered that 
according to them a mechanism underlying an action is reasons-responsive as long as 
                                                
108 Ibid, p 239. 
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there is one possible incentive that would induce the agent to act differently. If that 
incentive is not actually present, then it is physically impossible for the agent to act 
differently. The neuroscientist can therefore ensure that the agent acts in one 
particular way despite having equipped the agent with a reasons-responsive 
mechanism. The neuroscientist can simply design the mechanism to respond 
differently to only one incentive (of the neuroscientist’s choosing) and then ensure 
that this incentive is not actually available to the agent.  The agent’s knowledge that 
she had been manipulated could only lead to the agent acting differently if the agent 
could draw on some psychological state(s) (e.g. a desire to act differently, or a belief 
that she should act differently) which had not been implanted. However, to suppose 
that the agent could draw on psychological mechanisms that had not been implanted 
would be to suppose that the neuroscientist had failed to implant to all the 
psychological states that are involved in the occurrence of the agent’s action. This 
simply does not address the alien mechanisms challenge, which states that the 
neuroscientist had succeeded in implanting all these states. 
 
Fischer and Ravizza suggest (but do not fully develop) two other possible grounds 
for differentiating determination by alien influences from determination by ordinary 
factors. The first suggestion is that the appearance of an alien mechanism always 
results in an abrupt, apparently inexplicable change in the agent’s motivations, 
whereas determination by ordinary factors does not involve this. This suggestion will 
be discussed in Chapter Seven.109 The second suggestion is that it is just a basic fact 
that certain types of cause of human behaviour (i.e. all of those that are intuitively 
‘alien’) are intrinsically troubling to most agents, whereas causation by one’s genes 
and environment is not. However, it is far from clear whether this empirical claim 
                                                
109 See section entitled: “1) Similarity with previous mental states.” 
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about ordinary people’s attitudes is accurate.110 Even if it were accurate, the question 
remains as to whether these attitudes have a rational basis – if they do not, it is not 
clear why they should play an important role in a compatibilist account of free will. 
 
What is Special about Philosophers? 
Finally, it is interesting to note one rather unusual feature of Fischer and Ravizza’s 
account. The conditions that must be satisfied before an agent can fairly be held 
responsible differ depending on whether or not the agent is ‘philosophically 
sophisticated’.111 On their account, an agent who has not ‘immersed himself in the 
debates about causal determinism, free will, and moral responsibility’ is considered 
to have ‘taken responsibility’ for the mechanisms underlying his actions whatever his 
beliefs about the nature or origins of those mechanisms. (As argued above, this 
considerably stretches the notion of ‘taking responsibility’.)112 In contrast, an agent 
who is familiar with the philosophical literature on the free will/determinism 
problem is treated differently. Such an agent has not taken responsibility (and hence 
is not responsible) for his mechanisms, unless he finds it ‘plausible’ that the 
(retributive) reactive attitudes are compatible with determinism and he is willing to 
put aside any ‘residual doubts’ about this for all practical purposes. (As noted above, 
Fischer and Ravizza seem mistakenly to assume that the only reasons why someone 
                                                
110 See, e.g., T Sommers, ‘Experimental Philosophy and Free Will’ (2010) 5 Philosophy 
Compass 199–212. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00273.x). 
111 Fischer and Ravizza (fn 2, above), p226. 
112 Imagine for instance that a person who is unfamiliar with the details of the academic free will 
debate nevertheless intuitively feels that a person is not responsible for behaviour that is the inevitable 
product of factors outwith her control. She assumes that her actions are not produced in this way. 
Someone might say that such views should be discounted when deciding whether the agent is 
responsible for behaviour that is in fact determined, because the agent is not sufficiently well-
informed about all the relevant philosophical arguments.  But it is quite another thing to insist that the 
agent herself takes responsibility for her deterministic mechanisms despite her (albeit ill-informed) 
views on the subject. If Fischer and Ravizza wish completely to ignore the agent’ s own views in this 
way, it raises the question of why they think that the fact that the agent herself adopts the subjective 
stance of ‘taking responsibility’ for her motivational mechanisms should be a precondition for being 
responsible in the first place. 
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might have doubts about the appropriateness of the reactive attitudes are to do with 
determinism.) They continue: 
 
‘But why should a reflective individual view himself in the 
way suggested? Why should such an individual deem himself 
a prima facie plausible candidate for the reactive attitudes, and 
be willing to put aside metaphysical worries? We believe that 
the considerations developed thus far in this book can move a 
reflective individual in precisely this direction.’113 
 
Now, Fischer and Ravizza’s work is undoubtedly extremely impressive. Even one of 
their most persistent critics has praised Fischer’s writings in the following terms:  
 
‘John Martin Fischer’s theory of moral responsibility is one of 
the great compatibilisms in the history of philosophy, standing 
alongside those of Aristotle, David Hume and Harry Frankfurt, 
for example, and of these it is arguably the most thoroughly 
developed.’114 
 
However, it would be somewhat premature to suggest that all philosophically 
informed individuals can be brought round to Fischer and Ravizza’s way of thinking. 
Indeed, Fischer and Ravizza acknowledge this. 
 
‘We concede that some individuals will not be convinced.... 
Such individuals will not deem themselves apt targets for the 
reactive attitudes, and thus they will not take responsibility for 
the kinds of mechanisms that lead to their behaviour. Thus, on 
our account, they will not be morally responsible for their 
behavior. But we do not take this to be a defect of our 
theory.’115 
 
                                                
113 Fischer and Ravizza (fn 2, above), p227. 
114 D Pereboom, ‘Reasons-Responsiveness, Alternative Possibilities and Manipulation Arguments 
Against Compatibilism: Reflections on John Martin Fischer’s My Way’ (2006) 47 Philosophical 
Books 198, p198. 
115 Fischer and Ravizza (fn 2, above), p228. 
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For the reasons stated earlier, it is submitted that a theory which relieves individuals 
of responsibility merely because they are not convinced by Fischer and Ravizza’s 
arguments for compatibilism has a significant defect.116 
 
Retributivism and ‘Our Moral Life’117 
One possible way of defending retributivism against the metaphysical objections 
raised in the last two chapters is by appealing to our “moral life” considered as a 
whole. Michael Moore believes that determinism and retributivism are compatible. 
He claims that the hypothesis that retributivism is “true” provides the best, most 
coherent explanation of the existence of many of our most powerfully felt (and 
“virtuous”) moral attitudes and that we should therefore accept the retributive 
justification of punishment.118 First, I will criticise Moore’s account (and a somewhat 
similar view advanced by PF Strawson). Next, I will criticise another related way of 
defending retributivism. This latter defence states that we should not reject 
retributivism because doing so would undermine vitally important moral attitudes 
and social practices, which would be disastrous. 
 
Moore’s Moral Life Argument 
Section A: The Coherentist Defence of the retributive principle 
Moore attempts to defend retributivism by appealing to “our moral experience”.119 
The moral experience he is referring to consists of emotional responses to the actions 
of ourselves and others (such as resentment, outrage and guilt) as well as more 
                                                
116 Furthermore, it should be noted that if an agent is not morally responsible for a crime, then 
according to retributivism, he should not be held criminally responsible. According to Fischer and 
Ravizza, philosophers who are convinced that compatibilism is false are not morally responsible. But 
it is hard to imagine any jurisdiction adopting a criminal defence specifically designed to cover a 
certain kind of philosopher. 
117 Moore, Placing Blame, p543. 
118 Ibid, chapters 2, 3, 4, 12. 
119 Ibid, p543. 
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cognitive responses (such as judging another to be blameworthy). Moore120 argues 
that most ordinary people have retributive responses when they think about (at least a 
certain class of) criminals. He cites horrific examples of violent attacks, rapes, and 
premeditated killings, arguing that most readers would feel so outraged by such 
crimes that they would desire the suffering of the perpetrators even if that suffering 
did not produce any good consequences. He concludes that we have very good 
grounds for believing retributivism to be true, because it forms ‘part of the most 
coherent [explanation] of our moral experience, considered as a whole.’121 
 
Moore acknowledges that sometimes retributive responses come into conflict with 
other reactions people have towards criminals. For example, if we are persuaded that 
a person’s criminal behaviour was caused by the deprivation and child abuse she 
suffered, then we may be moved to sympathy for her – a sympathy which can 
undermine our retributive impulses. According to Moore, however, a moral theory 
should aim to achieve maximum coherence among our intuitions.  Therefore, he 
argues that sympathetic responses towards disadvantaged criminals should simply be 
discarded as ‘moral hallucinations’ because they only comprise a very ‘small and 
isolated’ class of responses and they do not ‘fit’ with the rest of our moral 
experience.122 
 
Moore’s coherentist approach is open to criticism. It is possible to have a completely 
coherent set of false or wicked principles. Furthermore, as Thomas Clark argues, 
‘conflict between retributive feelings… and sympathetic feelings…may simply 
reflect a real moral conflict and to discount one side of the conflict in order to 
preserve theoretical consistency might well compromise theoretical accuracy.’ 123 
                                                
120 Henceforth ,when the name “Moore” is used it refers to Michael Moore, not G.E. Moore. 
121Michael Moore, Placing Blame, p542.  
122 Ibid, p543 
123 Thomas Clark, ‘Against Retribution’, Human Nature review, 2003, p 471. 
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Moore’s aversion to moral conflict might result in a distorting over-simplification of 
our moral life. 
 
Even if, as Moore suggests, our retributive responses are more numerous than our 
‘small and isolated’ class of sympathetic responses towards disadvantaged offenders, 
this is not in itself a sufficient reason for thinking that our retributive responses are 
more worth preserving or are more likely to be justified. If determinism is true, and 
if, as was argued in previous chapters, retributive judgements depend on principles 
(e.g. the principle of alternative possibilities) which are incompatible with 
determinism, then these retributive judgements cannot be justified. Furthermore, 
Moore’s claim about the internal coherence of his position is doubtful. Moore 
believes in both determinism and in retributivism, but if, as was argued in chapters 
three and four, these theories are incompatible, then taken together they do not form 
a coherent explanation of our moral life.  
 
Even if Moore is right in saying that our sympathetic responses to disadvantaged 
criminals form ‘a small and isolated’ class of responses, it is doubtful that the best 
explanation for this phenomenon is that our sympathetic responses are ‘moral 
hallucination[s]’. A better explanation is that we are usually wholly or largely 
ignorant of the causes of any particular criminal’s behaviour. Certainly we are not 
usually aware of anything approaching a causal circumstance (i.e. a sufficient, 
necessitating cause) capable of explaining such behaviour. Occasionally, people 
become aware of a significant part of an agent’s causal history (e.g. they may 
discover that the agent had a violent upbringing). Such people may be moved to 
adopt a kind of partial determinist position. Their retributive urges falter because 
they feel that, given the part of the agent’s causal history that they know about, the 
agent did not have much chance of behaving differently. However, on most 
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occasions, people probably do not think that there exist any causes which 
wholly/largely remove the agent’s ability to behave differently. It is for this reason 
that sympathetic responses to criminals are relatively few in number, which in no 
way suggests that such responses are hallucinatory. 
 
Moore claims that our retributive responses persist in the face of knowledge of 
causes of behaviour and that this provides strong grounds for thinking that retributive 
responsibility is compatible with actions being caused. He says,  
 
 
‘we undeniably parcel out both praise and blame for actions 
and choices we know to be caused by factors external to the 
actor’s free will. Our moral life is built on praising or blaming 
people ….[for their actions] – even though we know at least 
some of the factors that caused these actions’.124  
 
However, it should be emphasised that the persistence of retributive responses 
despite knowledge of some of the causal factors influencing behaviour goes no way 
towards reconciling retributivism with determinism. The belief that an action was 
influenced by some causal factors does not amount to the belief that the action was 
determined. Moore might try to claim that people persist in their retributive 
judgements, despite being convinced that the behaviour in question was causally 
necessitated by factors outwith the agent’s control. However, this claim is 
implausible. Unlike Moore, most people are probably not convinced of the truth of 
determinism (brain scientists, legal theorists, and philosophers aside, most people 
have probably never explicitly thought about determinism) and, as argued above, if 
they were convinced of the truth of determinism their retributive responses would not 
persist.  
 
                                                
124 Moore, Placing Blame, p543. 
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Section B: Virtuous Emotions 
Another part of Moore’s strategy for justifying retributivism appeals to the idea of 
‘virtuous emotions’.125 He argues that our retributive inclinations are likely to reflect 
moral reality because these inclinations are based on virtuous emotions such as 
compassion for innocent victims of crime and outrage on their behalf. (Although he 
acknowledges that retributivist attitudes may sometimes be based on vicious 
emotions like vindictiveness and a desire for revenge). According to Moore, virtuous 
emotions are our ‘main heuristic guide’ to discovering ‘moral truth’.126  
 
Even if this part of his strategy were sound, it would still not overcome the 
objections raised above. If a virtuous emotion (e.g. outrage against a wrongdoer) is 
based on a false belief (e.g. the belief that there is no serious evidence for thinking 
that the wrongdoer’s action was determined, or the belief that determinism and 
retributivism are compatible) then this ‘virtuous’ emotion cannot be a good heuristic 
guide to discovering moral truth.  Furthermore, it seems implausible to suggest, as 
Moore does, that retributive responses are virtuous, while compassion for 
disadvantaged offenders is not. As Thomas Clark argues:  
 
‘Putting ourselves in the…shoes of an offender should inspire 
sympathy, for if it does not, then we are supposing that we 
would have been immune to the influences that shaped her. 
From a naturalistic perspective, which Moore shares, in which 
human beings are determined by environment (as well as 
heredity), such a supposition is clearly false and the lack of 
sympathy it generates is a clear moral defect.’ 127 
 
However, it is submitted that, quite apart from the above objection, Moore’s 
‘heuristic guide’ strategy is flawed. His view raises the question of how we are to 
                                                
125 Moore, Placing Blame, chapter 3. 
126 Ibid, p135. 
127 Thomas Clark, ‘Against Retribution’, Human Nature review, 2003, p 471. 
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distinguish a virtuous emotion from one that is not virtuous. Moore claims that the 
theory which has been generated from virtuous emotions provides the criteria for 
distinguishing virtuous from non-virtuous emotions. This obviously seems circular. 
However, Moore claims that this is not a vicious circle. In defence of this claim, he 
draws an analogy between moral thinking and scientific enquiry,  
 
‘…[S]urely in science we do not expect to have to come up 
with some prescientific test for the epistemic import of 
sensory experience before we meld those experiences into a 
scientific theory. Rather, we rely on the body of scientific 
theory itself to justify exclusions of experience from the 
data.’128 
 
However, merely making this observation about scientific method is not sufficient to 
establish the soundness of Moore’s strategy. Moore may have come up with an 
example of a virtuous circle, but he needs to demonstrate more than the fact that 
virtuous circles exist. He needs to show that his is one of them. In view of the 
numerous striking disanalogies between scientific thinking and moral thinking, this 
would be a formidable task, which Moore hardly begins to carry out.129  
 
Section C: The Truth of Retributivism is Not the Best Explanation for 
our Retributive Inclinations 
Moore claims that the best explanation for the fact that many people have retributive 
responses is that the “truth” of retributivism “causes” people to have these 
responses.130 The many objections that have been raised above cast doubt on this 
claim. Still, given that retributive beliefs are very widely held, it might be wondered 
                                                
128 Moore, Placing Blame, p138. 
129 Giving a full account of the difference between scientific thinking and ethical thinking is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Here is one key difference: Scientific theories, unlike moral theories, can 
generate predictions about the world, which can be tested by observation. Scientific theories are 
subject to repeatable experiments of this kind, which, in the case of a well-corroborated theory, 
deliver the same results for all competent enquirers. Moral theories are in no literal sense testable in 
this way by empirical observation. 
130 Moore, Placing Blame, p109. 
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how so many people could be mistaken. One response is to say that widespread error 
is not uncommon. Many people believed that the world was flat, that the sun moved 
around the earth, that the earth was at the centre of the universe, that base metals can 
be turned into gold etc. until scientific discoveries showed these beliefs were 
mistaken. In the moral domain, many people believed that slavery was justified, that 
only male property owners deserved the vote, that some races were inferior to others, 
that absolute monarchy was the ideal form of government etc. until moral argument 
persuaded people that these views were misguided. Furthermore, scientific 
investigation can show certain moral beliefs to be misguided. Scientific explanations 
of sudden deaths, and illnesses probably undermined the belief that people had a 
moral duty to burn witches, who had previously been held responsible for causing 
these deaths and illnesses. So too, it is possible for scientific discoveries supporting 
the theory that human behaviour is determined to undermine the belief that it is 
intrinsically good to make wrongdoers suffer irrespective of the consequences of 
doing so.131 
 
Furthermore, there are several coherent explanations for why people have retributive 
responses, which could be adopted instead of Moore’s explanation. A 
consequentialist might say that the retributive principle serves as a useful “rule of 
thumb” to indicate those occasions when inflicting suffering on someone will be 
necessary in order to prevent greater suffering. The consequentialist might say that it 
is the usefulness of the rule that explains why people to adhere to it (even if the 
rule’s adherents do not fully realise that this is why they accept it).132 Alternatively, it 
                                                
131 In one famous American case, a defence lawyer, Clarence Darrow, argued that the judge should 
have compassion for two murderers, because their criminal behaviour was ultimately the product of 
causes over which they had no control. The judge sentenced Darrow’s clients to life imprisonment 
(although he was under great public pressure to sentence them to death). People v Leopold and Loeb, 
Cook County Crim Ct III [1924] per Robin West and Christopher Brown, “Opening Statements and 
Closing Arguments” (1978) 8 Maryland Law Forum 126 
132 On the role that a “rule of thumb” can play in moral thinking see, Jonathan Glover, Causing Death 
and Saving Lives (1977), p106. 
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could be argued that, for many people, retributive beliefs are simply based on a 
desire for revenge or on sadism (e.g. public executions once attracted huge crowds of 
spectators, who used the fact that the offender had committed some wrong as an 
excuse to enjoy watching him suffer). John Mackie presents a “biological 
explanation for the tendency to feel non-moral resentment of injuries and gratitude 
for benefits and a sociological explanation for their moral counterparts,…the 
retributive emotions.”133 Basically, Mackie argues that the tendency to retaliate 
against aggression directed against oneself or against one’s offspring was a trait 
favoured by natural selection. He then argues that co-operation with others to protect 
the social group against aggression was also favoured by natural selection. Over 
time, Mackie maintains, certain kinds of behaviour came to be regarded as generally 
harmful and meriting a hostile response. The generality of these judgements give 
them the ‘apparent impartiality’ characteristic of moral judgements. This group 
morality was reinforced by social interaction and passed on to successive generations 
through education. Given the objections to retributivism that have been raised in this 
thesis, it is submitted that any one of the accounts just mentioned (or any 
combination of them) provides a better explanation of the prevalence of retributive 
attitudes than the supposition that retributivism is true. 
 
PF Strawson’s ‘Reactive Attitudes’ 
Moore’s discussion of our moral life draws to some extent on Peter Strawson’s 
highly influential compatibilist theory based on the reactive attitudes, including 
resentment, (discussed at p62, above). Unlike Moore, Strawson believed that our 
reactive attitudes and practices of holding each other responsible are not merely 
heuristic guides to the truth about the nature of responsibility, but are constitutive of 
responsibility. Strawson seems to be too complacent about relying on our emotional 
                                                
133 John Mackie, “Morality and the Retributive Emotions” 1982 Criminal Justice Ethics 3, at pp8-9. 
 
 83 
responses and current practices. As noted above, it is perfectly conceivable that these 
responses and practices are misguided. The fact that we currently hold criminals 
responsible in the retributive sense cannot by itself tell us that they are responsible in 
that sense. According to Strawson, retributive reactive attitudes are an inevitable part 
of human life and so it is pointless to argue about whether they are justified. In 
response, even if experiencing attitudes of resentment and disapprobation is 
inevitable, Strawson cites no evidence to suggest that their translation into 
institutions of retributive punishment is inevitable, so surely discussion of whether 
such institutions can be justified is not completely pointless.  
Strawson also suggested that if, per impossibile, we could imagine giving up the 
retributive reactive attitudes, doing so would not be rational as life would be terrible 
without them. I will consider arguments of that kind below. 
 
Retributivism, Illusionism and Criminal Behaviour 
In defence of retributivism, it might be argued that attempting to remove the 
retributive elements from our attitudes and social institutions would be morally and 
socially disastrous. For example, the retributivist might claim that, in order for 
people to be motivated to behave well, they must feel that they are retributively 
responsible for their actions – i.e. they must feel that if they commit a crime, it will 
be appropriate for the state to punish them, regardless of the consequences of 
imposing such punishment. Also, the retributivist might claim, in order for criminals 
to be reformed and rehabilitated, they must feel retributive guilt – i.e. they must feel 
that they deserved to be punished purely because of what they did and irrespective of 
the consequences of such punishment being imposed. In Smilansky’s words: “to put 
it bluntly: people as a rule ought not to be fully aware of the ultimate inevitability of 
what they have done, for this will affect the way in which they will hold themselves 
responsible….Humanity is fortunately deceived on the free will issue, and this seems 
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to be a condition of civilised society and personal value.” 134 This illusionism, 
whatever its supposed merits, is no kind of retributivism, but a variety of 
consequentialism. It directs us to cultivate the illusion of retributivism because of the 
supposedly disastrous consequences of rejecting the illusion. 
 
Furthermore, it is hard to take seriously such scare mongering about the corrupting 
psychological effect of rejecting retributive responsibility. So far we have not 
witnessed a crime-wave perpetrated by free-will-sceptical philosophers. Other 
writers have argued at length that rejecting retributive responsibility would not be 
psychologically demoralising and it is outwith the scope of this thesis to present a 
full discussion of these psychological claims.135 It is submitted that even if these 
claims were correct, they would not establish the soundness of the retributive 
principle that punishing the guilty is an intrinsic good. A principle is not sound 
merely because we desperately want it to be, nor because we are afraid of what might 
happen if the principle were discovered to be unsound.  
 
I will argue, however, in the next chapter that there is no logical reason why 
removing the retributive elements from our penal institutions would lead to an 
inhumane or unjust society. It would be unjust, however, to punish people solely on 
the basis of a penal theory, like retributivism, which is highly problematic. This 
thesis focuses specifically on punishment. I do not propose that people should try 
entirely to excise all retributive assumptions or sentiments from their mental lives 
and everyday dealings with others.  
 
                                                
134 S Smilansky, “Free Will, Fundamental Dualism and the Centrality of Illusion” in Kane (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2002) 489, p500. 
135 See Honderich, How Free Are You?, chapter 10; Derk Pereboom, Living without Free Will (2001); 
Sommers T, ‘The Objective Attitude’ (2007) 57 (228) The Philosophical Quarterly 321. 
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A related objection is that my strategy of arguing against retributivism entails that 
the state should take no steps to deal with the criminally dangerous. However, this 
objection misconstrues my argument. The thought-experiments involving Jane and 
the robot, discussed in the last two chapters, were intended to demonstrate that it 
would be counter-intuitive to punish these determined agents only because they had 
committed wrongful actions, irrespective of the consequences of punishing them. 
These thought-experiments were not designed to show that, with respect to 
wrongdoers whose actions are determined, it is unjustifiable to punish them 
simpliciter. 136  On the contrary, there are important non-retributive reasons for 
punishing such wrongdoers, which are compatible with determinism.137  
 
One theory of crime prevention which does not depend on the existence of 
retributive responsibility is suggested by Pereboom. He argues that, just as we have a 
right to quarantine carriers of severe infectious diseases in order to protect society, 
we also have the right to isolate dangerous criminals in order to protect society. The 
legitimacy of quarantine does not depend on the carrier being retributively 
responsible for having a dangerous disease. By analogy, society may have a right to 
isolate someone who has shown a sufficiently strong tendency to commit serious 
crimes, even though that person is not retributively responsible.138 Alternatively, on 
the deterrence theory, punishment is justified if it prevents serious harm to society by 
deterring criminal behaviour. If, as argued in chapter two, determinism and 
                                                
136 The retributivist might claim that this would not be punishment in the fullest sense. If so, it is 
submitted, so much the worse for punishment in the so-called fullest (i.e. retributive) sense. The 
semantic manoeuvre of stipulating that only retributive punishment counts as punishment in the fullest 
sense does nothing to show that there is not some other meaningful and important sense of 
punishment which is compatible with determinism and which is justifiable. 
137  One might object that consequentialism is incompatible with determinism because 
consequentialism assumes that some things matter (e.g. suffering, preference satisfaction) and 
determinism entails nihilism i.e. that nothing matters. However, this objection is dismissed by most 
writers in the area of determinism and a full critique of this objection is outwith the scope of this 
thesis. For a discussion of determinism and nihilism see Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room (1984), pp153-
156. 
138 Pereboom “Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism”, in Kane (ed) The 
Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2002), 478, at p480. 
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rationality are compatible, then, even if determinism is true, rational would-be 
offenders can be deterred through their understanding of the consequences of law 
breaking. On the moral education theory, punishing wrongdoers may be justifiable if 
we have grounds for believing that punishment can (causally) bring about their 
reform and rehabilitation, through presenting them with good moral reasons for 
modifying their value systems.139 There may be reasons why these non-retributive 
approaches are unacceptable, but my strategy for arguing against retributivism, does 
not in itself entail that these theories are unacceptable.140 Subsequent sections of this 
thesis will focus on developing a defensible non-retributive approach to responding 
to criminal behaviour. 
 
To summarise: Appealing to our ‘Moral Life’ cannot rescue retributivism from the 
metaphysical difficulties that have been raised in Chapters One and Two. Moore’s 
arguments based on our moral experience and the supposedly virtuous nature of 
                                                
139 R.A. Duff has written extensively on the communicative function of the criminal law. See, e.g., 
Trials and Punishments (1986). However, it is not being suggested that his view of punishment as 
communication is necessarily consistent with determinism in all respects. 
140 It might be thought, for example, that a legal system which rejected retributive responsibility 
would have no rational basis for retaining the concepts of mens rea or excuses and that this would be 
unacceptable. HLA Hart argues that these features of our system should be preserved for 
consequentialist reasons, because, if they were abolished, people would be forced to live in a 
permanent state of fear. This is because, “if we are… to be liable if we [perform a prohibited act] by 
accident, by mistake, under coercion, etc., the chances that we shall incur the sanctions are 
immeasurably increased” and it will be difficult to predict when we will be subject to legal sanctions. 
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, (1968), p47-48. The deterrence theory is regarded as 
unacceptable by many people because it treats criminals merely as a means. A view which stresses the 
importance of moral communication (perhaps in combination with other considerations such as the 
need to protect society) is not so susceptible to this criticism. If one of the goals punishment is 
intended to achieve is the moral betterment of the criminal, then the criminal is being treated partly as 
an end in herself. If the attempt to reform is through moral dialogue, addressed to the rational 
faculties of the agent, then arguably this also shows respect for the agent as an end in herself. Another 
possible objection to these non-retributive theories of punishment is based on the principle that it is 
intrinsically wrong to punish someone unless that person is retributively responsible for a wrongful 
action. One way of replying to this would be to argue against the soundness of that principle. Another, 
response is to argue that the principle is sound but can be outweighed by consequentialist 
considerations. The following writers believe that determinism and retributive responsibility are 
incompatible and have defended alternative theories of punishment: Honderich, How Free Are You?, 




retributive emotions are unconvincing. They cannot establish that the truth of 
retributivism is the best explanation for the existence of retributive attitudes and 
emotions. Furthermore, arguments based on the supposedly disastrous consequences 
of abandoning retributivism cannot show that that the suffering of the guilty is an 
intrinsic good.  
 
Conclusion 
The theory that human behaviour is determined is conceptually sound and seems to 
have empirical support. Quantum indeterminism has not been shown to affect mental 
processes in a way that could provide a basis for retributive responsibility. The truth 
of determinism would seriously undermine retributivism. A retributivist who tries to 
reconcile his view with determinism is in a highly paradoxical position. He must 
maintain that it is intrinsically good to punish an offender, just because that offender 
has voluntarily committed a wrongful action, irrespective of the consequences of 
imposing punishment. Yet, he must accept that had he, the retributivist, been subject 
to the same external factors that determined the offender’s action, he would have 
committed the very same offence. He must maintain that it does not matter that the 
offender could not have done otherwise. Nor, on his view, does it matter that the 
offender’s decision was ultimately the product of luck. He must advocate inflicting 
suffering, a thing we normally consider to be bad in itself, on the grounds that, 
despite all the above considerations, it can be intrinsically good in itself. The 
cumulative effect of this series of counterintuitive claims is to make the attempt to 
reconcile retributive responsibility and determinism seem almost incoherent. Any 
attempt to justify punishment must meet a high standard. Part One of this thesis has 
cast serious doubt on the idea that people can be held responsible in a way that could 
justify retributive punishment. 
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The arguments against retributivism that have been raised in this thesis have 
important practical implications for the legal system. Rejecting retributivism would 
free society from the obligation of ensuring that every guilty person is made to suffer 
in direct proportion to her moral guilt. Instead, it may be morally permissible to 
pursue alternative, more flexible responses to criminal behaviour. In view of the 
severe treatment that offenders undergo within the penal system (e.g. deprivation of 
liberty, loss of certain rights, stigma), over-crowding of prisons and the high rate of 
recidivism, it is important to consider whether our current penal practices can be 
justified on a non-retributive basis, what alternatives are available and what goals 
and values should guide attempts at reform. 
 
As indicated above, some theorists worry that abandoning retributivism would lead 
to bad consequences for society, and specifically would result in an unjust and 
inhumane penal system. If this were correct, it would not show that the retributive 
principle is sound, but it would pose problems for the non-retributive approach to 
punishment that I advocate in this thesis. The next chapter will argue that a ‘hard 
incompatibilist’ approach to punishment (i.e. one that rejects libertarian and 
compatibilist retributivism) could be fair and humane. It is possible to have justice 
without retributive desert.  
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Chapter Three: Justice without Desert 
Introduction 
Ben, a sane adult, kills an old lady for her money. Martin, who is severely mentally 
ill, kills an old lady because he has the delusional belief that she is going to kill him. 
In both cases, the state has strong reasons to consider interfering with the killer’s 
liberty. Retributivists claim, however, that the state’s main grounds for interfering 
with Ben are completely different from its reasons for interfering with Martin.141 
According to traditional retributivism, the state is justified in interfering with Ben, 
because he is blameworthy and deserves to suffer for his crime; whereas Martin, who 
is blameless due to his insanity, may need restrictions placed on his liberty because 
he is dangerous. Non-retributivists, on the other hand, often cite the need to protect 
society as the main reason for interfering with both sane and insane offenders. 
Focusing on the forward-looking goal of social protection is claimed by the 
proponents of this approach to be more humane than the supposed vengefulness of 
traditional retributivism. Retributivists often respond that far from treating criminals 
humanely, this forward-looking approach actually demeans responsible offenders, by 
failing to distinguish them from insane lawbreakers on the basis of desert. For 
example, in an influential article, CS Lewis warned that once desert is abandoned in 
favour of harm prevention, responsible offenders are objectified and are no longer 
protected by considerations of justice: 
 
‘There is no sense in talking about a...‘just cure’... We demand 
of a cure not whether it is just but whether it succeeds. Thus 
when we cease to consider what the criminal deserves and 
consider only what will cure him or deter others, we have 
tacitly removed him from the sphere of justice altogether; 
                                                
141 Or at least ‘pure retributivists’ claim this. Mixed theories are discussed briefly on below under the 
heading ‘General Deterrence and the Mere Means Objection’. 
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instead of a person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere 
object, a patient, a “case”.’142 
This chapter argues that discarding retributive desert, does not mean discarding 
justice, or treating offenders like objects.143  By examining principles that apply 
equally to both sane and insane offenders, this chapter will show how a non-
retributive response to crime can be fair to lawbreakers.144 It is intuitive that a fair 
legal system must have the following features: 1) the state does not frame people 
who have not broken the law; 2) sentences are proportionate (or at least not grossly 
disproportionate); 3) rules of due process are upheld (e.g. the state bears a heavy 
burden of proof; there is independent judicial oversight; the suspected law-breaker is 
allowed to participate in the process); 4) the lawbreaker is not treated as a mere 
means. These principles are said to follow from retributivism. Philosophical 
discussions of punishment often remark that non-retributive (especially 
consequentialist) approaches sometimes recommend breaching these principles, or at 
least that these approaches fail to capture the real reason why the principles are so 
important.145  It is also frequently assumed that these principles only govern the 
                                                
142 CS Lewis, ‘The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment’ (1953) 6 Res Judicatae 224. Lewis’s article 
is cited approvingly in, e.g., S Morse, ‘Thoroughly Modern: Sir James Fitzjames Stephen on Criminal 
Responsibility’ (2008) 5 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 505, p511; and in N Vincent, in B van 
den Berg and L Klaming (eds), Capacitarianism, Responsibility and Restored Mental Capacities, 
Technologies on the Stand. Legal and Ethical Questions in Neuroscience and Robotics (2011 Wolf 
Legal Publishers, Nijmegen), p51. PF Strawson also advocated drawing a sharp distinction between 
the norms governing sane and insane law-breakers on similar grounds: P Strawson, ‘Freedom and 
Resentment’ (1962) 48 Proceedings of the British Academy, 187. 
 
143 Henceforth, the term ‘desert’ will refer to retributive desert. However, it should be noted that desert 
is sometimes used in an explicitly non-retributive sense. For instance, Benjamin Vilhauer uses the 
term ‘personhood-based desert’ to refer to claims that people have simply in virtue of their status as 
persons, rather than any action for which they are retributively responsible. He contrasts ‘personhood-
based desert’ with ‘action-based’ desert. B Vilhauer, ‘Persons, Punishment and Free Will Scepticism’ 
(2011) Philosophical Studies (online first). DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9752-z. 
144 The question of whether a non-retributive approach can be fair to victims and potential victims will 
be discussed in a subsequent chapter. 
145 See, e.g., A Duff, ‘Crime and punishment’ in E Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Routledge, London 1998). Retrieved October 29, 2011, from 
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/T002; K Murtagh, ‘Punishment’, in J Fieser and B Dowden 
(eds.), The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 29, 2011 from 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/punishme/; H Bedau and E Kelly, ‘Punishment’, in E Zalta et al (eds.), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010), Retrieved 29 October, 2011, from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment/.  
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treatment of responsible offenders. This chapter argues that these four principles (or 
analogous principles) also apply to insane offenders, whom no-one considers 
retributively responsible and that therefore these norms can be defended 
independently of the notion of ‘desert’. It is argued that principles of justice can be 
endorsed by those who are sceptical about ‘free will’ and ultimate moral 
responsibility. 
Consequentialist explanations of the above-mentioned principles depend on hard-to-
verify empirical claims about the probable results of different penal policies. The 
norms of justice defended in this chapter do not depend on such contingencies. Nor 
does this chapter endorse a system of ‘social hygiene’ whereby no distinction at all is 
made between sane and insane offenders. But it does argue that such distinctions can 
be drawn on a non-retributive basis. Recognising the important similarities as well as 
the differences between these sane and insane offenders is necessary in order to treat 
both groups fairly and humanely. 
Framing the Innocent 
Here is an example that is frequently cited to demonstrate the short-comings of 
consequentialism:   
 
Framing a Moral Agent 
A horrible act of violence is committed and the culprit cannot 
be found. A riot will ensue that will harm many innocent 
people, unless the mob is persuaded that the wrongdoer has 
been apprehended and punished. So the authorities frame and 
punish an innocent man.146 
                                                
146 An example of this kind was used by H McCloskey, ‘A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment.’ 
in G Ezorsky (ed), Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment Albany, (State University of New York 
Press, 1972), p127. 
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 Retributivists allege that consistent consequentialists must endorse this, since the 
authorities’ actions promoted the best over-all consequences.  Only retributivism, 
they claim, can adequately explain why the framed person has been treated unjustly. 
To understand the basis for a non-retributive prohibition on framing the innocent, 
consider the following example:  
 
Framing a Non-Agent 
A horrible act of violence is committed by an insane attacker 
who cannot be found. A riot will ensue that will harm many 
innocent people, unless the mob is persuaded that that the 
insane attacker has been apprehended and confined in a secure 
mental hospital. The authorities find a mentally ill man, 
Timothy, who has never committed an act of violence before. 
Timothy is perfectly safe and has until now enjoyed his 
freedom to move about the town and interact with the 
townspeople and wants to be liked by them. However, he is 
too mentally disordered to be considered a morally responsible 
agent. Because of various circumstances, the authorities are 
able to persuade the mob that Timothy was the insane attacker. 
So the authorities frame Timothy and shut him up in a secure 
mental hospital (despite knowing that he is perfectly safe and 
was not the attacker).  
It seems intuitive to say that Timothy has been treated unjustly. Retributivists cannot 
explain this intuition with reference to retributive desert. Retributive desert does not 
come into it. The authorities do not claim that Timothy deserves to be locked up. 
Timothy is not a responsible agent and so would not deserve retributive blame even 
if he had been the attacker. The actual attacker (being insane) does not deserve 
retribution either.  
 93 
The authorities’ actions can be criticised for the following reasons. Firstly, they have 
wronged Timothy by lying about him. The lie is particularly objectionable because it 
denies important good qualities that Timothy actually has (e.g. gentleness and 
friendliness), and falsely asserts that he has serious negative qualities (a propensity to 
kill innocent people). True, Timothy is not responsible for having these good 
qualities, nor do the authorities claim that Timothy is responsible for his alleged 
negative qualities.  Nevertheless, it seriously wrongs a person to tell this kind of lie 
about him.  Furthermore, Timothy is detained on the basis of such outrageous lies. 
This also wrongs him, because the grounds of his detention are illegitimate. 
Timothy’s detention also treats him merely as a means to avert a threat from 
elsewhere. It does not seek to eliminate a threat that he himself poses.147  
The above-mentioned objections could also be raised against framing a sane person.  
There are therefore strong reasons against framing people who have not broken the 
law, which are neither based on retributivism, nor on consequentialism. Unlike 
consequentialist objections to framing people, the reasons given here seem to capture 
the intuitive idea that framing is unjust, because the framed person has been 
victimised. The consequentialist rationale refers to some calculation of the general 
welfare and this fails to capture our intuitions about the injustice done to the 
individual. Unlike retributivist objections, the reasons offered here help to explain 
why framing is unjust in both the agent and the non-agent examples. This is an 
advantage, since it seems intuitive that the injustice that occurs in both examples is 
relevantly similar. 
                                                
147 For more on the distinction between treating someone as a mere means and eliminating a threat 
they pose see below, under the heading ‘General Deterrence and the Mere Means Objection’. The 
mere means argument was famously put forward by Kant. However, Kant seems to have tied this 
argument to the idea of rational agency, so it is not clear whether non-rational agents are protected by 
the duty of respect for persons as he originally formulated it. H Paton (tr), I Kant, The Moral Law: 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (Routledge, London 1948), 85. However, it is submitted 
that the principle of respect for persons should extend to non-rational or partially rational people such 
as the mentally ill, learning disabled people and young children. See A Wood and O O’Neill, ‘Kant on 
Duties Regarding Non-Rational Nature’ in (1998) 72(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 211.  
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Having said this, there may be some extreme situations in which framing non-
offenders is permissible. If the authorities knew that the entire world would be 
destroyed and every person on the planet would die in agony unless an innocent 
person was framed, then framing that person seems permissible in this dire situation. 
Nevertheless, an injustice would still have been done to the individual, even though 
it would be permissible on balance to perpetrate this injustice. This is an outcome 
that most sane retributivists would accept. At precisely what point consequences can 
be said to be sufficiently serious to warrant inflicting injustice is a hard question. But 
it is no harder for the theory being defended here than for retributive theories. 
Recognising the tension between the need to do justice, and the need to avert bad 
consequences better captures the complexity of our moral experience, than a theory 
that claims to produce neat, conflict-free answers to such questions. 
Benjamin Vilhauer has proposed a different kind of personhood-based, non-
retributive argument against framing the innocent. 148  According to Vilhauer, 
respecting someone’s personhood means treating them in a way that they would 
rationally consent to be treated. He does not rely on the person’s actual consent, but 
on the notion of ‘hypothetical consent’– i.e. they would consent to be treated this 
way if they were rational. He uses Rawls’s idea of ‘the original position’ to model 
rational consent.149 The original position is a thought experiment in which people 
choose the rules that will govern a society. The rules are chosen behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’: the choosers are unaware of certain facts about what their own position 
will be in the society and what personal characteristics (e.g. race, gender, wealth, 
strength, intelligence and industriousness) they will have. They are aware of the 
fundamental interests that they all have in common (e.g. security and the freedom to 
pursue one’s goals) and they have knowledge of relevant scientific and sociological 
                                                
148 Vilhauer, fn143, above. 
149 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2nd Ed, OUP, Oxford 1999).  
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theories. The veil of ignorance is designed to describe a situation of fairness among 
the social contractors, to ensure their impartiality and to filter out factors that are just 
down to luck. Each deliberator must also imagine that he or she is just as likely to be 
harmed by any principle that is chosen as to benefit from it. Vilhauer, unlike Rawls, 
includes knowledge of whether one will be a wrongdoer as a factor that is hidden 
from the social contractors. This is because Vilhauer is a free will sceptic and 
believes that one’s moral character is, like race and gender, a product of the genetic 
and environmental lottery. Vilhauer claims that respecting someone’s personhood 
means treating them as they would rationally consent to be treated, i.e. in accordance 
with a principle that would have been agreed to by deliberators in the original 
position. He claims that no rational deliberator could have chosen the principle that 
the authorities may, when it is expedient, frame innocent individuals. Such a regime 
would involve the authorities systematically deceiving the members of this society. 
Otherwise the scapegoating of innocent individuals would be ineffective. A 
deliberator in the original position must acknowledge that under this regime he could 
be one of those who are deceived about a basic principle governing that society. 
Consenting to systematic deception undermines one’s status as a rational agent. 
Therefore, according to Vilhauer, the idea that a rational deliberator would choose to 
be systematically deceived about something so important is self-contradictory.150  
Vilhauer’s argument is intriguing and could be invoked to supplement the position 
defended in this chapter. However, it does not seem to capture the main reason why 
the authorities’ actions are wrongful in the two framing cases. Intuitively, the main 
injustice in both cases is the wrong that has been done to the framed individual. 
However, Vilhauer’s explanation focuses on the wrong of deceiving the general 
public. On Vilhauer’s account, the wrong that is done to the framed individual 
                                                
150 This strategy of arguing is also inspired by Kant. 
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derives from the supposed logical problems with a principle that endorses deceiving 
the public. This seems too indirect.  
Furthermore, it is not obvious that choosing to be deceived by the authorities is 
necessarily irrational.  Imagine that the original position deliberator is considering 
whether to choose the principle that the authorities must never deceive the public 
even if that is the only way to prevent a riot. The deliberator must assume that she is 
equally likely to be harmed by that policy as to benefit from it. In other words, the 
deliberator must assume that, if the policy were implemented, she might well end up 
as one of the people harmed or killed in the riot. It is not obviously irrational for the 
deliberator to prefer the risk of being deceived by the authorities to the risk of being 
harmed or killed in the riot. It does not seem that Vilhauer’s argument can support 
the strong claim that consenting to such deception is logically contradictory. 
However, it might support a weaker claim. There is a disturbing paradox in the idea 
of a rational agent choosing to be systematically deceived and the original position 
deliberator certainly has reason to hesitate before endorsing such deception. This 
would not necessarily lead to a complete prohibition on framing innocent individuals 
in all cases, but it does imply that these cases are always ethically troubling. Perhaps 
this better captures the conflicting intuitions that are evoked by cases of framing than 
a principle which categorically prohibits framing ‘though the heavens may fall’. If 
this modification of Vilhauer’s argument is successful, then this argument can 
provide an additional non-retributive explanation of our concerns about framing. 
Proportionality 
If desert were abandoned, some fear that the state’s response to law–breaking would 
no longer be governed by principles of proportionality. For instance, Lewis 
maintained that a medical model of punishment would permit the authorities to 
interfere with the liberty of citizens, whenever the authorities found this convenient. 
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They would simply label the citizens ‘diseased’. He claimed that the authorities 
could impose on such unfortunate citizens any ‘treatment’, no matter how 
burdensome, and any period of confinement, no matter how lengthy. Ordinary 
people, he maintained, would have no basis for objecting to this on grounds of 
justice, since ‘justice’ is a retributive concept.151 
 
This line of argument is based on a misconception of the principles that should apply 
to the mentally ill. It is unjust to confine someone or force her to undergo treatment 
against her will merely because she has a mental illness. She must pose a threat to 
the safety of herself or others.152 Furthermore, certain treatments are so risky or so 
devastating to the individual that it would be unjust to impose them on her, even if 
she is mentally ill and dangerous. It would also be unfair to impose a particularly 
lengthy or onerous treatment/confinement on someone if her behaviour only had a 
relatively minor impact on the welfare of any particular individual.153 For instance it 
would be grossly unfair to lock up a mentally ill person for life in a secure 
institution, just because she made loud noises in the street, causing only minor 
irritation. This is a consideration of proportionality (though clearly of a non-
retributive kind). It is not merely a question of whether the intervention is necessary 
in order to prevent the objectionable behaviour. It is conceivable that for some 
people, a measure almost as drastic as confinement in an institution might be 
required in order to prevent them from causing a nuisance. Imposing such a drastic 
measure would still be unjust. This proportionality constraint is not merely the result 
of utilitarian calculation. Classical utilitarianism is aggregative. On an aggregative 
approach if enough people were each caused a tiny bit of distress by the nuisance, 
                                                
151 Lewis, fn142, above. 
152 See e.g. Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, ASP 13. 
153 In the context of a discussion of the punishment of sane offenders, this principle is defended in T 
Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications (Penguin Books: Middlesex 1984), p 78.  
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then that could eventually outweigh the interests of mentally ill person and justify 
locking her up. In contrast the proportionality principle defended here states that the 
intervention must be proportionate to the impact that the harm to be prevented by the 
intervention would have on any particular victim. So a greater intervention, such as 
lengthy confinement, would be justified to prevent killing or a serious violent or 
sexual attack. Whereas a much more minor intervention, such as counselling, or 
supervision in the community would be justified to prevent nuisances.  The 
proportionality principle is based on respect for the separateness of persons and on 
an ideal of equality – it is prima facie wrong to create a situation where people suffer 
grossly unequal levels of distress.154  
If this principle of proportionality applies to insane law-breakers who are clearly not 
deserving of retribution, then an analogous principle of proportionality would also be 
available to sane offenders under a non-retributive system. It might be objected that 
the proportionality principle does not give very precise recommendations about the 
exact degree of burdensomeness that is appropriate in each case. However, this 
objection is equally applicable to retributive conceptions of proportionality. The 
most that can probably be said for both conceptions is that they serve as a safeguard 
against injustice, ruling out clear cases of gross disproportionality. 
Due Process 
Daniel Dennett, though far from being a traditional retributivist, has recently argued 
that there will be ‘totalitarianism’, unless we have a system of punishment based on 
desert.155 However, this ignores the fact that important individual rights and rules of 
due process apply in contexts where desert is not an issue e.g. when the state wishes 
                                                
154 Like most of the principles of justice defended here, this is a strong presumption, but not 
necessarily an absolute prohibition in all cases. As noted earlier, retributivists themselves often admit 
that principles of justice can sometimes be outweighed if the consequences are serious enough. 
155 D Dennett, ‘My Brain Made Me Do It’ (2011), Max Weber Lecture Series. Retrieved 30 
September, 2011 from 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/16895/MWP_LS_2011_01.pdf?sequence=1. 
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to restrict the liberty of non-responsible, mentally ill offenders. Such individuals 
cannot be detained at the mere whim of a totalitarian dictator.  
For instance, article 5 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
provides that such detention must be ‘in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
law’. Non-responsible individuals are also entitled to challenge the grounds for their 
detention. Article 5 (4) of the ECHR provides that ‘everyone who is deprived of his 
liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the 
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release 
ordered if the detention is not lawful.’ This provision applies to sane people and to 
people of ‘unsound mind’. 
Domestic legislation also implements various safeguards which protect the rights of 
mentally ill persons against infringements by the authorities. The Mental Health 
(Care and Treatment)(Scotland) Act 2003 provides that a mentally ill person who 
may be subject to compulsory treatment or hospitalisation is entitled to have her 
interests defended by a ‘named person’.  Decisions about compulsory 
treatment/hospitalisation are made by a Mental Health Tribunal which is independent 
of the executive and which must consult with and provide information to the 
mentally ill person and her named person. The burden of proof is on the experts to 
demonstrate that the mentally ill person poses a ‘significant risk’ to the safety of 
herself or others and that compulsory treatment/hospitalisation is necessary. The 
Mental Welfare Commission is a separate, independent body whose role is to protect 
the welfare of individuals who are vulnerable through mental disorder. The mentally 
ill person or her named person is also entitled to appeal against decisions to 
impose/continue compulsory treatment or hospitalisation. 
Thus it can be seen that several important principles of due process do not depend on 
desert and are applicable to sane and mentally ill individuals. To summarise, these 
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principles include the following: interventions are prescribed by law; the burden of 
proof is on those who wish to intervene; decisions are made by courts or tribunals 
that are independent of the executive; the person who may be subject to the 
intervention is entitled to participate in the process and to be fully informed and 
adequately represented; persons subject to interventions are entitled to initiate a 
review of the legitimacy of the interventions. Any non-retributive response to law-
breaking should uphold these principles. However, there are further principles of due 
process that should apply specifically to sane offenders. These will be discussed in 
the final section. 
 
General Deterrence and the ‘Mere Means’ 
Objection 
According to consequentialist deterrence theories, the state may punish an offender 
in order to make an example of him. Consequentialists justify this with reference to 
the general welfare, rather than the culpability of the offender. However, some 
‘mixed theorists’ argue that it is only permissible to make an example of the offender 
if he is also culpable. In this sort of case, the punishment ‘kills two birds with one 
stone’ by giving the offender what he deserves and also deterring potential 
offenders.156 (Such theories are ‘mixed’ because they take account of retributive and 
forward-looking considerations.) It is often alleged that punishing someone for 
purely deterrent reasons instrumentalises that person. Mixed theorists, may claim, 
however, that making an example of a retributively culpable offender does not treat 
him merely as a means, as long as the state is also responding to his free choice. 
                                                
156 See, e.g. Lewis, fn142, above, p227. Andrew Von Hirsch defends a related line of argument. He 
maintains that criminals deserve censure for their wrongdoing because they are culpable. But he 
claims that the state is justified in providing prudential reasons for obeying the law, in the form of the 
harsh treatment aspect of punishment, in addition to moral reasons. The prudential reasons should 
help to strengthen people’s resolve to act in accordance with the moral reasons. A Von Hirsch, 
Censure and Sanctions (OUP, Oxford 1993). 
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The analogy with insane law-breakers suggests that it is indeed wrong to punish 
criminals purely in order to make an example of them. The state can restrict the 
freedom of dangerous insane lawbreakers in order to incapacitate them. But it would 
be unjust to confine a non-dangerous person in order to ‘make an example’ of him, if 
that person broke the law due to a fit of temporary insanity that will never recur. The 
state would be using him as a mere means. It should be noted that the ‘mere means’ 
objection is not tied to retributivism (although its originator, Kant, was a 
retributivist). It is used by deontologists in a wide range of contexts, not just 
retributive punishment. The mixed theorist’s defence against the mere means 
objection relies on the idea of retributive responsibility. If no one is retributively 
responsible then the mere means objection seems to apply equally to sane and insane 
offenders and to provide a strong reason against harming either group for purely 
deterrent reasons. (Although, as will be seen below, in some unusual contexts the 
prohibition on instrumentalisation can be outweighed by other considerations.) 
This does not mean, however, that the state should try to ensure that its response to 
law-breakers does not have deterrent effects. A measure may be used as a deterrent, 
provided that it is also strictly necessary in order to incapacitate the dangerous 
person. It is possible that someone may be non-responsible, due to her mental 
condition, but also capable to a certain extent of being deterred. For instance, a 
person with severe learning disabilities may understand that some form of behaviour 
(e.g. running into the road, or being violent) will result in a negative consequence for 
her (e.g. she will have less freedom, and be subject to greater supervision). The 
thought of this negative consequence may help to restrain her from engaging in the 
dangerous behaviour. It is not wrong for her carers to explain to the person (in 
humane, non-inflammatory terms) that these negative consequences will occur as a 
result of such behaviour and have been imposed on others. They may explain this in 
the hope that this will affect the conduct of the person with learning disabilities. The 
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knowledge that mentally ill offenders will still be confined, if dangerous, may also 
deter some sane offenders from trying to fake an insanity defence. The state does not 
wrong mentally ill law-breakers by publically pointing out that such law-breakers 
need to be confined if dangerous. Any deterrent effect such statements may have is 
no bad thing, provided that the authorities do not use unduly stigmatising and 
inflammatory language. Therefore, the notion of retributive responsibility is not 
required in order to make this limited form of deterrence acceptable. 
Victor Tadros has recently produced a strikingly original defence of general 
deterrence, which sharply differentiates between culpable and non-responsible 
people.157 He maintains that his approach is neither consequentialist nor retributivist. 
This theory of punishment is based on an analogy with self-defence. It is impossible 
within the scope of this thesis to capture all of the details of his highly sophisticated 
and nuanced theory. This section will briefly summarise the significance of 
culpability in his account.  
Tadros draws a distinction between ‘manipulative’ and ‘eliminative’ harm. Harming 
someone as a means to avert a threat from someone else is an instance of 
‘manipulative’ harm. Whereas harming someone in order to eliminate a threat which 
that person is directly posing counts as ‘eliminative’ harm. He argues that both 
responsible and non-responsible (e.g. insane) people who pose a direct threat may be 
harmed in order to eliminate that threat. However, he claims that only people who 
are morally culpable (and had the opportunity to avoid being harmed) may be 
harmed manipulatively. He uses the following examples to support these claims: 
 
‘Hit Man 
 I hire a hit man to kill you. The only way in which you can 
prevent the hit man from doing that is to pull me in front of x’ 
                                                
157 V Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of the Criminal Law (OUP, Oxford 2011). 
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This is an instance of manipulative harm. The hit man’s boss is no longer posing a 
direct threat to the intended victim. The intended victim uses the boss as a means to 
avert the threat from the hit man. It is intuitive to say that that this is permissible. 
Tadros uses this example to support the claim that it is permissible to subject a 
culpable offender to manipulative harm. 
 
‘Shield 
 A maniac is attacking me. The only way to prevent myself 
from being killed is to pull you, an innocent bystander, in front 
of me, using you as a shield. If I do that you will be killed.’158 
This also involves manipulative harm, since the innocent bystander poses no direct 
threat. It is intuitive to say that it is wrong to use the bystander as a shield. Tadros 
uses this example to support the claim that it is wrong to subject a non-culpable 
person to manipulative harm.  
 
‘Maniac 
 I go temporarily insane and attack you. I will kill you unless 
you kill me.’159 
This is an example of eliminative harm. The “maniac” is not killed as means to 
averting a further threat. The maniac is the threat. It is intuitive that it is permissible 
to harm the ‘maniac’. Tadros uses this example to support the claim that it is 
permissible to inflict eliminative harm on people who pose direct threats, whether or 
not those people are culpable. 
Punishing someone purely in order to deter others is an example of manipulative 
harm. According to Tadros, the above-mentioned self-defence cases help to show 
that it is permissible for the state to inflict this kind of manipulative harm on culpable 
offenders, but not on insane law-breakers. 
                                                
158 Tadros fn157, above, p241. 
159 Tadros fn157, above, p241. 
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However, it is far from clear that the self-defence cases genuinely support this sharp 
distinction between culpable and insane offenders when it comes to manipulative 
harm.  Consider the following case: 
 
 Hit man with an Insane Boss 
An insane person has paranoid delusions about a neighbour. 
He asks a hit man to kill the neighbour. The insane person 
accompanies the hit man to the neighbour’s house to watch the 
killing. The neighbour knows the hit man’s boss is insane. The 
only way the neighbour can prevent the hit man from killing 
her is to pull the insane boss in front of her, using the insane 
boss as a shield. 
This case involves manipulative harm of a non-culpable insane person. It is far from 
obvious that it is wrong for the neighbour to use the insane boss as a shield. Yet 
Tadros would not want to conclude that it is all right for the state to inflict 
manipulative harm on insane law-breakers, e.g. by harming them purely in order to 
deter potential offenders. On balance, it seems that the prohibition on using someone 
as a mere means can be overridden in this unusual type of self defence case. But this 
does not imply that the state is entitled to harm the law-breaker as a means to some 
further end. The state has a strong duty of care to all its citizens, including law-
breakers. In particular, it has an important duty to respect the personhood and basic 
equality of citizens. It is therefore especially problematic for the state to treat one 
citizen merely as a means, in order to benefit another group of citizens. In contrast, 
the neighbour in the self-defence case does not have that kind of special relationship 
to the insane boss, but she does have a strong right of self-preservation. Furthermore, 
the state’s response to law-breaking is a public act that is performed after 
deliberation, in ‘cold blood’ and which expresses society’s values. There is also a 
tremendous inequality of power between the state and the law-breaker. The state has 
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the offender at its mercy. Given this context, if the state were to inflict manipulative 
harm on a law-breaker this would do much to erode the prohibition on 
instrumentalisation. Harming someone as a means during a private act of self-
defence does not send out such a strong message. 
Furthermore, there seems to be a tension between Tadros’s scepticism about 
retributive desert and the emphasis he places on culpability and opportunities. Tadros 
argues that the intuitions that support judgements about retribution are based on 
implicit ideas we have about free will. It is natural to think that the choices for which 
we deserve praise or blame were neither predetermined by factors beyond our 
control, nor a matter of chance. However, Tadros maintains that this implicit view of 
human choices is unlikely to reflect reality – it seems likely that our choices are in 
fact determined by our genes and environment. Therefore the intuitions in favour of 
retributive desert are probably misleading.  He gives the following example to show 
that there are considerable difficulties in trying to reconcile free will and 
determinism. Imagine that you are contemplating a baby who will grow up to be a 
wrongdoer. (If determinism is true it would be possible in principle to predict the 
future with certainty if we had a complete knowledge of the facts of the past and the 
laws of nature.) This baby’s genes and environment guarantee that he will become a 
wrongdoer. Tadros persuasively argues that a great misfortune has befallen the child. 
Furthermore, ‘to think it a good thing that the badness of his life is compounded by 
making him suffer [for his wrongdoing] seems barbaric’.160 Given these views about 
determinism, it seems odd that Tadros draws such a sharp distinction between the 
harm that it is fair to inflict on culpable versus non-culpable law-breakers. As we 
have seen, he maintains that only non-culpable individuals should be protected from 
manipulative harm, because culpable offenders had the opportunity to avoid being 
subjected to such harm. However, if determinism is true then it was predetermined 
                                                
160 Tadros, fn157, above, p63. 
 106 
by factors outwith the offender’s control that he would not take that opportunity. It 
seems that ‘culpable’ and ‘non-culpable’ law-breakers are both victims of bad luck. 
Differences between Sane Law-Breakers and 
the Mentally Disordered  
So far, this chapter has focussed on similarities between the norms governing our 
response to sane offenders and people who are dangerous due to mental disorder. 
However, there are also important differences between these groups that cannot be 
ignored. 
Different Methods of interacting with Sane Offenders and People with 
Mental Disorders 
Different methods are appropriate for dealing with the behaviour of insane as 
opposed to sane law-breakers. Psychiatric counselling or treatment is typically the 
best approach for insane law-breakers. Sometimes it is justifiable to make such 
counselling or treatment compulsory, if the ability of the individual to make 
decisions about her own treatment is compromised by mental illness.  
However, the behaviour of sane offenders may change for the better if they come to 
see the force of the moral reasons against wrongdoing. It is widely accepted that 
rationality is compatible with determinism, even if retributive desert is not. 
Presenting offenders with moral reasons for reforming themselves shows respect for 
the offender’s ability to grasp such reasons. As we saw  in the example involving 
Timothy at the beginning of this chapter, it is important for the state to acknowledge 
and not deny positive qualities that citizens may have, even if the citizen is not 
retributively responsible for having those qualities. Rationality is a quality that sane 
offenders possess and which the state must recognise. This point will be further 
developed in subsequent chapters.  
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Sane offenders might also benefit from certain limited kinds of psychological 
treatment or enhancement. However, such interventions should only be given to the 
offender if the offender consents.  The subsequent chapters provide a much fuller 
account of the conditions under which such interventions are permissible. 
The Trial Process 
Restrictions may sometimes be placed on the liberty of mentally disordered people, 
without ever putting those people through a criminal trial before a jury. This is often 
the most humane and sensible approach, since the issue of what treatment or 
supervision such mentally disordered people require is best determined by medical 
experts.  
However, as noted above, moral reasoning, rather than medical help is typically the 
appropriate means of enabling sane offenders to reform themselves. The trial process 
can serve as a vivid form of moral communication, which can help the offender to 
appreciate more fully the impact of her conduct on others and to resolve to change 
her behaviour.161 It also shows respect for the offender’s rationality and membership 
of the moral community to allow her to give an account of her conduct in court, 
before other members of the community. 162  (This point is also developed in 
subsequent chapters.) 
Actual Conduct and Standards of Proof  
Before a sentence can be imposed on a sane offender, it must be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt that the person committed a crime. This principle can be justified 
on a non-retributive basis. It upholds the value of liberty by protecting the individual 
against the power of the state.  The state also shows respect for citizens by having a 
very strong presumption that those citizens are non-dangerous. Past behaviour is one 
                                                
161 See e.g. R Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (OUP, Oxford 2001); R Duff, RA 
Duff, Trials and Punishments (CUP Cambridge 1986). 
162 See Duff (2001) and Duff (1986), fn161, above. 
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of the best guides to future behaviour.163 It is therefore appropriate that proof that the 
individual has actually engaged in dangerous conduct should be a necessary 
condition of interfering with the freedom of sane individuals. The state also shows 
respect for citizens by having a very strong presumption that their conduct is guided 
by the fundamental moral values embodied in the criminal law. 
 However, proof beyond reasonable doubt of actual law-breaking is not a necessary 
condition for the detention of mentally disordered people who are judged to be 
dangerous. Can this distinction between sane offenders and the mentally disordered 
be justified? Well, there are actually some genuine worries about forcing a mentally 
ill person to undergo treatment and/or confinement, without strong evidence that the 
individual has actually engaged in dangerous conduct. Reconsider the case of 
Timothy. Now imagine he is given a routine brain scan and the doctors conclude that 
he has certain structures in his brain that are strongly correlated with extreme 
violence. Recall that Timothy has always been gentle and friendly, enjoys wandering 
round the town and wants to be liked by people. On the basis of the brain scan 
evidence, Timothy is confined in a secure mental hospital. This seems rather 
disturbing. Some people may feel that the risk to others outweighs Timothy’s right to 
liberty. Indeed, they may also feel that way about a sane person who was discovered 
to have the ‘extreme violence’ brain structure (particularly if that person was their 
neighbour, or their child’s teacher or babysitter). 
Nevertheless, some of the reasons behind the requirement of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt of actual prohibited conduct do not apply as strongly (if at all) to 
mentally disordered persons as to sane individuals. Consider the liberty-based 
rationale. A person who is so mentally disordered as to be non-responsible is likely 
to have limited liberty anyway. If her powers of critical reflection and practical 
                                                
163 See J Callender, Free Will and Responsibility: A Guide for Practitioners (OUP, Oxford 2010), 
chapter 8. 
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reasoning are impaired, she may not be able to form stable, authentic values and 
goals and may not be able to pursue these effectively. So placing her under 
psychiatric supervision would not be as great a deprivation for her as confinement 
would be for a sane individual who was quite capable of forming and pursuing his 
own goals. Indeed, compulsory treatment of the mentally disordered person might 
actually increase her liberty, if the treatment successfully restores her powers of 
practical reasoning.  Furthermore, the presumption that citizens guide their conduct 
by good moral reasons, cannot apply to individuals who have been shown to be too 
mentally disordered to grasp and apply these reasons. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that four of the most important principles of justice have 
analogues that govern our treatment of insane offenders. Given that insane offenders 
do not deserve retributive punishment, this suggests that these principles of justice 
need not depend on retributive desert. Traditionally, punishment theorists have often 
wanted to draw a very sharp distinction between sane and insane law-breakers. This 
may have been motivated by the poor treatment that people with mental health 
problems have historically received. These theorists did not want sane offenders to 
be treated equally badly. However, the treatment of both types of offender would be 
improved if we focussed on the need to respect personhood and the principles of 
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Part Two: Overview 
As a result of the problems faced by compatibilists and libertarians, hard 
incompatibilists have argued that (at the very least) there is enough uncertainty about 
retributive moral responsibility to mean that the kind of serious harm involved in 
punishment should not be inflicted for purely retributive reasons.164 Unfortunately, 
many hard incompatibilists then rush to embrace some form of consequentialism (i.e. 
the view that punishment is justified solely because it produces the best overall 
consequences). However, there is also considerable uncertainty surrounding the 
soundness of consequentialism. For instance, in principle, consequentialism could 
sanction ‘punishing’ people who have not actually committed an offence, if this 
promoted the social good. My thesis will examine how we should respond to the 
uncertainty surrounding the soundness of both consequentialism and retributivism. 
 
Different kinds of uncertainty can enter into our deliberations about what we should 
do. Firstly, there is uncertainty relating solely to the non-normative facts, e.g. 
whether or not the accused was the person who actually killed the victim. There is a 
vast literature concerning non-normative uncertainty. However, surprisingly little 
attention has been paid to the topic of moral uncertainty – doubt concerning which 
moral theory should guide one’s actions.165 This category includes uncertainty about 
which theory of punishment is morally preferable (the focus of this thesis). It should 
                                                
164 E.g. R Double ‘The Moral Hardness of Libertarians’ (2002) 5 (2) Philo 226; B Vilhauer, ‘Free Will 
and Reasonable Doubt’ (2009) 46 (2) American Philosophical Quarterly 131; D Pereboom, Living 
without Free Will (CUP, Cambridge 2001); G Harrison, ‘Hooray! We’re Not Morally Responsible!’ 
(2009) 8 Think 87. 
165 Recent publications that discuss this issue in detail include: J Hudson, ‘Subjectivization in 
Ethics’(1989) 26 American Philosophical Quarterly 221;  G Oddie ‘Moral Uncertainty and Human 
Embryo Experimentation’ in K Fulford et al (eds), Medicine and Moral Reasoning (CUP, Cambridge 
1994); A Guerrero, ‘Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability and Caution’ (2007) 136 
(1) Philosophical Studies 59;  T Lockhart, Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences (OUP, Oxford  
2000); J Ross, ‘Rejecting Ethical Deflationism’ (2006) 116 Ethics 742; A Sepielli, ‘Review of Ted 
Lockhart’s Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences’ (2006) 116 Ethics 601; A Sepielli, ‘What to Do 
When You Don't Know What to Do’ in R Shafer-Landau (ed.), 
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume Four (OUP, Oxford 2009); B Vilhauer, ‘Free Will and 
Reasonable Doubt’ (2009) 46 (2) American Philosophical Quarterly 131; M Zimmerman, Living With 
Uncertainty (CUP, Cambridge 2009). 
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be noted that uncertainty about the soundness of a moral theory can stem from doubt 
about the non-normative facts – e.g. one may be uncertain about the validity of 
libertarian retributivism because one does not know whether or not human actions 
are undetermined. 
 
How certain must we be that an argument for punishing a person is sound before it is 
justifiable to rely on it? Chapter Four will present an overview of some of the main 
theories of moral uncertainty and will highlight some of their key shortcomings (at 
least in relation to dealing with uncertainty about theories of punishment). Some 
theorists have argued that theories of punishment must be held to the ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ standard. 166 However, they have not defended this claim in 
sufficient detail. In Chapter Five I will examine the underlying rationale for the 
beyond reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials and will argue that it implies that 
we should hold the entire moral argument for punishing someone to a high standard 
of credibility. In Chapter Six, I will argue that in order to minimise the risk of 
punishing someone unjustifiably, we should only punish that person if the main 
punishment theories agree that doing so is justifiable. I will call this ‘the convergence 
requirement’. I will give some reasons why theorists from different philosophical 
perspectives should endorse this requirement.  
                                                
166 See references in fn 164, above. 
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Chapter Four: Approaches to Moral 
Uncertainty 
Introduction 
This Chapter will briefly describe some of the current literature on moral uncertainty, 
before defending my own approach to the problem of moral uncertainty about 
punishment.  
A Simple Approach 
The simplest approach to the problem of moral uncertainty would be to act on the 
moral theory in which one has the most credence. In situations where two or more 
theories seem equally plausible this approach is, of course, of no help at all.  In other 
situations it would be possible but deeply irrational to adopt the simple approach. To 
see this, first consider an example involving uncertainty about the non-moral facts:  
Imagine someone is deciding whether to drink a cup of coffee and has just slightly 
more credence in the idea that the coffee is safe than that it is poisoned. It would 
obviously be crazy to go ahead and drink the coffee, because the consequences 
would be so serious if it were true that the coffee is poisoned.167 This suggests that in 
the parallel moral case, it would be irrational to focus only on how much credence 
one has in a view which states that a particular action is morally wrong and to ignore 
how seriously wrong the action would be if that view turned out to be correct.  
Maximising Expected Moral Value 
In some cases it would be reasonably straightforward to take into account both one’s 
degree of belief in each competing moral theory and also the risk of serious 
wrongdoing. For instance, imagine that a particular action is morally neutral on 
                                                
167 This example is taken from Sepielli (2009), fn 165 above. 
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theory A and morally heinous according to theory B. Imagine that one thinks that 
both A and B are reasonable, defensible positions, but on balance one finds A 
slightly more plausible than B. It nevertheless seems that one should, morally, refrain 
from performing the action. However, things can get much more complicated. 
Consider the following case: A judge is wondering which sentence she ought, 
morally, to impose on a particular offender. Her credence is divided between 
utilitarianism and retributivism. Giving the offender one particular sentence would 
maximise utility (and so would be obligatory according to act utilitarianism), but that 
sentence would be disproportionate to the offender’s moral desert (and so would be 
unjust according to retributivism). One approach to this problem involves factoring 
in how much utility is at stake and how disproportionate the sentence would be. 
Taking this approach would require a method of comparing the level of moral 
goodness/badness each theory accords to each course of action. One might imagine, 
on the one hand, a scale indicating the retributive moral worth of possible actions, 
with massive injustice at the bottom and perfect justice at the other extreme, and, on 
the other hand, a scale of utilitarian moral worth, with actions that would cause a 
huge amount of disutility at one end and actions that would produce a huge increase 
in utility at the other end.  How could these two scales be made commensurable? 
Ted Lockhart is one of the very few authors who have tried to tackle this question in 
detail in the context of moral uncertainty.  He does not specifically consider the issue 
of moral uncertainty surrounding punishment theories (focussing instead on 
examples from medical ethics, and the ethics of charitable giving). However, his 
theory is meant to have general application to all cases of moral uncertainty. 
Lockhart defends what he calls the ‘Principle of Equity among Moral Theories’, 
which states that: 
 
‘The maximum degrees of moral rightness of all possible 
actions in a situation according to competing moral theories 
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should be considered equal. The minimum degrees of moral 
rightness of possible actions in a situation according to 
competing theories should be considered equal unless all 
possible actions are equally right according to one of the 
theories (in which case all of the actions should be considered 
to be maximally right according to that theory).’168 
In other words, if we rate the best possible action the person could do in that 
situation according to Theory A as scoring ‘10/10’ on the scale of moral worth, then 
we must also take Theory B to accord 10/10 to whichever action Theory B views as 
the best action in that situation. If we rate the worst possible action in that situation 
according to Theory A as 0/10 then Theory B must be considered to give 0/10 to 
whichever action Theory B rates as the worst. If a theory says that all actions 
available in that situation are right and does not prefer one action over another then 
all actions are considered to score 10/10 on that theory.  
Unfortunately, in many cases Lockhart’s method of scoring degrees of moral 
rightness/wrongness completely defeats the purpose of trying to take the degree of 
rightness/wrongness into account in the first place. Consider applying Lockhart’s 
principle to the following situation involving moral uncertainty about punishment 
theories. A judge has only two possible options – to acquit or to convict and is 
unsure what is the morally right thing to do. His credence is divided between a 
utilitarian theory (U) and a form of retributivism (R). According to R, the accused 
deserves to be acquitted, because he is morally blameless. According to U, the 
accused should be convicted in order to maximise utility. It seems that, for R, the 
best available option (the action which gets 10/10) is acquitting the accused and the 
worst (0/10) is convicting him. For U the situation is exactly reversed. This can be 
represented as follows: 
 
                                                





















It seems that in this situation, according to Lockhart’s principle, the judge must just 
try to work out which theory he thinks is more likely to be true – looking at the 
scores each theory gives each action cannot help him decide what to do. Yet this 
completely ignores the fact that certain situations will involve issues that are of 
tremendous moral significance according to one theory, but where according to a 
rival theory, nothing of very great importance is at stake. For it may be that, for one 
theory, the best option available in this particular situation is just about the best 
option conceivable in any situation and the worst possible option in this situation is 
just about the worst conceivable option in any situation.169 In contrast, for another 
theory, it may be that the best option available in this situation is merely OK 
compared with the available options in other situations, and the worst available 
option in this situation is merely slightly bad, when compared with the options for 
wrong-doing available in other situations. To return to theories of punishment, 
imagine that, according to R, convicting the accused would involve a massive 
injustice. Acquittal is the best available option for R, so Lockhart would give an 
                                                
169 For related criticisms see: Ross (2006), fn 165 above and Sepielli (2009), fn165 above. 
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acquittal a score of 10/10. However, imagine that according to U convicting the 
accused is only slightly better than acquitting him. Lockhart would still insist that the 
conviction is given a score of 10/10, as long as this is the best option available in this 
situation according to U. This kind of scoring completely distorts things. 
Andrew Sepielli attempts to deal with moral uncertainty by using an alternative 
method of comparing different theories’ conceptions of moral value. He says that we 
can get some idea about the value that different theories accord to different courses 
of action by comparing each action to other actions that are generally agreed to have 
a certain value. He gives the following example. A woman is deliberating about 
whether or not to have an abortion. Her credence is divided between theory A and 
theory B. Theory A says that abortion is really bad – as bad as murder – and that not 
having an abortion is not wrong at all – it might be compared to any morally 
permissible action, e.g. using an innocuous form of birth control, such as the rhythm 
method. Theory B says that abortion is not wrong at all – it has the moral value of, 
say, the rhythm method - and that failing to have an abortion would be worse than 
not having one, but not as bad as, for instance, murder. So, Sepielli concludes, we 
can say that according to A the difference between having an abortion and not having 
one is as big as the difference between murder and using the rhythm method (the 
latter difference being uncontroversially very big indeed), whereas B treats the gap 
between having an abortion and not having one as being smaller than the gap 
between murder and the rhythm method.170 Now, Sepielli’s ‘comparators’ are fairly 
plausible because we can see more or less in what respects abortion might be thought 
by some to resemble contraception and by others to resemble murder. However, it is 
less clear how this approach would work for theories of punishment. It is not 
                                                
170 Of course, the woman’s deliberations do not end there because she has to factor into the equation 
exactly how probable she considers each theory to be. 
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obvious, for instance, what action might be compared with the wrongness a 
retributivist would accord to a case of injustice. 
The Presumption Approach 
Both Sepielli’s and Lockhart’s approaches to the problem of uncertainty surrounding 
moral theories seek to work out the ‘expected moral value’ of an action. This 
involves determining the moral goodness/badness of the action if a particular theory 
is true, factoring in the probability of the theory actually being true and going 
through this process for each competing theory. These methods might be called 
‘maximization strategies’ since they all recommend performing whichever action has 
the maximum expected moral value. A markedly different approach to the problem 
of uncertainty surrounding the soundness of punishment theories might be called the 
‘presumption approach’. Ben Vilhauer, for instance, proposes that there should be a 
presumption against punishment which the punishment theorist must rebut, by 
establishing her argument to an extremely high standard of credibility.171 According 
to Vilhauer, the justifiability of this presumption is something about which there is a 
relatively high degree of moral certainty – most people, he claims, would agree that 
the deliberate infliction of serious harm on an individual by the state is something 
that is prima facie wrong and which should only be a last resort. He proposes that a 
moral argument for punishing a particular person must be established to be sound 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’, before it is appropriate to punish the person on the basis 
of that argument. Vilhauer’s approach could produce very different results from 
maximization strategies. For instance, a maximization theorist might claim that we 
should punish a person on the basis of a penal theory that is merely ‘probably sound’ 
as long as the potential moral benefits of punishing the person (if that theory were in 
fact sound) would be so substantial that they outweighed the potential wrongfulness 
                                                
171 Vilhauer (2009), fn165 above. 
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involved in punishing him if a competing theory that opposed punishing him turned 
out to be correct.  
Presumption theories avoid the commensurability problem involved in trying to 
weigh the moral benefits of punishment on one theory against the moral 
wrongfulness of punishment on a different theory, where the theories have different 
conceptions of ‘value’. Yet they face their own problems, including the challenge of 
explaining what precisely it means to say that a moral argument has been established 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’. Vilhauer argues that no retributive argument for 
punishing anyone can be established beyond reasonable doubt. This, he claims, is 
because retributive punishment is only justifiable if the offender had free will with 
respect to his offence. He argues that the fact that the free will debate is widely 
regarded as being ‘philosophically valuable’ indicates that it can reasonably be 
doubted that anyone ever has free will. He suggests that consequentialist arguments 
for punishing people may meet his proposed standard. However, this claim is 
dubious, for there is also a philosophically valuable debate about the soundness of 
consequentialism.172  By parity of reasoning, this indicates that consequentialist 
justifications of punishment also fail to meet the beyond reasonable doubt standard. 
The problem of moral uncertainty surrounding the soundness of punishment theories 
has received insufficient attention. Existing approaches to moral uncertainty 
encounter serious difficulties. In the next two chapters I will argue that Vilhauer is 
right to say that the arguments for punishing people must be held to a high standard 
of credibility. However, his precise definition of the beyond reasonable doubt 
standard is inappropriate to the context of theories of punishment. In Chapter 6 I will 
argue that a person should only be punished if the main theories of punishment agree 
                                                
172 Elsewhere, Vilhauer defends a Rawlsian contractarian theory of punishment. However, there is 
surely also a philosophically valuable debate about the soundness of this theory. B Vilhauer, ‘Free 
Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base’ (2009) 39 (3) Canadian Journal of Philosophy 489. 
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that punishing that person is appropriate – I call this ‘the convergence requirement’. 
If an argument for punishing someone satisfies the convergence requirement then it 
has reached a sufficiently high standard of credibility – the nearest arguments for 
punishment can get to being established beyond reasonable doubt.  
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Chapter Five: The Rationale for the 
Beyond Reasonable Doubt Standard 
 
Introduction 
In Part One, I drew attention to the serious doubts about the adequacy of 
retributivism that are raised by the free will debate and I have also pointed to 
difficulties with retributivism’s main rival – consequentialism. In this chapter, I will 
relate these doubts about punishment to the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ (BRD) 
standard of proof in criminal trials. I argue that it would be arbitrary to maintain that 
an accused’s criminal responsibility must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
before it is fair to punish her, but to fail to take seriously the issue of doubt 
surrounding the soundness of the conception of responsibility and punishment being 
applied. I argue that we should therefore hold the entire moral argument for 
punishing a person to a high standard of credibility. (Although, as I will explain in 
Chapter 6, it does not follow that all elements of the argument must be held to 
precisely the BRD standard). 
I will consider two ways in which this proposal could be challenged: Firstly, the 
beyond reasonable doubt standard itself might be rejected. If we can endorse a lower 
standard of proof in criminal trials, then we might also be satisfied with a similarly 
low credence in the moral justification for punishing people. Secondly, perhaps there 
are good reasons why the beyond reasonable doubt standard should only apply in its 
current context and should not be extended in the way I propose. In order to address 
these challenges it is necessary to look at the underlying justification(s) for the 
beyond reasonable doubt standard. 
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The BRD standard has extremely widespread support among legal theorists173 and is 
a central principle of most adversarial legal systems.174 Therefore, the first strategy 
of abandoning this principle altogether would be a tough bullet to bite. In addition, 
the BRD standard is supported by a number of key non-consequentialist principles 
including:  the doing/allowing distinction; the foreseen/intended distinction; and 
arguments relating to the state’s moral authority to punish. These principles, in turn 
would be costly for non-consequentialists to abandon, since they each have a 
plausible moral basis and they help to explain widespread intuitions in a range of 
different cases. The non-consequentialist principles that can justify the BRD standard 
are also general ethical principles (that can be endorsed by a variety of punishment 
theorists). The rationale for the BRD standard does not stem directly from any 
specific theory of punishment, e.g. retributivism. I will also argue that the most 
plausible justifications for the BRD standard provide no basis for restricting the BRD 
solely to its current context in criminal trials. The entire moral argument for 
inflicting serious harm on offenders should be held to a high standard of credibility. 
Consequentialists on the whole are also reluctant to reject the BRD standard (with 
some notable exceptions).175 However, this chapter will primarily provide reasons 
why non-consequentialists should support the BRD standard. In the next chapter, I 
                                                
173 Patrick Tomlin notes that even theorists who strongly disagree about how courts should interpret 
the BRD standard still agree on the importance of the principle and agree that its underlying 
normative justification is based on the grave wrongness of mistaken convictions: ‘Extending the 
Golden Thread? Criminalisation and the Presumption of Innocence’ The Journal of Political 
Philosophy (Forthcoming).  
174 See e.g. A v HM Advocate 2003 S.L.T. 497; Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; Re Winship 397 
U.S. 358 (1970), at 364.  In these jurisdictions the BRD standard is considered to be required by the 
presumption of innocence. Hock Lai Ho points out that even in inquisitorial systems, the presumption 
of innocence still requires that the state must prove guilt: ‘The Presumption of Innocence as Human 
Right’ in Roberts P (ed) Criminal Evidence and Human Rights: Reimagining Common Law 
Procedural Traditions (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2012), 259, p262.  
175 For a consequentialist defence of the BRD standard see:  Rizzolli M and Saraceno M, ‘Better That 
Ten Guilty Persons Escape: Punishment Costs Explain The Standard Of Evidence’ (2011) Public 
Choice DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9867-y (online first). For a consequentialist critique of the BRD 
standard see: Laudan L, ‘The Rules of Trial, Political Morality, and the Costs of Error: Or, is Proof 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Doing More Harm than Good’ in L Green and B Leiter (eds) Oxford 
Studies in Philosophy of Law (OUP, Oxford 2011). 
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will address those who are not committed to the non-consequentialist principles 
discussed in the present chapter and will argue that they too should demand that the 
state’s moral argument for punishing people is held to a high standard of credibility. 
Arguments Against a Retributive Basis for the 
BRD Standard 
I will begin by critiquing a possible justification for the BRD standard that derives 
specifically from retributivism.  My thesis aims to show that there are serious doubts 
about the soundness of pure retributive and pure consequentialist conceptions of 
responsibility and punishment; that (by analogy with the BRD standard) we should 
hold arguments for punishing people to a high standard of credibility; and that, 
therefore, such arguments should not rely on either pure consequentialism or pure 
retributivism alone. If the ‘real’ reason for the BRD standard were retributive, then 
this could pose problems for my argument. A critic might object that since the BRD 
standard would only be defensible if retributivism were correct, and there is little 
doubt about the appropriateness of the BRD standard, then is little doubt about the 
appropriateness of retributivism. Or, conversely, the critic might argue that if the 
beyond reasonable doubt principle is sound, then retributivism must be sound, but 
retributivism is faulty and therefore the beyond reasonable doubt standard is 
unsound. My thesis aims to question the soundness of retributivism, without 
undermining the BRD standard. So it is important to show that the BRD standard 
does not depend on retributivism. 
 
Jeffrey Reiman tries to derive the BRD standard directly from retributivism itself.176 
Retributivism contains two requirements – 1) punish the guilty (positive 
                                                
176 Reiman J and Van Den Haag E, ‘On the Common Saying that it is Better that Ten Guilty Persons 
Escape than that One Innocent Suffer: Pro and Con’ 7(2) (1990) Social Philosophy and Policy 226. 
(Henceforth: Reiman and Van den Haag, ‘On the Common Saying’.) 
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retributivism); and 2) do not punish the innocent (negative retributivism). Confining 
punishment to only those people whose guilt has been established to the BRD 
standard seems to privilege the second duty over the first. Reiman argues that 
retributivism has the conceptual tools to justify this. He tries to find a way of 
comparing the relative stringency of the two retributive obligations. He does this by 
comparing the seriousness of failing to fulfil these obligations with the seriousness of 
criminal offences. He claims that punishing an innocent person for a crime (i.e. a 
failure to fulfil duty 2) is about as seriously wrong as the crime itself - for example, 
punishing an innocent person for murder is about as wrong as murder. In contrast, he 
claims, failing to punish an actual murderer (i.e. a failure in duty 1) is not as bad as 
murder.  
 
In order for Reiman’s account to succeed he must first explain (in retributive terms) 
why he has chosen the seriousness of crimes as the ‘comparator’ for measuring the 
seriousness of failures to achieve retributive justice. Secondly, he must find a rational 
basis for his claim that punishing the innocent and committing crimes are equally 
bad, but that it is less bad to let guilty people go free - to do this he must find a way 
of assessing the degree of badness which each of these things involves. 
He justifies his choice of comparator with reference to the lex talionis – the idea 
(historically associated with retributivism) that making the punishment ‘fit’ the crime 
requires that ‘criminals ought to be punished (as nearly as is feasible) with harm 
equivalent to that which they intentionally caused their victims’.177 The lex talionis 
invites us to compare the seriousness of punishments to the seriousness of crimes (in 
common with other retributive proportionality requirements).  
 
                                                
177 Reiman and Van den Haag, ‘On the Common Saying’, p230. 
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The lex talionis also seems to assess the gravity of the offence in terms of the harm 
done to the victim. Similarly, Reiman proposes that the badness of failing to fulfill 
the two retributive duties can be measured in terms of the ‘palpable harm’ that this 
inflicts on the people to whom the duties are owed; i.e. the extent to which this 
failure ‘subtracts…from his ability to pursue his own purposes’.178 According to 
Reiman, the duty not to punish the innocent is owed to the innocent. He is less sure 
to whom the duty to punish the guilty is owed, but he considers three possibilities: 
guilty criminals themselves (who may have a ‘right’ to be punished); victims (and 
their friends and family) and the law-abiding population.179 Reiman states that 
punishing an innocent person for crime X harms the punished person (i.e. interferes 
with their purposes) to roughly the same degree as committing crime X against an 
innocent victim harms that victim. However, failure to punish a guilty person for 
crime X per se does not harm the criminal, the victim or the law-abiding population 
to the same degree as crime X harmed the victim. Reiman’s calculation might work 
out differently if we took into account factors such as failure to prevent the 
mistakenly acquitted person from re-offending. However, Reiman justifies his 
narrow focus on the ‘direct negative impact’ of these failures of duty to the persons 
to whom they are owed, because any consideration of ‘further losses’ would ‘cross 
the boundary’ that distinguishes consequentialism from retributivism.180 If Reiman’s 
reasoning were correct, then this would provide a retributive basis for the claim that 
punishing the innocent is worse than acquitting the guilty and thus a retributive 
justification for the BRD standard. 
However, there are problems with Reiman’s account. The lex talionis measures the 
amount of punishment that criminals deserve by comparison with harm to individual 
                                                
178 Reiman and Van den Haag, ‘On the Common Saying’, p234. 
179 Reiman states that the duty to punish is owed to ‘victims’ without explicitly mentioning whether 
this includes friends and family of direct victims. If it does not, it is puzzling what Reiman would say 
about murder victims. See V Halvorsen, ‘Is it Better that Ten Guilty Persons Go Free than that One 
Innocent Person be Convicted?’ 23 (2004) Criminal Justice Ethics 3. (Henceforth: Halvorsen, ‘Ten 
Guilty Persons’). 
180 Reiman and Van den Haag, ‘On the Common Saying’, p232. 
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crime victims. Even if it were acceptable to focus on ‘harm’ in that context, it is 
dubious to measure the stringency of the retributive duty to punish or the wrongness 
of failing to punish in terms of ‘harm’ to individuals. The harm to individuals that 
results from the failure to punish a particular wrongdoer can vary, depending on 
factors including how much the victim or others want to see the wrongdoer harmed 
(which sometimes depends on how vengeful they are, or how popular the victim 
was); whether the victim is still alive and whether they have any living friends or 
relatives. But all of these factors seem largely irrelevant to the question whether there 
is a duty to punish the murderer of an unpopular orphan, or how stringent that duty is 
or how bad a breach of that duty would be.  
 
Furthermore, measuring the stringency of the duty to punish in terms of the ‘harm’ 
caused by failing to punish seems to involve a significant departure from the spirit of 
retributivism. The retributive duty to punish the guilty (and its stringency) seems 
more plausibly to stem from the demands of abstract justice, or perhaps, as Ernest 
van den Haag puts it, from an obligation to the ‘perpetual moral community’ (even at 
the expense of harm to the contemporary community).181 Reiman’s focus solely on 
narrow class of harms seems arbitrary and does not succeed in transforming his 
account into a retributive one. 
 
Even if Reiman could justify his reliance on the notion of ‘harm’ (in his restrictive 
sense) this would not necessarily help his argument. Reiman asks: ‘for a given crime 
and its appropriate punishment, does failing to punish the guilty criminal impose a 
loss on his victim that is as bad as the loss that the crime imposed on the victim?’ He 
answers that the crime itself would always cause the victim to ‘suffer more’ than the 
mere failure to punish the victimizer. He then asks whether punishing an innocent 
                                                
181 Reiman and Van den Haag, ‘On the Common Saying’, p242. 
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person would cause that person to suffer as much as the original victim of crime and 
answers that it would. Therefore, he concludes that punishing innocent people is 
worse than failing to punish guilty people. However, his statements about the relative 
suffering caused by failure to punish, being a crime victim and being unjustly 
punished are not always correct. Consider the following example:  
Imagine that a criminal, motivated by prejudice, assaults a victim. The assault was 
minor. The main harm the victim suffered was psychological distress. In this case, 
the failure of the system to bring that bigot to justice may be as distressing for the 
victim as the original offence. The victim might rather be assaulted again and have 
both bigots punished, than let the bigot get away with this crime. 
Furthermore, one can imagine that some unjustly punished people suffer less than 
crime victims. Some unjustly punished people may be innocent of a specific crime, 
but may also have a string of just convictions. For some such people, the suffering 
caused by a single false conviction may not be as great as the suffering that crime 
victims experience. (How much unjustly convicted people suffer can plausibly be 
affected by how accustomed they are to the prison environment). Yet the BRD 
standard rightly protects people who may be innocent of the particular crime with 
which they are charged, even though they are not wholly ‘innocent’ in a broad sense. 
Perhaps people would typically suffer more from being subject to crime or to unjust 
punishment than from seeing guilty people go free. However, Reiman claims that the 
relative stringency of the duty to punish the guilty and the duty to acquit the innocent 
depends on the relative amounts of harm that result from failures in these duties. If 
this were correct, then presumably in the ‘exceptional’ cases where failure to punish 
the guilty would cause more harm than inflicting undeserved punishment, the duty to 
punish the guilty would become more stringent than the duty not to punish the 
innocent. This would lead us to lower the standard of proof in such cases if that 
would increase the chance of the guilty person being punished, even at the expense 
 128 
of risking punishing an innocent person. Some consequentialists might be content to 
vary the standard of proof in this way, but it does not seem to be something that a 
retributivist could endorse and it does not seem just.182 
 
My own defence of the BRD standard is not based on the essential nature of the 
retributive duties. Instead, I will invoke general non-consequentialist ethical 
principles such as the requirement that inflicting active, intentional harm must be 
justified to a very high standard. It is certainly open to retributivists to appeal to these 
principles, but they are independent from retributivism, constraining the positive 
retributive duty to punish. There is nothing in the nature of the retributive duties per 
se, which tells us which retributive duty is more stringent. Reference must be made 
to these broader principles. My defence of the BRD standard does not imply that the 
standard of proof should vary from case to case. Punishment in every case involves 
the active and intentional infliction of harm. True, the severity of the punishment 
varies. But all punishment is above the threshold which attracts the protection of 
these non-consequentialist safeguards. Reiman cannot appeal to this threshold idea, 
because his theory depends on measuring the precise level of harm that failing to 
acquit the innocent causes versus failure to convict the guilty. On his theory, the first 
failure is only worse than the second, because the level of harm that the first failure 
involves is (allegedly) greater. It follows that, in cases where this is not true, 
punishing the guilty should be prioritised over acquitting the innocent. In contrast, on 
my account, we need a high standard of proof because when the state punishes 
innocent people it always inflicts harm actively and intentionally and this needs to be 
strongly justified. Whereas when it fails to punish guilty people because the evidence 
has not met the required standard, the harm that flows from that is merely allowed 
and is unintentional.  
                                                
182Cf: Lilquist E, ‘Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability’ 36 
(2003) University of California Davis Law Review 85. 
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In the next two sections I will develop my justification for the BRD standard, based 
on the doing/allowing and intention/side-effect distinctions. As, I have said, 
retributivists (together with other non-consequentialists) can consistently appeal to 
these distinctions in order to justify the BRD standard. The fact that most 
retributivists recognise the importance of the BRD standard could motivate them to 
endorse this type of justification for it. But since there is nothing about these 
distinctions that ties them to the context of the criminal trial, they also provide a 
rationale for applying a high standard of credibility to theories of punishment, 
including retributivism. 
 
The Doing/Allowing Distinction and the BRD 
Standard 
The purpose of this section is to argue that theorists who endorse the doctrine of 
doing and allowing have reason to support the BRD standard and that such theorists 
also have reason to apply the BRD standard (or a similarly high standard of 
justification) to the entire moral argument for inflicting serious harm on offenders. I 
will begin with a brief description of the doctrine of doing and allowing and with an 
indication of why many theorists consider the doctrine to be important. I will then 
rebut some of the main arguments that have been presented by those who doubt that 
the doctrine can provide a basis for the BRD standard. My discussion will be focused 
on how the doctrine of doing and allowing relates to the BRD standard. I will not 
attempt to engage with the debate on whether it is possible to distinguish between 
doing and allowing at all, or with the wider debate about whether this distinction (if 
it can be drawn) is ethically significant. This section, is therefore, primarily 
addressed to theorists who find the doctrine of doing and allowing plausible. 
However, this chapter also criticises some of the main alternative strategies for 
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defending the BRD standard that do not depend on the doctrine of doing and 
allowing.183 These criticisms may provide some motivation for those who endorse 
the BRD standard also to endorse the strategy for defending it that draws on the 
doctrine of doing and allowing. The position of those who reject the doctrine of 
doing and allowing will be further discussed in chapter 6, where I will present some 
different reasons (including meta-theoretical reasons) for holding the moral argument 
for inflicting serious harm on offenders to a high standard of justification. 
 
The doctrine of doing and allowing (or DDA) states that it is harder to justify doing 
than allowing harm. Fiona Woollard has recently provided a sophisticated account of 
what this doctrine is and why it is important, which draws together themes from 
various other proponents of the doctrine.184 Here is Woollard’s brief summary of 
what she takes to be the doctrine’s significance: ‘The DDA should be understood as 
a principle that protects us from harmful imposition. When an agent does harm, he 
imposes on the victim. When an agent is required to prevent harm he is imposed 
upon by the potential victim. Protection against both types of imposition, as provided 
by the DDA is required to recognise our authority over what belongs to us.’185 In 
other words, firstly, if the DDA were false and deciding actively to harm another 
person did not require particularly strong justification, then we would all become 
excessively vulnerable to being harmed by other agents in the course of pursuing 
their goals. Having authority over oneself and one’s resources, however, implies that 
we have a powerful right not to be interfered with by other agents, which would take 
                                                
183 See my discussion of Reiman’s retributive strategy in the previous section, as well as my 
discussion of Tadros’s deterrence strategy, Lee’s social contract strategy, and a condemnation-based 
strategy discussed in subsequent sections. 
184 See e.g., Woollard, ‘If This Is My Body…: A Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing’ 
(2013) 94(3) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 315; Woollard F, ‘The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing 
I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction’ 7(7) (2012) Philosophy Compass 448 [henceforth: 
Woollard, ‘DDA I’]; Woollard F, ‘The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing II: The Moral Relevance of 
the Doing/Allowing Distinction’7 (7) (2012) Philosophy Compass 459 [henceforth: Woollard, ‘DDA 
II’]. 
185 Woollard, ‘DDA II’, p466. 
 131 
considerable justification to overcome. Secondly, without the DDA, morality 
becomes excessively demanding: if our obligations to prevent harm were as powerful 
as our obligation not to do harm, we would have to give up our resources and make 
ourselves liable to injury or death in a very wide range of circumstances. But if, as 
the DDA states, our obligations to prevent harm are weaker than our obligations not 
to do harm, this sets limits to the claims others can make on us and thus helps to 
safeguard our authority over our bodies and resources. 
 
Supporters of the DDA should hold justifications for harming offenders to a high 
standard of credibility for the following reason: When the state inflicts serious harm 
on offenders in response to their crimes, it does so actively, whereas the harms that 
result from failing to impose hardship on offenders are merely allowed to occur. 
 
Reiman dismisses the act/omission distinction (and presumably also the 
doing/allowing distinction) as a basis for determining whether the state should 
prioritise sparing the innocent over punishing the guilty.186 He points out that the 
state has a pre-existing obligation to punish the guilty. Where someone fails to 
discharge a pre-existing obligation, they cannot ‘get an automatic moral discount’ 
because that failure is an omission. For example, doctors who intentionally refuse to 
                                                
186 Reiman and Van den Haag, ‘On the Common Saying’, p229. Jeff McMahan points out that the 
act/omission distinction is not identical to the doing/allowing distinction. He gives the following 
example: Imagine a thief steals my wallet because he needs the money to pay for an operation to 
prevent him becoming disfigured. I run after him and take the wallet back; the thief cannot afford the 
operation and so becomes disfigured. He has become disfigured partly as a result of my act. But 
(assuming I know his motives) I have merely allowed him to become disfigured, by withholding my 
resources from him: ‘A Challenge to Common Sense Morality’ (1998) 108 (2) Ethics 394, p411. 
Similarly, the acquittal of a factually guilty person can result from various acts by state officials 
(including the choice of the high standard of proof), but the harm to victims and others that results 
from this is merely allowed by the state. Cf Cass Sunstein’s and Adrian Vermeule’s argument that the 
state cannot appeal to the act/omission distinction to diminish its responsibility for the harm criminals 
cause to victims, because some of those crimes could have been prevented if the state had made 
different policy choices and policy choices are ‘acts’: ‘Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, 
Omissions and Life-Life Tradeoffs’ (2005) 58 Stanford Law Review 703. Youngjae Lee also observes 
that the Sunstein-Vermeule argument ignores the doing/allowing distinction: ‘Deontology, Political 
Morality, and the State’ 8 (2011) Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 385, pp388-390. 
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treat their patients or parents who intentionally fail to feed their children are, 
according to Reiman, ‘morally indistinguishable’ from doctors who actively kill their 
patients or parents who actively take food away from their children.187 Similarly, he 
concludes that: 
 
‘ [If the state’s] obligation to punish the guilty is as strong as 
their obligation not to punish the innocent, then failure at the 
first obligation is as bad as failure at the second. This leaves us 
with the task of determining the relative strength of these 
obligations, which is where we were before taking up the 
acts/omissions distinction.’188 
Thought-experiments designed to undermine the doing/allowing distinction, typically 
involve agents who are motivated by clearly inadequate or immoral 
considerations.189 The agents in Reiman’s examples apparently want or intend their 
victims to come to harm and that is what explains their decision actively to cause or 
allow this to happen. Even where agents have such bad motives, some theorists have 
argued that the doing/allowing distinction is still morally relevant. Halvorsen argues 
that a lifeguard who fails to rescue a swimmer (though still very blameworthy) is less 
culpable than a lifeguard who actively holds a swimmer’s head under the water until 
he drowns.190 This seems plausible even where both lifeguards are motivated by 
hostility towards the swimmer. However, the significance of the doing/allowing 
distinction becomes even clearer when the agent is motivated by something of 
significant moral value. Consider the following cases: 
Allowing Harm – Diverting Resources 
                                                
187 Reiman and Van den Haag, ‘On the Common Saying’, p229. 
188 Reiman and Van den Haag, ‘On the Common Saying’, p229. 
189 E.g. James Rachels’ famous ‘Wicked Uncle’ case: ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’ (1975) 292 
New England Journal of Medicine 78. 
190 Halvorsen, ‘Ten Guilty Persons’, p11. 
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Imagine a doctor who diverts resources away from some patients, thereby allowing 
some harm to come to them, in order to treat even more needy patients. We normally 
think that this is permissible. 191 
 
Doing Harm – Medicine Machine 
Now imagine that there is a machine in a room in a hospital that can produce 
medicine for some very sick patients. However, the doctor knows that there is a 
patient in that room who cannot immediately be moved and, if the machine is 
switched on, it will emit toxic fumes (as a side-effect of the production process) 
which would harm that patient. It seems that the doctor should not turn on the 
machine until the patient can be moved, even though this delay is likely to harm the 
patients who need their medicine.192  
In these examples, the doctor has a duty of care to all the patients concerned, but how 
he carries out his duty is constrained by the powerful considerations against active 
harming. Similarly, the state has a duty to respond to crime in a just manner – to 
coercively interfere with offenders who ought to be subject to such interference and 
not interfere with individuals where this is unjustified, e.g. where the individual is 
innocent - but how it carries out its duty is likewise constrained by the powerful 
considerations against active harming. These considerations are so powerful that they 
can only be rebutted by an argument that is at least as compelling. Hence the 
prosecution’s case for convicting the accused will only succeed if it meets the 
demanding BRD standard. Likewise, more generally, seriously harming offenders is 
only permissible if the moral justification for doing so meets a high standard of 
credibility. 
                                                
191 V Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of the Criminal Law (OUP, Oxford 2011), 
p120. 
192 This example is a variation on a thought-experiment discussed in Philippa Foot, ‘The Problem of 
Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect’ in P Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral 
Philosophy (OUP, Oxford 2002), 19. 
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Youngjae Lee attempts to formulate a better counter-example, in which the agent’s 
motives are good and where she is justified in choosing to do harm to someone 
instead of allowing harm to befall others.193 He imagines several variations on a 
scenario from the novel Sophie’s Choice.194 These variations are progressively 
altered to make them more analogous to the state’s decision about where to set the 
standard of proof.  
Sophie’s Choice 
In the scenario, there is a war and Sophie is taken to a prison camp. In the first 
variation, a sadistic prison guard tells Sophie that he will release five children (whom 
she has never met) if she kills Bruno (a man whom she has never met). Otherwise he 
will release Bruno and the five children will stay in the dangerous prison camp. Lee 
then replaces the unknown children with Sophie’s own children, on the basis that 
Sophie’s parental duty is analogous to the state’s obligation to protect victims of 
crime. He also adds that at the beginning of the war Sophie’s husband was murdered 
and ‘it is more likely than not’ that Bruno is the murderer, although this could not be 
established beyond reasonable doubt.  
 
Lee argues that it may be harder for Sophie to justify killing Bruno in the first 
variation, where the children she is trying to save are strangers to her. However, 
when we imagine that Sophie is their mother, Lee claims that her positive duty to 
protect them may make it ‘mandatory for her to violate the negative duty owed to 
Bruno [not to kill him]’, and this conclusion, he claims, is strengthened when we 
factor in that Bruno is probably a murderer.195  
 
                                                
193 ‘Deontology, Political Morality, and the State’ 8 (2011) Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 385. 
(Henceforth: Lee, ‘Deontology’.) 
194 William Styron, Sophie’s Choice (The Modern Library, New York 1998). 
195 Lee, ‘Deontology’, p392. 
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Sophie must choose between the lives of her own children, and the life of Bruno - a 
stranger and probable murderer. Lee claims this is analogous to the state’s choice 
between protecting ‘its citizens’ and giving probable ‘criminals’ the benefit of the 
BRD standard.196 This way of framing the problem is incorrect, because the state has 
also got a duty to protect accused people. To make the Sophie case somewhat more 
analogous, imagine that Bruno is one of her children. The claim that she is required 
to kill her child in order that her other children will be released seems less 
persuasive. The idea that Sophie is morally required to base this decision on the 51% 
chance that her child is a murderer is also problematic. It is far from clear that Sophie 
would be doing something wrong if she refused to believe that her child had done 
such a terrible thing and therefore dismissed this consideration. As CS Lewis writes, 
‘to love involves trusting the beloved beyond the evidence, even against much 
evidence...Such confidence...is in fact almost universally praised as a moral 
beauty....’. 197  As I will argue in more detail below, trust is an important part of other 
kinds of relationships too, in particular, between the state and citizens. It might be 
argued that given the terrible choice that Sophie is forced to make, the normal 
attitude of trust should be abandoned.  Even if this were true, the loss of trust would 
be a tragic feature of this kind of emergency situation, and hardly a principle that a 
society under ordinary conditions should enshrine in its institutions.  
 
In a footnote, Lee envisages the objection that the state’s duty of protection is not 
limited to innocent victims of crime, but extends to criminals and to accused people. 
However, he denies that this undermines his analogy. Even if Bruno were Sophie’s 
child, he argues, the ‘the fact that she has a duty to protect Bruno from harm does not 
give her an additional reason not to kill Bruno’.198 This seems very counter intuitive. 
                                                
196 Lee, ‘Deontology’, p392-393. 
197 CS Lewis, ‘On Obstinacy in Belief’ (1955) 63(4) The Sewanee Review 525, p535. 
198 Lee, ‘Deontology’, p393, fn28. 
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While he insists that Sophie’s positive obligation to protect her children is more 
stringent than her duty to prevent other people’s children from being harmed, he 
denies that Sophie’s protective role as a mother strengthens her negative obligation 
not to kill her children. This negative obligation is, according to Lee, no more 
stringent than her general negative duty not to kill strangers. Therefore, if we assume 
that Sophie has done her best to protect all her children including Bruno (e.g. by 
attempting to help them escape) and has ‘run out of such options’, she has discharged 
her parental duty to Bruno and it is no longer relevant to her decision to kill him.199 
Lee’s argument rests on a peculiar asymmetry between positive and negative duties: 
the duty to protect, on his account, only strengthens the positive duty to aid the 
protected person, and in no way strengthens the negative duty not to harm the 
protected person. He compares the protector to a debtor who pays back his creditor 
and then steals from him. The debtor’s positive duty to pay the creditor has been 
discharged and does not give him an additional reason not to steal from his creditor. 
The debtor simply has the general negative duty we all have not to steal. A flaw in 
this analogy is the fact that protectors (such as parents, or the state) have a duty to 
protect their children/citizens, but the debtor does not have a positive duty to protect 
the creditor’s assets. A closer analogy would be a security guard who steals the thing 
he is meant to be protecting from thieves. His position of responsibility does seem to 
give him an additional reason not to steal. Similarly, as I will argue below, the state’s 
duty to protect its citizens does give it an additional reason to refrain from convicting 
and punishing them unless there is extremely good evidence that this is justified. 
 
Even if Sophie were clearly required actively to kill one of her children in order to 
save the others, this cannot undermine the general validity of the doing/allowing 
distinction. Nor can it undermine the use of this distinction to defend the BRD 
                                                
199 Lee, ‘Deontology’, p393, fn28. 
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standard in the context of punishment. Sophie makes her choice in an emergency 
situation where civil society has broken down. In such emergency situations 
important values are often sacrificed. These values may include trust, freedom and 
the doing/allowing distinction among others. But we should not model our criminal 
justice system according to the moral norms governing captives struggling for 
survival in a concentration camp. Social life would be hellish if we did. My earlier 
hospital analogy (which supports the doing/allowing distinction) taps into intuitions 
that are of greater relevance to state punishment. Hospitals, like the penal system 
need to adopt policies that are appropriate for everyday life in relatively peaceful 
societies. In such societies we cannot be willing actively to inflict serious harm on 
others, unless this is justified to a very high standard.  
 
Larry Laudan attempts to find examples from our ordinary social practices that 
undermine the doing/allowing distinction.200 He argues that, in fact, such examples 
can be found within the criminal justice system. He cites several cases where he 
claims we tolerate the risk of unjustifiably doing harm to individuals, rather than 
allow a greater harm to occur. For instance, confessions are admissible in evidence. 
But we know that accused people sometimes make false confessions, so admitting 
confession evidence at all means that we are willing to risk convicting innocent 
people. Even the BRD standard itself, does not make convicting innocent people 
impossible. High as it is, the BRD standard demands less than absolute certainty. To 
completely avoid the risk of the state doing harm to innocent people, punishment 
would need to be abolished altogether. 
However, Laudan’s examples do not provide evidence against the doing/allowing 
distinction as generally understood. In fact, he is arguing against a straw man. Few 
                                                
200 He actually uses the terms ‘omission/commission’: Laudan L, ‘The Rules of Trial, Political 
Morality, and the Costs of Error: Or, is Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Doing More Harm than 
Good’ in L Green and B Leiter (eds) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law (OUP, Oxford 2011). 
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proponents of the doing/allowing distinction hold that actively causing harm is never 
justified, or is only permissible if we are completely certain that we are doing the 
right thing (assuming we can be completely certain of anything). It is clear that our 
society does not, and has never taken this approach to harmful acts. As I have 
explained above, the doing/allowing distinction just states that it is harder to justify 
doing harm than allowing harm.  
Whether a harmful act can be justified, in a particular context, depends on a variety 
of considerations. For example, it can be permissible to cause harm in the course of 
protecting a particularly powerful right, e.g. the right to self-defence. But even in 
self-defence cases, the doing/allowing distinction is still relevant. Because doing 
harm to others is so serious, strict constraints are placed on the use of force in self-
defence. Punishment is analogous to self-defence in some respects (it can protect 
innocent people from wrongdoers) but there are key differences. For instance, 
criminal courts have more time for deliberation than individuals in self-defence 
situations. Secondly, acts of convicting and punishing criminals have symbolic force 
(i.e. they communicate messages about society’s core values), but an individual’s 
decision to repel an attacker does not have this same symbolic force. Thirdly, (as I 
will discuss in more detail below) the state has a special relation to the offender, 
which makes miscarriages of justice particularly egregious. These differences mean 
that the constraints on harming people for societal self-defence must be stricter than 
the constraints on individual self-defence – the BRD standard is appropriate for 
decisions about punishment; but the ‘reasonable belief’ standard is appropriate for 
decisions about individual self-defence. 
 
As I explained at the start of this section, there is not scope within this thesis to 
provide a full defence of the doctrine of doing and allowing.  Instead, I have 
focussed on the relevance of the DDA to the justification of the BRD standard. I 
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have rebutted some of the main arguments that have been presented by those who 
doubt that the doctrine can provide a basis for the BRD standard. Many of the 
arguments that I have criticised so far share a similar strategy: they deny the 
relevance of the distinction, by producing examples where the distinction 
purportedly fails to govern our judgements about the agent’s behaviour. Without 
considering every supposed counter-example against the DDA I will make some 
general remarks about common flaws with this strategy: Firstly, the DDA states that 
it is harder to justify doing harm, than allowing harm, because doing harm is prima 
facie particularly wrong.  (Hence punishment, which undeniably involves doing 
harm, is not absolutely prohibited by this principle, but must be strongly justified). 
So examples that merely show that doing harm is sometimes permitted/required do 
not automatically undermine the distinction. Furthermore, given that the principle is 
concerned with justifying harm, purported counter-examples (such as Reiman’s 
examples, discussed earlier in this section) involving behaviour which is very clearly 
unjustified, and which the agents themselves do not try to justify, are not obviously 
relevant. As Warren Quinn has pointed out, the DDA does not imply that badly-
motivated agents who do harm will always seem more culpable than badly-motivated 
agents who allow harm.201 Furthermore, it is a mistake to think that the difference 
between doing and allowing harm is only morally significant if every pair of cases 
that differ in this respect, also differ as to permissibility. Sometimes a factor that is 
normally morally significant can have its force negated or outweighed by other 
aspects of the particular case.202 In addition, it is often difficult, or impossible to be 
sure if the doing/allowing distinction makes a moral difference in a particular case, 
because we cannot be confident that our intuitions are entirely accurate, especially if 
the case involves certain distracting features (e.g. the extreme wickedness of an 
                                                
201 Quinn W, ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing’ (1989) 
98 (3) Philosophy and Public Affairs 287. 
202 Kagan S, ‘The Additive Fallacy’ 99 (1988) Ethics 5. 
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actor’s motivations). Thus, it is hard to tell if the DDA makes any difference to 
James Rachels’s case of the wicked uncles. In this famous example, one uncle allows 
his young nephew to drown in a bathtub because he desires the money that the 
nephew stands to inherit, and the other uncle actively drowns his nephew with the 
same motivation.203 Our intuitions may enable us to judge that both uncles behave 
wrongfully, but our intuitions may not be sensitive enough to detect subtle moral 
differences between the two cases. Our extreme abhorrence at the uncles’ wicked 
motives may ‘swamp’ responses we might otherwise have to the examples.204 It 
would therefore seem premature to conclude on the basis of such examples that our 
intuitions are misguided in those cases (discussed above) where the doing/allowing 
distinction does seem relevant.  
 
To conclude this section: those who endorse the doctrine of doing and allowing have 
reason to endorse the BRD standard. When the state inflicts serious harm on 
offenders in response to their crimes, it does so actively, whereas the harms that 
result from failing to impose hardship on offenders are merely allowed to occur. The 
BRD standard, as it is currently applied in the courtroom, helps to ensure that part of 
the state’s purported justification for harming offenders (that they have committed a 
crime) is sufficiently credible. But since the doctrine of doing and allowing is a 
general ethical principle, implying that all instances of doing harm require 
particularly strong justification, there is no reason to restrict the application of this 
doctrine to the process of establishing factual guilt in a criminal trial. The entire 
moral argument for seriously harming an offender should be held to a high standard 
of credibility. 
  
                                                
203 Rachels, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’ (1975) 292 New England Journal of Medicine 78. 
204 Woollard F, ‘The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing II: The Moral Relevance of the Doing/Allowing 
Distinction’7 (7) (2012) Philosophy Compass 459. 
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The Doctrine of Double Effect (or the 
Intention/Side-effect Distinction) 
The state’s infliction of serious harm on offenders is not only active; it is also 
intentional. In this section I will argue that theorists who endorse the doctrine of 
double effect – also known as the intention/side-effect distinction - have reason to 
support the BRD standard and that such theorists also have reason to apply the BRD 
standard (or a similarly high standard of justification) to the entire moral argument 
for inflicting serious harm on offenders. Like the previous section, my focus will be 
on how this non-consequentialist principle relates to the BRD standard and I will not 
attempt to provide a full defence of the doctrine of double effect. I will, however, 
rebut some of the main arguments that have been presented by those who doubt that 
the doctrine can provide a basis for the BRD standard. Chapter 6 will provide some 
different reasons for holding the moral argument for inflicting serious harm on 
offenders to a high standard of justification, which may appeal to those who reject 
the intention/side-effect distinction. 
The doctrine of double effect (DDE) is a widely held non-consequentialist principle. 
The formulation that I will focus on states that it is often harder to justify harming 
people intentionally than to justify harming them as a side-effect; and that there are 
cases where it is permissible to harm people as a side-effect, where it would have 
been impermissible to harm them intentionally. Like the doctrine of doing and 
allowing, the importance of the doctrine of double effect may lie in its recognition of 
the individual’s independence from other agents and of each individual’s authority 
over herself. If we were permitted, without particularly strong justification, to 
intentionally harm someone (e.g. because doing so would further our goals, or 
remove an obstacle to our goals), then we would all be vulnerable to being co-opted 
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into other agents’ plans. As Warren Quinn puts it, ‘people have a strong prima facie 
right…not to be pressed, in apparent violation of their prior rights, into the service of 
other people's purposes. Sometimes these additional rights may be justifiably 
infringed… but in all cases they add their own burden to the opposing moral 
argument. The Doctrine of Double Effect thus gives each person some veto power 
over a certain kind of attempt to make the world a better place at his expense.’205 
When criminals are punished, they are harmed intentionally. This is true regardless 
of which theory of punishment is taken to justify punishing them. On retributive 
theories (elements of) the hardship involved in punishment is taken to be (partly) the 
end that is aimed at. On deterrence theories, the hardship of punishment is a means to 
the end of preventing crime through deterrence. On incapacitation theories, the harm 
of interfering with the offender’s liberty is a necessary evil, which is justified 
because the threat offenders pose to society needs to be eliminated. Incapacitation 
theorists do not want the offender to suffer, but they do intend that the offender is 
deprived of his liberty and this deprivation is a harm to the offender. In contrast, if a 
court mistakenly fails to convict an offender and he then goes on to harm another 
victim, the authorities do not intend that victim to be harmed. Similarly, when 
offenders are sent to prison, this often harms their families, but the authorities do not 
harm offenders’ families intentionally.  
                                                
205 Quinn W, ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect’ (1989) 98 (4) 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 334, pp350-351. This rationale for the DDE is similar to Tadros’s 
rationale for the prima facie prohibition on harming others as a means (discussed in Chapter 3 above). 
The DDE and the means principle are closely related, but the DDE is wider – it applies to all forms of 
intentional harming including, for example, harming people who pose a direct threat to oneself or 
others. Tadros claims that harming direct threats counts as ‘eliminative harming’ and is outwith the 
scope of the means principle – a principle that applies to ‘manipulative harm’. Even if Tadros is right 
that it is permissible to inflict ‘eliminative harm’ in a wider range of circumstances than ‘manipulative 
harm’, the DDE still implies that eliminative harm requires strong justification, since it is a type of 
intentional harm. Furthermore, in order for eliminative harm to be justified, we must be very confident 
that the harm we are intending to inflict genuinely is ‘eliminative’, i.e. we must have good grounds for 
believing that the person is a direct threat and that our action will remove/reduce the threat. 
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Those who endorse the doctrine of double effect therefore have a reason to hold 
purported justifications for intentionally inflicting serious harm on offenders to a 
high standard of credibility. If the state intentionally harms someone and it turns out 
that it lacked adequate justification for doing so, for instance because the person was 
actually innocent, this is a particularly serious kind of injustice. The BRD standard is 
meant to act as safeguard against this kind of injustice.  
Some theorists might question my claim that punishment of the innocent (under all 
systems of punishment) counts as ‘intentional’ harm. For instance, Victor Tadros 
assumes that, under a retributive system of punishment, when the innocent are 
punished, they are harmed unintentionally.206 He therefore argues that retributivists 
cannot use the intention side/effect distinction to justify the BRD standard (and he 
claims that, more generally, retributivists have ‘problems’ justifying procedural 
protections for accused people). This is because, he argues, retributivists believe that 
giving offenders their just deserts is good, and ‘normally, when we aim at some 
significant good, we are quite tolerant of bad side effects that we would bring about 
in achieving that good’.  
This objection is flawed. When the state mistakenly punishes an innocent person, it 
does harm that person intentionally, and not merely as a side-effect.   True, the state 
does not mean to punish him qua ‘innocent person’. But it does intentionally inflict 
hardship on the particular individual who has been convicted. Consider the analogy 
of mistaken self-defence. A person who harms someone whom she mistakenly 
believes to be attacking her cannot claim that this mistake meant that she harmed the 
supposed attacker unintentionally.  
                                                
206 Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of the Criminal Law (OUP 2011) pp328-329. 
See also Reiman and Van den Haag, ‘On the Common Saying’, p245 for a similar argument.  
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Tadros is correct to argue that the BRD standard cannot be derived solely from the 
retributive principles that the state should punish the guilty and should not punish the 
innocent.207 However, pace Tadros, retributivists can consistently defend the BRD 
standard on the basis of general ethical principles including the DDA and the DDE. 
Any punishment theorist who accepts these general principles can use these doctrines 
to justify the BRD standard. This type of justification for the BRD standard is not 
tied to one particular theory of punishment. 
Another potential objection to my argument cites the state’s positive obligation to 
protect those who may be harmed by criminals who escape punishment. If the state 
has an obligation to protect potential victims from harm, it might be claimed, it is 
morally irrelevant that those victims are not intentionally harmed by the state. 
Therefore, the critic claims, the intention/side-effect distinction provides no moral 
justification for the BRD standard – a standard which in effect favours allowing 
harm to befall potential victims (as a side-effect of mistakenly acquitting criminals) 
over intentionally harming possible offenders when there is reasonable doubt as to 
the justification for inflicting such harm.208  
 
This objection is misconceived. The Intention/side-effect distinction is still relevant 
despite the presence of a positive obligation to protect or care for the individuals who 
may be harmed. Consider the following cases: 
 
Diverting Resources 
This example (which I also cited in the previous section) involves doctors who divert 
resources from one group of patients to another larger or needier group of patients.  
 
                                                
207 Tadros, fn 206, pp328-329. 
208 Cf. Y Lee , ‘Deontology, Political Morality, and the State’ 8 (2011) Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law 385. 
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Human Guinea Pigs209 
The doctors deliberately leave a certain group of patients untreated in order to study 
the progress of the disease, so they can treat a larger group of patients more 
effectively.  
Intuitively, it seems that the doctor’s conduct in Diverting Resources is morally 
permissible, because the harm that results to the patients is only an unintended side-
effect of the withdrawal. In contrast, the conduct of the doctors in Human Guinea 
Pigs seems morally unacceptable, because they intend harm to befall the patients.  In 
both of these examples the doctors have a positive obligation to care for all the 
patients. Yet the intention/ side-effect distinction still seems morally relevant. 
Similarly, the state has a duty to respond to crime in a just manner – to coercively 
interfere with offenders who ought to be subject to such interference and not 
interfere with individuals where this is unjustified, e.g. where the individual is 
innocent - but how it carries out its duty is likewise constrained by the powerful 
considerations against intentional harming. These considerations are so powerful that 
they can only be rebutted by an argument that is at least as compelling. Hence the 
prosecution’s case for convicting the accused will only succeed if it meets the 
demanding BRD standard. Likewise, more generally, seriously harming offenders is 
only permissible if the moral justification for doing so meets a high standard of 
credibility. The DDE is not irrelevant in situations where there is a positive 
obligation to protect or care for individuals who may be harmed. 
Some writers might attempt to challenge my argument by claiming that the 
intention/side-effect distinction is only relevant to blameworthiness not to 
permissibility.210 In other words, according to this claim, when the state intentionally 
                                                
209 W Quinn, ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect’ (1989) 98 (4) 
Philosophy and Public Affairs  334. 
210 For an interesting discussion of this issue see D Husak, ‘The Costs to Criminal Theory of 
Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to Permissibility’ 3 (2009) Criminal Law and Philosophy 51. 
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harms offenders despite lacking adequate moral justification, it may show itself to be 
especially morally deficient. But the fact that the harm is intentional does not, on this 
view, make the state’s action especially impermissible, or any more impermissible 
than allowing harm to occur as a side-effect of failing to punish. Even if this were 
true, however, the intention/side effect distinction could still help to justify the high 
standard of proof in criminal trials. If the state consistently showed itself to be 
morally deficient, by intentionally harming offenders, despite lacking adequate 
justification, the state could lose the moral authority to punish at all.  
 
It might be objected that courts do not (and should not) intend to harm offenders 
when they convict and sentence them. For instance, on a communication theory of 
punishment, the intention is to call the offender to account for his wrongdoing, to 
attempt to persuade him of the wrongfulness of his criminal conduct and to restore 
him to the moral community.  While it might be conceded that the things we do to 
offenders (publically condemning them as wrongdoers, depriving them of their 
liberty and/or some of their resources etc.) would normally count as harmful, it might 
be objected that the court does not impose such burdens on offenders qua harms. In 
response, it is submitted that the relationship between what the state intends to do to 
the person who is convicted and punished and the harm which that involves is a 
constitutive relationship not a causal one. Where one state of affairs is causally 
downstream from another state of affairs, it can be meaningful to speak of intending 
the former, while foreseeing the latter as an unintended side-effect. However, where 
one state of affairs constitutes another state of affairs, the intention side-effect 
distinction cannot apply. Consider an analogy from the literature. A group of 
explorers are trapped in a cave – one of their number, who is particularly fat, is stuck 
in the entrance and cannot be moved.211 The only way to escape is to use dynamite to 
                                                
211 See e.g. W FitzPatrick, ‘The Intend Foresee Distinction and the Problem of ‘Closeness’ 128 (2006) 
Philosophical Studies 585. 
 147 
blow him to bits. Can the explorers claim that they did not intend to kill him; they 
only intended to blow him to bits? It seems not, because the relationship between 
those two states of affairs (“killing him” and “blowing him to bits”) is too close.  
“Blowing him to bits” constitutes “killing him”. 212  Similarly, when the state 
intentionally imposes severe burdens on an offender, such as labelling him a 
murderer and sending him to prison for life, this constitutes harming him. 
 
Some theorists might claim you do not really ‘harm’ a person if what you do to him 
is justified. However this idea can sometimes seem counterintuitive. If somebody 
breaks an attacker’s leg in self-defence, or breaks a bystander’s leg in order to rescue 
five people from certain death, it would seem odd for him to say, ‘I did not harm 
anyone, because what I did was justified’. It would be more natural to say, ‘yes, I 
harmed the attacker/bystander, but what I did was justified’. Perhaps, if the 
justification is a paternalistic one, then it might seem more natural to deny that the 
conduct was harmful. But even then, it does not seem clearly wrong to speak of 
‘harm’. Imagine that a person is trapped beneath a collapsed building and a rescuer 
cuts off the person’s arm, which is pinned by some debris, because this is the only 
way to rescue him. The rescuer might say, ‘I didn’t do him any harm, because, 
overall, my actions benefited him’. On the other hand, the rescuer might say, ‘yes I 
harmed him, but I did it for his own good’. The latter statement still seems to be a 
legitimate use of the word ‘harm’. Or contrast the following two lives: Person A 
leads a law-abiding, comfortable, healthy life, pursuing his own goals. Person B 
commits a crime and is sentenced to 20 years in prison (under fairly grim conditions) 
in order to help him see the error of his ways and restore him to the moral 
community. It would seem counterintuitive to say that B suffered no more harm in 
his life than A. In any case, this semantic issue can be sidestepped, when it comes to 
                                                
212 Ibid. 
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justifying the beyond reasonable doubt standard. We could say that imposing 
measures such as fines or imprisonment involves the intentional infliction of what is 
prima facie harmful. It therefore requires strong justification. It is only after that 
justification has been provided and has met the relevant standard of credibility that 
we can be satisfied that depriving an offender of liberty or property does not ‘truly’ 
harm him. Alternatively, one might say that such measures involve the intentional 
infliction of ‘hardship’. Although I will continue to refer to the principle that the 
active, intentional infliction serious harm requires strong justification, those who are 
still sceptical about whether justified harm really counts as harm, may substitute the 
terms ‘prima facie harm’ or ‘hardship’ where I use the term ‘harm’.213  
 
To conclude this section: I have argued that those who endorse the doctrine of double 
effect have reason to endorse the BRD standard. When the state inflicts serious harm 
on offenders in response to their crimes, it does so intentionally, whereas the harms 
that result from failing to impose hardship on offenders are unintended. Since the 
doctrine of double effect is a general ethical principle, implying that all instances of 
doing harm require particularly strong justification, there is no reason to restrict the 
application of this doctrine to the process of establishing factual guilt in a criminal 
trial. The entire moral argument for seriously harming an offender should be held to 
a high standard of credibility. 
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The state has a special obligation to protect citizens from unjustified harm. The state 
can breach this duty if it allows criminals to continue offending and makes 
insufficient efforts to bring them to account. This breach involves failing to carry out 
the duty to protect. However, there is an even more serious way in which this duty 
can be breached – if the supposed protector actually becomes the threat from which 
people need protection. This is an ‘inversion’ of the original duty.  
 
John Gardner makes this distinction in order to show why killings by police officers 
are among the worst types of killing.214 He states that certain ‘public officials....are in 
a special moral position because they are officials.’215 Sometimes police kill people 
in the belief that this is necessary in order to carry out their duty to protect people 
from harm. Gardner cites the example of Jean-Charles de Menezes, whom the police 
killed, having mistaken him for a terrorist. Even if their belief was reasonable, this 
does not neutralise the moral awfulness of what happened (although it might render 
the police officers blameless). They ended up doing the opposite of their duty – they 
were bound to protect Mr de Menezes from harm (including the harm of being 
killed) and they themselves killed him.  
 
When supposed protectors attack the people who had trusted and depended on them, 
they violate their victims’ legitimate expectations. Gardner makes this point 
especially vivid, by citing reactions from a victim of the Utoya massacre to the sight 
of the killer dressed as a policeman: ‘Just think of it, he dressed himself in a police 
uniform, the symbol of safety and support.’216 Similarly, when courts convict and 
sentence people without an adequate justification for doing so, the state has betrayed 
                                                
214 ‘Worst’ does not necessarily mean ‘most blameworthy’. Gardner J, ‘Criminals in Uniform’ in R.A. 
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the people it was meant to protect. The husband of Sally Clark (a mother who was 
wrongly convicted of murdering her children) commented on the devastating effect 
of this kind of betrayal. He writes: ‘We were all people who had complete faith in 
the justice system and still find it hard to believe it could have let us down. .... both 
of us [were] numb with shock and disbelief as we heard the appeal refused.’217  
Gardner notes that time constraints limit how carefully the police can assess the 
justifications for their actions. But, as I have noted above, at the trial stage there is 
much more time to deliberate than in police operations. Therefore, the state’s 
argument for inflicting harm on offenders, who have already been apprehended, 
should be held to an even higher standard of justification than decisions made by 
police officers.  
 
Gardner also observes that that the police are often the victim’s ‘last line of 
protection’. A similar statement could also be made concerning parents and spouses. 
This exacerbates the wrongfulness of unjustified harm inflicted by the police, parents 
or spouses on those who depend on them. This feature also characterises the state’s 
relation to offenders and possible offenders. The accused and the convicted criminal 
are at the mercy of the courts. Where else can they turn for protection? 
 
Gardner also notes that failure to recognise the particular moral awfulness of 
protectors doing the opposite of their duty means that one misses what is especially 
tragic about Sophie’s Choice (discussed above). This is another reason why Lee’s 
reliance on this type of case fails to undermine the rationale for the BRD standard. 
 
To summarise my argument so far, I have claimed that those non-consequentialists 
who endorse the DDA, the DDE and the notion of special obligations should support 
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the BRD standard because punishment involves the active, intentional infliction of 
serious harm by the state. According to the DDA the active infliction of harm 
requires strong justification; according to the DDE the intentional infliction of harm 
requires strong justification; and the argument from special obligations suggests that 
the state needs strong justification when it proposes to harm someone whom it has a 
duty to protect. It seems that nothing about this rationale for the BRD standard 
restricts its application to the process of proving an accused’s factual guilt in a trial. 
Instead this rationale implies that the entire moral justification for harming offenders 
should be held to a high standard of credibility.  
 
I have also argued that the BRD standard is not tied to one particular justification of 
punishment. I have already argued against Reiman’s retributive rationale for the 
BRD standard. I will now critique three other purported rationales: one based on a 
communication theory of punishment, one derived from a social contract theory of 
punishment and one derived from a deterrence theory of punishment. It is important 
to expose the difficulties with these purported rationales for the following reasons. 
Firstly, if the rationale for the BRD standard did derive solely from one theory of 
punishment then theorists who rejected that theory of punishment would have no 
reason to accept the BRD standard.218 However, my thesis claims that all theorists 
have reasons to hold arguments for punishment to a high standard of justification. 
(This chapter gives reasons that should appeal to non-consequentialists; the next 
chapter also addresses those who may not be committed to non-consequentialism.) 
Secondly, the difficulties with the alternative strategies for defending the BRD that I 
will now discuss may provide some motivation for theorists to endorse the rationale 
for the BRD standard that I have defended in this chapter. 
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A Communicative Theory of Punishment and 
The BRD Standard 
Some theorists have claimed that the rationale for the BRD derives from a 
communication theory of punishment.219 On this view, convicting and punishing 
offenders involves condemning them as wrongdoers. Condemning someone without 
being really sure that such condemnation is justified shows disrespect for the person 
condemned. Therefore, according to this approach, we need the BRD standard to 
avoid the wrongfulness of unjustifiably condemning people, not to avoid the 
wrongfulness of unjustifiably imposing hard treatment on them. This view faces 
certain difficulties. 
 
Firstly, it is possible to imagine a system of punishment (or quasi-punishment) where 
the state does not intend to condemn wrongdoers. For instance, imagine a 
consequentialist system that viewed morally condemning wrongdoers as 
counterproductive, so inflicted hard treatment on them, without subjecting them to 
moral condemnation. If there were two such consequentialist systems and one of 
them upheld the BRD standard and the other did not, we would have reason to prefer 
the former system. The condemnation approach cannot explain why one system is 
preferable to the other. The communication/condemnation theorist might criticise 
both systems for getting the positive justification for punishment wrong.  However, 
this criticism is separate from the criticism that the system, in failing to uphold the 
BRD, fails adequately to constrain punishment.  
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Ashworth (OUP, Oxford forthcoming), Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103337 
- see especially pp3-4. See also, V Tadros, ‘The Ideal of the Presumption of Innocence’, paper 
presented at Fraying the Golden Thread: The Presumption of Innocence in Contemporary Criminal 
Law (Aberdeen, 2012).  Tadros’s main reason for endorsing the BRD standard seems to be his 
‘manipulative harm’ argument discussed below. He has not yet provided an account of how precisely 
that argument relates to the ‘condemnation argument’ for the BRD standard.  
 154 
Secondly, the idea that people need protection from unjustified condemnation, but 
not from unjustified hard treatment seems arbitrary, fails to reflect the concerns of 
many accused people and fails to capture our intuitions about the wrongness of 
miscarriages of justice. Typically, an accused person who was told that they could be 
convicted on the balance of probabilities, or on the basis of a mere suspicion, would 
not only be concerned about the risk of being unjustifiably condemned, but would 
also be concerned about the hard treatment aspect of punishment e.g. being falsely 
imprisoned. One of the terrible aspects of miscarriages of justice is the unjustified 
infliction of hard treatment. It would be odd to say, on discovering that an innocent 
person had spent 20 years in prison or (in a country which imposed the death 
penalty) had been executed that the really objectionable thing about the case was the 
unjustified condemnation, not the hard treatment aspect. 
 
Having said this, the ‘condemnation approach’ does have an element of truth in it. 
The risk of being unjustifiably condemned is one of the things accused people would 
have reason to be concerned about if the standard of proof were lowered and it is one 
element of what is wrong about punishing the innocent. It is plausible to claim that 
condemning a person without good evidence fails to respect that person. However, 
that idea derives from the more basic principle that it is wrong to inflict serious harm 
on someone without strong justification. Publically condemning someone as a 
criminal wrongdoer is a way of seriously harming that individual (or at least involves 
imposing serious negative consequences or hardship on her).220 
 
 
                                                
220 See above for a discussion of the meaning of ‘harm’. 
 155 
Lee’s Social Contract Theory and the BRD 
Standard 
Although Lee denies that the doing/allowing and intending/foreseeing distinctions 
could justify the beyond reasonable doubt standard, he proposes another rationale for 
the standard, which he claims is more promising.221 His account has two key 
elements – a slippery-slope-type argument and a social-contract-type argument. 
Firstly, he points out that the requirement that the state must prove guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt constrains the state’s power to punish. If the state were permitted to 
depart from this standard in order to increase deterrence and to reduce the number of 
people who are victimised by falsely acquitted people, the state might end up 
punishing people even where these social benefits will not be achieved by such 
punishment or where these benefits are outweighed by other consequentialist 
considerations. He writes: ‘The government enjoys an enormous amount of power to 
interfere with peoples’ lives with force and to stigmatize individuals with its stamp 
of blameworthiness....Unless we treat the constraints against convicting without 
sufficiently convincing proof...as close to inviolable, such limitations on 
criminalization and punishment will give too often and will not be able to provide 
meaningful limitations of the government’s power to criminalize and punish’.222  
 
Lee’s account seems to cite the wrong kind of reason for guarding against false 
convictions. 223 Punishing someone whom we know may well be innocent (who 
perhaps has a 49% chance of being innocent) seems wrong because that individual 
has been treated unjustly, not merely because it could lead to further bad 
                                                
221 He argues that his rationale is better than the alternative justifications, but leaves it open whether 
the beyond reasonable doubt standard is ultimately defensible. His main claim is that this question can 
only be settled with reference to his proposed framework. 
222 Lee ‘Deontology, Political Morality, and the State’ 8 (2011) Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 
385, p399. 
223 This element of Lee’s account seems similar to Bentham’s utilitarian defence of a high standard of 
proof, which is liable to the same objection. J. Bentham, A Treatise on Judicial Evidence (Paget, 
London 1825). Even if Bentham’s argument provides a good reason for the BRD standard, it cannot 
be the sole or the main reason for that standard. 
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consequences. It seems odd to characterise this kind of injustice as the beginning of a 
slippery slope to bad consequences – rather, a society with such practices is already 
at the bottom of the mountain.224 
 
The other feature of his account relates to the source of the state’s duty and power to 
punish. The state is authorised and obligated to protect citizens through punishment 
because those citizens have consented to render the power to punish to the state (and 
to refrain from taking the law into their own hands). However, they only give the 
state this power if it abides by strict conditions, including upholding the beyond 
reasonable doubt standard. According to Lee, the state’s protective duty towards it 
citizens differs from Sophie’s duty towards her children in the following respect – 
Sophie’s duty stems from her role as a mother, whereas the state’s obligation is 
conferred on it by the people. When Sophie is deciding whether to sacrifice one child 
to save the others she must take into account her children’s competing rights and 
interests. But when the state is faced with a similar choice regarding its citizens, it 
must also take into account the restrictions imposed on it by the people, who are the 
source of its authority. The state has its power to protect ‘only on condition that it 
respect[s] such limitations’.225 The people ‘demand that the state be able to justify 
the acts it is about to take by correctly identifying wrongdoers. The proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt requirement is generated from this demand.’226  
 
This raises the question of whether the people’s demands have a rational basis. It 
seems likely that the people do not support the beyond reasonable doubt standard for 
purely utilitarian reasons. The shock people feel at miscarriages of justice seems to 
                                                
224 Relying heavily on the slippery slope argument in this context seems almost as bizarre as someone 
who says, ‘It is wrong for me to murder Tom, because that would be the start of dangerous slippery 
slope – I might end up killing Dick and Harry as well’. Even if the slippery slope consideration is one 
reason for endorsing the BRD standard, it does not seem to be the main reason. 
225 Lee ‘Deontology, Political Morality, and the State’ 8 (2011) Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 
385, p400. 
226 ibid, p399. 
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be a reaction to the wrong done to the individual, not primarily due to ‘their 
subsequent realisation that a false conviction is going to reduce the overall utility of 
the system’.227 If the deontological arguments in favour of the beyond reasonable 
doubt principle are as inadequate as Lee has argued, and the people generally support 
that principle for deontological and not merely utilitarian reasons, then the state’s 
supposed duty to respect their irrational demands seems a flimsy basis on which to 
defend the beyond reasonable doubt standard.  
 
If Lee’s account were accepted it might be thought that we could keep the beyond 
reasonable doubt principle and not be forced to apply it to issues like free will or 
retributivism. Lee’s account seems to imply that if the people do not (yet) demand 
that the BRD standard be applied to these issues there is no reason to do so. This 
kind of account seems too complacent. It does not have the resources to say how the 
system should be improved. The people might be content with an unjust system, e.g. 
one that unfairly discriminated against minority groups.  
Tadros’s Deterrence Theory and The BRD 
Standard 
Tadros does not succeed in refuting the defence of the BRD standard that relies on 
the DDE or the DDA. His alternative method of defending the BRD standard, I will 
argue, has considerable difficulties of its own. His preferred strategy is a non-
consequentialist one. Although, he accepts the importance, in general, of the 
intention/side-effect distinction and of the DDA, he employs neither of these 
doctrines to defend the BRD standard. He argues that it is the means/side-effect 
distinction, rather than the intention/side-effect distinction that can justify the BRD 
standard. He claims that we need the BRD standard, because we need protection 
                                                
227 Halvorsen, ‘Ten Guilty Persons’, p8. 
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against being harmed as a means (or ‘manipulative harm’).228 He claims that 
manipulative harm is normally prohibited, with the following exception: punishment 
that is inflicted for the purpose of general deterrence is a justified form of 
manipulative harm. He claims we need to avoid mistaken convictions because 
inflicting unjustified manipulative harm is extremely wrong.  
 
Tadros’s strategy fails to get to the heart of why the BRD standard is important. We 
would need the protection afforded by the BRD standard even if punishment were 
not inflicted for instrumental reasons (e.g. to deter crime) and thus did not count as 
manipulative harm. For instance, consider a system under which punishment were 
inflicted for purely retributive reasons. According to Tadros, since retributivists 
regard the suffering involved in punishment as being the end they seek to achieve 
(not a means of achieving some further end), it does not count as manipulative harm. 
Yet it would still be wrong for a purely retributive system to abandon the BRD 
standard. If there were two such purely retributive systems and one of them upheld 
the BRD standard and the other did not, we would have reason to prefer the former 
system. Tadros’s approach cannot explain why one of these retributive systems is 
preferable to the other. Tadros might criticise both retributive systems for getting the 
positive justification for punishment wrong.  However, this criticism is separate from 
the criticism that the system, in failing to uphold the BRD, fails adequately to 
constrain punishment. Similarly, we would need the BRD under a purely 
incapacitative system of dealing with offenders, i.e. one that interfered with their 
liberty purely to reduce the harm they might pose to others. However, Tadros classes 
incapacitation as a form of ‘eliminative harm’ (i.e. harming someone to eliminate a 
threat they directly pose), not as ‘manipulative harm’. Thus his defence of the BRD 
standard (based on the need to protect people from manipulative harm) could not 
                                                
228 V Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of the Criminal Law (OUP, Oxford 2011). 
Chapter 3 of this thesis also discussed ‘manipulative harm’. 
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explain why an incapacitative system of dealing with offenders that upheld the BRD 
standard would be preferable to one that did not. 
The most that can be said for the deterrence-based rationale is that were we to accept 
deterrence as a justification for punishment this would provide additional reasons for 
endorsing the BRD standard. However, it is submitted that even if we were 
persuaded by Tadros’s argument that it is all right to punish culpable wrongdoers to 
deter others, we should not rely on his deterrence theory of punishment alone 
because we should have a reasonable doubt about whether the people whom we 
subject to deterrence are culpable in the right sense.229 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that non-consequentialists should support the BRD 
standard because this standard is implied by the principle that the active, intentional 
infliction of serious harm by the state requires strong justification. This principle 
draws on the DDA, the DDE and the notion of special obligations. I have also 
rejected various alternative rationales for the BRD standard.  
                                                
229 See my discussion of this issue in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter Six: The Convergence 
Requirement 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I examined the moral basis for the beyond reasonable doubt 
standard in criminal trials. I argued that the justification for this standard of proof 
does not stem directly from any particular theory of punishment, and is not tied to the 
specific context of the criminal trial. Instead, I argued that the most plausible non-
consequentialist rationale for the beyond reasonable doubt standard relies on four 
considerations (which a variety of different punishment theorists could invoke): 1) 
the doctrine of doing and allowing; 2) the intention/side-effect distinction; 3) the 
seriousness of the hardship involved in convicting and punishing someone; and 4) 
the fact that unjustifiably punishing someone is an inversion of the state’s duty to 
protect that person.  These considerations imply that we should only punish a person 
if we have a high degree of certainty that doing so is justifiable. This does not merely 
mean that certain facts (e.g. that the accused was the person who committed the 
crime) should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Rather, we should also require 
that the entire moral argument for punishing a person be established to a high 
standard of credibility. (I call this the “cautious approach” to punishment.) Given the 
significant room for doubt about the soundness of each theory of punishment, it 
seems unlikely that any single theory of punishment can satisfy this standard.  
I propose that we should try to reduce the risk of inflicting unjustified punishment by 
only punishing someone if the main theories of punishment agree that punishing that 
person is appropriate. (I call this the “convergence requirement”.) This chapter will 
begin by giving some reasons why people from different theoretical perspectives 
have reason to endorse my cautious approach to punishment and my convergence 
requirement, rather than simply relying on their own favoured theory of punishment. 
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I will then further clarify why exactly the convergence minimises the risk of 
unjustified punishment. Next, this chapter will address two potential objections to 
my view. One challenge stems from the existence of uncertainty about which theory 
of moral uncertainty is sound. The other potential objection concerns my reliance on 
the idea of agreement among ‘experts’ on punishment. The final section will briefly 
outline some issues that are relevant to the implementation of the convergence 
requirement in practice.  
Why Should Theorists from Different 
Philosophical Perspectives Accept The 
Convergence Requirement? 
Theorists from different philosophical perspectives have somewhat different reasons 
for endorsing the convergence requirement. Those non-consequentialists who are 
also retributivists have three reasons for doing so: a consideration that is internal to 
non-consequentialism; a reason that stems specifically from their adherence to 
retributivism; and finally a consideration that derives from their status as ethical 
decision-makers under conditions of uncertainty. Consequentialists on the other 
hand, should accept my approach because of this final consideration and because of 
another consideration, which is internal to consequentialism. 
 
A Non-Consequentialist Basis for the Convergence Requirement 
Firstly, non-consequentialists have a reason qua non-consequentialists for endorsing 
my approach. If they support the beyond reasonable doubt standard (as they almost 
certainly will) then, as I have argued in the previous chapter, the non-
consequentialist considerations in favour of the beyond reasonable doubt standard 
also count in favour of holding substantive theories of punishment to a similarly high 
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standard and count against relying on a single, hotly-contested theory of punishment 
alone.  
 
A Retributive Basis for the Convergence Requirement 
Secondly, retributivists have some motivation qua retributivists for endorsing my 
approach, for pragmatic reasons. This is because, as I will explain, there is some 
reason to think that the convergence requirement could constrain emotions and 
biases that interfere with the administration of justice (conceived in retributive 
terms). It is a fact about human nature that a desire for retribution very easily slides 
into a desire for vengeance.230 Indeed, it is often psychologically very difficult for 
individuals to tell whether their desires are genuinely retributive or merely vengeful 
(assuming that this distinction is valid in principle). A desire to find a scapegoat on 
whom to vent vengeful feelings could result in wholly undeserved punishment. 
Crimes with particularly emotionally-distressing features could also attract 
punishments that exceed a person’s true desert. The literature on moral psychology 
and cognitive biases also sheds some light on the ways in which people’s judgements 
about retribution can be distorted. For instance, there is some evidence that people 
may confuse a feeling of (non-moral) disgust for a judgement that an action is 
morally wrong and deserving of retributive punishment.231 Another bias called the 
                                                
230According to some recent psychological research, a tendency to hold attitudes in favour of personal 
vengeance is positively correlated with endorsing retributive punishment, see, e.g., I. McKee and N. 
Feather, ‘Revenge, Retribution and Values: Social attitudes and Punitive Sentencing’ (2003) 21 Social 
Justice Research 138. 
231 For instance, people who are in a dirty room make harsher condemnatory judgements than people 
who are passing moral judgments in a clean room. People who were hypnotically induced to feel a 
brief pang of disgust at an innocuous word, such as ‘often’, judged transgressions to be morally worse 
when the description of the transgression included the word ‘often’ than when a synonym was used. 
Some subjects even judged morally innocuous behaviour to be morally wrong when the behaviour 
was described using the disgust-inducing word. People who are particularly sensitive to non-moral 
disgust (e.g. noxious smells) also make harsher judgements about when punishment is deserved and 
about its severity. See, e.g. T. Wheatley and J. Haidt, ‘Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments 
More Severe’ (2005) 16 Psychological Science 780; for an overview of this literature see: Y. Inbar 
and D. Pizarro, ‘Grime and Punishment: How Disgust Influences Moral, Social, and Legal 
Judgments’ (2009) 21 The Jury Expert 11.  
 163 
‘fundamental attribution error’ causes people to underplay the causal importance of 
circumstances in bringing about an event and to exaggerate the role of human 
agency.232 Empirical studies on judges and mock juries reveal that cognitive biases 
and emotional factors can distort their decision-making about guilt and sentencing 
and there is also reason to believe that such biases can affect legislators when they 
decide to criminalise behaviour (and render those who engage in it liable to 
punishment).233 Even if some day a retributive theory were developed capable of 
convincing people beyond reasonable doubt that retributivism is correct in principle, 
there would still always be uncertainty about whether retributive punishment is 
appropriate in a given case or whether it only appears to be appropriate due to biases 
and distorting emotional factors and hence there would still be a danger of 
misapplying retributivism in practice. However, my convergence approach could 
make this less likely. If my approach were adopted, a supposedly retributive basis for 
punishing someone (which might be mistaken in an individual case) would not be 
enough to justify punishing the person - a consequentialist basis would also be 
required. This would be beneficial from the perspective of negative retributivism, as 
certain individuals who appear (e.g. due to cognitive biases) to satisfy the retributive 
requirement (but who really do not) would fail to satisfy the consequentialist 
requirement and these would be spared retributively undeserved punishment. Of 
course, from the perspective of positive retributivism the convergence requirement 
would have the disadvantage of allowing some guilty people to escape their ‘just 
deserts’. However, since most retributivists place more importance on the negative 
element, overall they would have reason to endorse the convergence requirement.  
                                                
232 D. Dripps, ‘Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame’ 
(2003) 56 Vanderbilt Law Review 1383. 
233See e.g., E. Peer and E. Gamliel, ‘Heuristics and Biases in Judicial Decisions’ (2013) 49 Court 
Review 114; J Salerno and B Bottoms, ‘Unintended consequences of toying with jurors’ emotions: 
The Impact of Disturbing Emotional Evidence on Jurors’ verdicts’ (2010) 22. 
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Furthermore, some research suggests that our cognitive biases and emotional factors 
in favour of punishment are more powerful and numerous than any similar factors 
that might lead us to refrain from punishing people who actually deserve it. Punitive 
biases therefore seem to be more in need of restraint than leniency biases. Evidence 
about psychological biases and moral judgements indicates that, ‘human beings are 
predisposed to give affirmative answers to questions about personal 
responsibility’.234 Moreover, studies have shown that people with a ‘leniency’ bias 
are more likely to set their bias aside when evidence about guilt is reliable, whereas a 
bias in favour of guilt-attribution is less affected by the strength of the evidence.235  
Anger is probably the emotion most likely to be aroused by contemplating serious 
crimes. Strong negative emotions tend to cause people both to become more punitive 
and to trigger the use of cognitive shortcuts or stereotypes to reach a decision 
(increasing the likelihood of unjust punishment). In contrast, studies of mock jurors 
have revealed that emotional considerations which one might expect to result in 
leniency (e.g. vividly describing the accused’s history of being abused as a child) 
sometimes produce a ‘backfire effect’ – causing jurors to judge the accused to be 
guilty and deserving of severe punishment.236 This may be because the anger at the 
accused’s abuser triggered reliance on stereotypes and the accused belonged to a 
negatively stereotyped group.237 It might also be explained by the fact that anger can 
increase punitiveness in general, regardless of who was the original cause of the 
anger.238 Another study found that ‘E-processors’ - individuals who were particularly 
susceptible to emotional considerations - were also prone to allow legally irrelevant 
                                                
234 Dripps, fn232, p1437. 
235 Kaplan and L. Miller, ‘Reducing the Effects of Juror Bias’ (1978) 36 (12) Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 1443, p1450. 
236 See e.g., M. Stevenson, B. Bottoms and S. Diamond, ‘Juror’s Discussions of a Defendant’s History 
of Child Abuse and Alcohol Abuse in Capital Sentencing Deliberations’ (2010) 16 (1) Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law 1. 
237 Salerno and Bottoms, fn233; D. DeSteno et al., ‘Prejudice from Thin Air: The Effect of Emotion 
on Automatic Intergroup Attitudes’ (2004) 15 Psychological Science 319. 
238Salerno and Bottoms, fn233. 
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information to bias their judgements about an accused’s guilt. 239  Although 
occasionally these irrelevant factors led E-processors to be unduly lenient, the overall 
effect was to bias them in favour of conviction and harsh sentences. My approach 
would provide a counterbalance against such punitive biases and therefore should be 
welcomed by retributivists. 
 
A retributivist might wonder whether the convergence requirement would only 
indirectly reduce instances of retributively unjust punishment, as a side effect of 
reducing the overall number of persons punished. However, there is also reason to 
think that the convergence requirement would specifically minimise retributively 
unjust punishment. The most central cases of retributive wrongdoing (about whose 
wrongfulness retributivists are most certain) are very often actions that 
consequentialists would also condemn and consider worthy of punishment. This is 
because part of what makes an action blameworthy from a retributive perspective is 
often that it infringes some of the victim’s fundamental interests (e.g. life, bodily 
integrity, or autonomy) – interests that consequentialists also recognise as important 
and wish to protect. In contrast, there are certain actions which might strike some 
retributivists as intuitively wrong, but whose wrongfulness is most in doubt, or 
which, over time, retributivists have realised are actually not immoral at all, e.g. 
certain non-harmful consensual sexual practices. It is often harder to find a plausible 
consequentialist justification for condemning these actions. Relying on retributive 
intuitions about the moral status of such actions carries a particularly high risk of 
moral error (including retributive injustice) because such intuitions often stem from 
misleading emotional factors such as disgust. The convergence requirement would 
avoid punishing people based on such intuitions alone, but would demand that a 
                                                
239J. Gunnell and S. Ceci, ‘When Emotionality Trumps Reason: A Study of Individual Processing 
Style and Juror Bias’ (2010) 28 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 850. 
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person should only be punished if doing so is also necessary to achieve a forward-
looking purpose (such as preventing him from causing serious harm in the future). 
Thus, this consequentialist element could actually minimise the chance of retributive 
injustice. Of course, the convergence requirement is not an infallible method of 
eliminating the effect of biases – people can always come up with spurious post hoc 
consequentialist rationalisations for their original biased judgements - but it seems to 
be one important way in which such biases could sometimes be corrected. Studies on 
moral decision-making provide empirical support for this claim, showing that when 
people revise their initial judgements that certain (non-morally) disgusting actions 
are morally wrong, this is often the result of deliberating about whether such 
behaviour is harmful. 240 
                                                
240 M. Feinberg et al., ‘Liberating Reason from the Passions: Overriding Intuitionist Moral Judgments 
Through Emotional Reappraisal’ (2012) 23(7) Psychological Science 788.  
I am not arguing that retributivism is necessarily unsound to the extent that it involves reliance on 
emotions. The capacity to experience certain emotions may be useful or even essential to making 
correct moral judgements. However, reliance on emotional reactions can sometimes cause 
retributivism to be misapplied, when a morally irrelevant emotional reaction is mistaken for a morally 
relevant one (and the studies cited above, fns 231 and 237, suggest that such mistakes are quite easy to 
make). Nor am I suggesting that consequentialist reasoning does not involve emotion. Compassion, 
for instance, may be one reason why consequentialists adopt their theory in the first place. However, 
the process of applying consequentialism (i.e. working out what will maximise good consequences) 
may be less influenced by emotions such as anger and disgust (and hence less vulnerable to the biases 
connected with these emotions) than the process of applying retributivism, which typically relies 
heavily on intuition or gut-feelings. Indeed retributivists often explicitly encourage reliance on such 
feelings when deciding who deserves punishment and how severe that punishment should be. Michael 
Moore calls intuition and certain emotions (e.g. outrage) ‘our best heuristic guide to moral truth’ and 
P.F. Strawson famously endorsed the role of ‘resentment’ in retributive blame and punishment (see 
Moore, Placing Blame (OUP, Oxford 1997)). and Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (1962) 48 
Proceedings of the British Academy 187.). In contrast, consequentialists such as Peter Singer often 
advocate caution about relying on intuitive/emotional responses, as these are often incompatible with 
consequentialist moral principles (see P Singer, ‘Philosophers are back on the job,’ New York Times 
Sunday Magazine 7 July 1974 pp19-20.). Neuroscientific research provides some support for these 
claims about the differences between retributive and consequentialist reasoning processes. When 
people make retributive judgements, areas of the brain associated with emotion are activated. In 
contrast, areas of the brain that are activated when people engage in consequentialist reasoning are 
also associated with cognitive processes that modify the influence of emotional factors. (See e.g., J. 
Greene, ‘The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Judgment’ in M. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive 
Neurosciences (4th ed. MIT) pp. 987-1002; K. Ochsner and J. Gross, ‘Cognitive Emotion Regulation: 
Insights From Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience’ (2008) 17 (2) Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 153.) The fact that, typically, retributivists tend to trust their intuitions about 
punishment (but are prone to confusing indisputably irrelevant emotional reactions with genuine 
moral disapproval) means that pure retributivism would be likely to result in over-punishment in 
practice, even by retributivists’ own lights. Insisting that both consequentialist and retributivist criteria 
must be satisfied before punishment was justified could help correct such pro-punishment biases. 
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A Consequentialist Basis for the Convergence Requirement 
Similarly, consequentialists, qua consequentialists, have a reason to adopt the 
convergence requirement. If officials had the power to punish someone whenever 
they judged that this would produce good consequences, regardless of the 
individual’s desert, this would probably cause bad consequences in practice. Given 
the widespread support for negative retributivism, the public would lose faith in the 
criminal justice system if they were aware that the state knowingly punished the 
factually innocent.241 If the state attempted to keep the factual innocence of such 
individuals secret, in order to maintain citizens’ faith in the system, then such 
secrecy would almost certainly lead officials to abuse their power for political or 
personal reasons.242 Thus, punishing someone only when the main theories of 
punishment converge could well produce the best overall consequences. 
A Meta-Theoretical Argument 
Thirdly, theorists have grounds for endorsing my approach qua ethical decision-
makers under conditions of uncertainty about which substantive moral principles are 
correct. If retributivists and consequentialists step back from their commitment to 
their own favoured theories and survey the structure of the debate about punishment 
they should realise that there are considerable grounds for uncertainty about which 
theory of punishment is correct. It is important to emphasise the sheer number and 
                                                
241 My claim that there is widespread support for negative retributivism (and for the principle that it is 
worse to punish the innocent than acquit the guilty which underlies the BRD standard) is consistent 
with my claim that people are subject to powerful pro-punishment biases. Support for negative 
retributivism and the BRD standard are generally conscious commitments, whereas pro-punishment 
biases are unconscious factors that often cause people to depart unknowingly from such commitments 
in practice. When people inflict unjust punishment because of these biases, they are not consciously 
aware that they are acting unjustly.  
242 C.f. J. Bentham, A Treatise on Judicial Evidence (Paget, London 1825), 197. R.M. Hare also 
argued that although consequentialism was correct in principle, due to human fallibility, attempting to 
apply pure consequentialism to all of one’s everyday actions could lead to bad consequences: Hare, 
Moral Thinking (OUP, London 1971). Furthermore, I should qualify my remarks in fn240, by 
acknowledging that consequentialist reasoning is not immune from biases, e.g. self-interest. It is 
possible that adopting the convergence requirement could help to correct consequentialists’ pro-
punishment biases as such biases may come to light when reflecting on whether the desert criterion 
was satisfied.  
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complexity of the philosophical arguments on the different sides of the debate. In 
Part One, I outlined some of the difficult hurdles that retributivists and 
consequentialists would have to overcome in order to make their positions credible. 
With every hurdle new possibilities for error arise and the cumulative effect of this is 
to create considerable room for doubt. 
As I argued in the previous chapter, theorists who support the BRD standard, 
because they think that it is particularly bad to punish a person without adequate 
justification, should also take seriously the doubts about which theory of punishment 
is correct. They have reason to adopt my convergence requirement because it 
minimises the chance of unjust punishment.243 
This argument invoked one set of substantive ethical principles (the non-
consequentialist basis for the BRD standard) to deal with moral uncertainty about 
another set of substantive ethical principles – theories of punishment. However, 
some theorists will doubt the first set of non-consequentialist ethical principles and 
the BRD standard itself. Therefore, I will now present a meta-theoretical argument 
for taking a cautious approach to punishment. 
The first step in this argument is to recognise that there are some ethical 
considerations/principles about whose soundness there is a relatively high degree of 
certainty and that there are other moral principles whose soundness is much less 
certain. Secondly, it seems sensible to give a privileged status in our decision-making 
to those ethical considerations about whose soundness there is most certainty, i.e. we 
should safeguard these them from being overridden too easily. Thirdly, it is 
submitted that we have grounds for having a relatively high degree of credence in the 
importance of an ethical consideration if respected experts who have thought 
seriously about the matter agree that it counts as an important consideration. It is 
                                                
243 As I will explain further below. 
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useful to introduce Benjamin Vilhauer’s term ‘basic reason’ to describe moral 
considerations about whose validity we can be most certain. 244  According to 
Vilhauer, a reason is basic if all mainstream ethical theories agree that we have this 
reason. To ‘safeguard’ a basic reason (about whose soundness we are very certain) 
involves only allowing it to be overridden in limited circumstances. Specifically, we 
should only allow other considerations to override a basic reason if we have a 
similarly high degree of credence that it is justified to do so. Again, it is submitted 
that we can have grounds for such credence if experts agree that overriding the basic 
reason in these circumstances is justified. 
A plausible candidate for a basic reason is the following: People have a strong reason 
not to deliberately inflict serious harm on others. Call this reason ‘Harm Avoidance’. 
Different theories provide different explanations of why we have this reason. For 
instance, as Vilhauer puts it: ‘Kantian deontologists explain [Harm Avoidance] as an 
imperative to which we must conform unless in harming someone (e.g. by punishing 
him) we do not use him as a mere means. Virtue ethicists might explain it as a 
principle followed by those who possess the virtue of justice except in cases where 
justice permits or requires harm. Act-utilitarians explain [Harm Avoidance] as 
derived from our reason to maximise overall happiness….’ However, despite the 
difference in the explanations that these theorists would give for why Harm 
Avoidance counts as a reason, it is difficult to deny that all mainstream ethical 
theories agree that we have a strong reason to avoid deliberately inflicting serious 
harm on others. It would be very difficult (or impossible) to imagine revising any of 
                                                
244 Vilhauer introduced the concept of a basic reason in order to argue that free will scepticism (unlike 
scepticism about induction and about other minds) does not undermine our reason against 
intentionally harming others. He further argues that free will scepticism actually strengthens this 
reason. B Vilhauer, ‘Taking Free Will Skepticism Seriously’ (2012) 62 The Philosophical Quarterly 
833, p849. However, unlike the approach adopted in this thesis Vilhauer does not argue that Harm 
Avoidance should only be overridden (in the context of punishment) when there is a high level of 
agreement among theorists that doing so is justified. Instead, in other work, he defends a Rawlsian 
theory of punishment: Vilhauer B, ‘Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base’ (2009) 39 
(3) Canadian Journal of Philosophy 489. 
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these ethical theories in a way that would remove this reason and yet preserve the 
theory as a whole. Ethical theories differ regarding what reasons, if any, could 
override Harm Avoidance – call these ‘overriding reasons’. For instance, in the 
context of punishment, retributivists believe that Harm Avoidance can be overridden 
in the case of a blameworthy offender who deserves punishment, and 
consequentialists about punishment believe that Harm Avoidance can be overridden 
in situations where punishing someone would promote the general welfare. Because 
there is a lack of agreement among experts about the retributivist’s overriding reason 
(and hence uncertainty about its status) my meta-theory of moral uncertainty implies 
that we should not override Harm Avoidance, based on the retributive consideration 
alone. Equally, it implies that we should not override Harm avoidance based on the 
consequentialist consideration alone. 
A consequentialist would object to the idea that it is intrinsically worse to inflict 
active, intentional harm than to allow harm to occur unintentionally. It is therefore 
important to make clear that my meta-theoretical approach to moral uncertainty is 
not based on the idea that there is convergence on the principle that the active, 
intentional infliction of harm is worse than allowing harm to occur unintentionally. 
Rather, I argue i) that there is convergence on the idea that there is a strong reason 
against the active, intentional infliction of harm and ii) that there is a lack of 
convergence on the principle which consequentialists claim can override this reason 
(their ‘overriding principle’), i.e. that inflicting active intentional harm is better than 
unintentionally allowing a greater harm to occur. Propositions i) and ii), when taken 
together with the idea that we should safeguard reasons about which there is 
convergence and only allow them to be overridden by principles about which there is 
a similar level of convergence, imply, in practice, that avoidance of active, 
intentional harm is given a privileged status. However, this argument for its 
privileged status is a meta-theoretical argument based on considerations about 
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uncertainty, not an argument that assumes the truth of a non-consequentialist theory 
or of a consequentialist theory. 
So, given moral uncertainty about theories of punishment, in what circumstances is it 
justifiable to override Harm Avoidance and inflict harm on an offender? Vilhauer 
proposes that theorists who give Harm Avoidance a privileged status in their 
decision-making should opt for a theory of punishment which (compared with other 
theories) would recommend subjecting a relatively small number of people to 
punishment and which would, overall, recommend relatively lenient types of 
punishment. Vilhauer believes that a Rawlsian theory of punishment is the most 
promising candidate.245 However, minimising the instances where Harm Avoidance 
is overridden is not the only thing that those who wish to safeguard Harm Avoidance 
should be concerned about. It is also important that, in those cases where Harm 
Avoidance is overridden, we can have a high degree of confidence that this is 
justified. In chapter 3 I mentioned one reason for doubting that Vilhauer’s Rawlsian 
approach can provide such justification (the doubt pertained to the ability of 
Vilhauer’s theory to explain what was wrong with punishing the innocent). More 
generally, it seems that we cannot have a sufficiently high degree of credence in any 
highly contentious theory of punishment to warrant relying on that theory of 
punishment alone as a basis for overriding Harm Avoidance. To determine what 
considerations could justify overriding Harm Avoidance, we should again attempt to 
minimise uncertainty by looking to areas of agreement among ethical theories. 
There are two types of agreement that might be invoked here. I will call these 
contrasting kinds of agreement ‘convergence’ and ‘consensus’.246 I will use the term 
                                                
245 I briefly discussed aspects of Vilhauer’s account in Chapter 3. 
246 My use of these terms is similar to their usage in the literature on ‘public justification’. For a 
general overview of this literature see: Vallier, K and D’Agostino, F, ‘Public Justification’ (2013) in 
The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justification-
public/ [Accessed August 2013]. Roughly speaking, theorists who advocate public justification 
believe that the state should only use coercive force on the basis of reasons that all citizens can accept 
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‘convergence’ to refer to agreement on decisions about what to do – in this context, 
the decision about which individuals may be harmed.  There is considerable 
agreement that the state may impose hardship on certain types of offender. Both 
retributivists (of all varieties) and non-retributivists (including consequentialist and 
non-consequentialist theorists) would agree that the state is entitled to constrain the 
liberty of dangerous violent and sexual offenders. However, retributive and non-
retributive theories provide different reasons for this decision. A pure positive 
retributivist, qua positive retributivist, would only endorse the decision to impose 
hardship on dangerous violent offenders because those offenders are violent 
criminals (i.e. because they have culpably committed violent crimes), not because 
they are dangerous.247 Many non-retributivists, on the other hand, do believe that the 
decision to interfere with such offenders is justified, at least partly, because the 
offenders are dangerous and need to be incapacitated.248 To say that ethical theories 
converge on a decision to impose hardship on an offender implies that these theories 
each provide a different, positive justification in favour of imposing hardship on that 
offender (and that these justifications are logically independent of each other).   
In contrast, I will use the term ‘consensus’ to refer to agreement on the rationale for a 
decision. In addition to convergence on decisions, there may also be some degree of 
                                                                                                                                     
as being valid for them (i.e. the state’s reasons count as reasons within the citizens’ own value-
systems). Public justification theorists might favour my convergence requirement. However, my 
defence of the convergence requirement is based on epistemic considerations – i.e. given uncertainty 
about the justification for coercive force, the convergence requirement maximizes the chance that 
such force is justified. In contrast, public justification theorists are typically motivated by 
considerations of what is required in order to show respect to citizens within a liberal democracy, the 
idea being that such respect requires the state to justify its use of force to all citizens in terms they can 
see as valid. 
247 ‘Positive’ retributivism refers to the idea that the offender’s moral culpability provides a positive 
reason in favour of punishing him. ‘Negative’ retributivism is the idea that we should refrain from 
punishing someone if he is not morally culpable.  
Culpability plays a different role in different types of retributive justification for punishment. For 
instance, according to Michael Moore’s retributive theory, the offender’s moral culpability makes it 
intrinsically good that he suffers for his crime. In contrast, according to RA Duff’s variety of 
retributivism, the offender’s culpable commission of a crime means that it is appropriate to punish 
him in order to bring him to recognize and repent the wrong he perpetrated. 
248 They may also justify such interference on the basis that it promotes goals such as deterrence, 
reform or rehabilitation. 
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consensus among theorists about the reasons to override Harm Avoidance. I have 
argued that, due to moral uncertainty (e.g. doubts about whether we have free will), 
retributive reasons alone are not credible enough to override Harm Avoidance. 
Similarly, we should not override Harm Avoidance whenever unconstrained 
consequentialism recommends this, because there is also moral uncertainty about 
consequentialism (e.g. the counterintutiveness of some of the implications of pure 
consequentialism and concerns about using people as a means). A theorist who 
accepts these arguments about moral uncertainty might look for a reason to override 
Harm Avoidance that would still be available if pure consequentialism and pure 
retributivism were rejected. If a theorist, who had previously endorsed retributivism, 
comes to believe that there is not enough certainty about the soundness of 
retributivism to allow it to override Harm Avoidance, what should this theorist do? 
Surely, it would not be rational for such a theorist to say that, if retributivism can no 
longer provide a sufficient basis for interfering with the liberty of rapists and 
murderers, such offenders may not be interfered with at all. True, a retributivist, qua 
retributivist, would not take dangerousness to be part of the justification for 
interference with an offender’s liberty. But that same theorist, qua ethical theorist 
under conditions of moral uncertainty, would almost certainly do so. As Murtagh, 
puts it:  
“Everyone seems to agree [that]…. even if they are not morally responsible for their 
crimes, it will still be justifiable to incarcerate habitually violent and dangerous 
offenders in order to protect the rest of society. That point is difficult to argue with, 
given the absurdity of allowing serial murderers and rapists to roam free.”249 
Derk Pereboom defends his incapacitation approach to dealing with offenders in this 
way. He reasons that there is at least a reasonable doubt about the soundness of 
                                                
249 K. Murtagh, ‘Free Will Denial and Punishment’ (2013) 39 (2) Social Theory and Practice 223. 
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retributivism and that therefore retributivism should not be relied on to justify 
punishment. He then claims that punishing people for reasons of general deterrence 
uses them merely as a means and should be ruled out on that basis.250 He then 
concludes that the need to protect people from dangerous offenders is something that 
any rational person will agree can warrant state incapacitation of such individuals. 
He draws an analogy with quarantine: if the state can justifiably protect itself against 
carriers of dangerous diseases by subjecting them to quarantine, then it has the right 
to protect itself from dangerous offenders by incapacitating them. However, there is 
an important consideration that Pereboom fails to recognise and which has important 
implications for the kind of evidence of ‘dangerousness’ that can justify 
incapacitation.  
The consideration that Pereboom overlooks is that we do not know beyond 
reasonable doubt that retributivism is false. As Stephen Kearns has recently 
explained, when we survey the state of the free will debate, there is a strong 
argument for ‘free will agnosticism’ rather than for certainty that we lack free will in 
the sense required for retributive responsibility.251 If we wish to safeguard Harm 
Avoidance, therefore, it is rational to treat appeals to free will and retributive 
responsibility differently depending on whether they feature in arguments for 
overriding Harm Avoidance or for strengthening Harm Avoidance.  Free will may be 
invoked as a reason for overriding harm avoidance when it features in a ‘positive’ 
retributivist argument for inflicting hardship on someone because he deserves it, or 
for increasing the penalty to proportionately reflect his desert. In contrast, free will 
can be used in order to strengthen Harm Avoidance (or in order to undermine a 
                                                
250 Although Pereboom uses the language of uncertainty and reasonable doubt when arguing against a 
retributive system he does not invoke uncertainty when arguing against a system of general 
deterrence. Considerations relating to uncertainty would considerably strengthen the latter argument 
as well as the former, since even those theorists who are sympathetic to a general deterrence approach 
must recognize that there is at least a reasonable doubt about whether such an approach is ethically 
defensible.) See, e.g., Pereboom, Living Without Free Will (OUP, Oxford 2001), chapter 6. 
251 S. Kearns, ‘Free Will Agnosticism’ (2013) Nous (Online First). DOI: 10.1111/nous.12032 
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potential overrider of Harm Avoidance) when it features in a ‘negative’ retributivist 
argument against harming someone who does not deserve it, or against inflicting a 
form of hardship that exceeds the individual’s desert. 
The possibility that we might have free will and that negative retributivism might be 
sound casts doubt on the justifiability of incapacitating people on the basis of 
predictions of dangerousness that are unrelated to their past conduct (e.g. predictions 
based on the results of a genetic test or a brain scan revealing biological traits that are 
associated with a disposition to act violently.) The negative retributivist might argue 
that detaining a person (at least a sane, rational agent) on the basis of such data 
would show disrespect for that person’s free will and would inflict an undeserved 
hardship on him.252 It would be reasonable for a theorist acting under conditions of 
moral uncertainty to take the above considerations into account in the following way. 
Firstly, the theorist should have a high degree of credence that there is a strong 
reason to avoid deliberately inflicting harm others (due to the agreement among 
mainstream theorists that we have this reason); secondly the theorist should also have 
a high degree of credence in the common sense idea that violent criminals cannot 
simply be allowed to roam free; and, thirdly, the theorist can give due weight to 
doubts about pre-emptive incapacitation by insisting that assessments of 
dangerousness are based at least partly on evidence of past seriously harmful 
behaviour. Thus, arguably, theorists under conditions of moral uncertainty would 
reach consensus about the proposition that Harm Avoidance can justifiably be 
overridden to the extent that this is necessary in order to incapacitate individuals 
who, through their own conduct, have shown themselves to be dangerous. 
                                                
252 There are also other considerations, which are independent of free will and retributivism, which 
cast doubt on the justifiability of incapacitating those who have never yet offended, such as trust-
based and personhood-based considerations. See chapter 3, above. 
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To summarise this section on convergence and consensus: both of these ideas 
involve trying to minimise the chance of inflicting unjust harm by only imposing 
hardship on an offender if there is agreement among different theorists that doing so 
is appropriate. As I have said, convergence involves agreement on the decision to 
impose harm on someone and consensus involves some degree of agreement on the 
reasons for this decision. It is submitted that the convergence approach and the 
consensus approach are both rational responses to moral uncertainty. They both 
reduce the chance of moral error, but in different ways. The convergence approach 
minimises the risk of inflicting unjust harm by providing more than one plausible 
rationale for a decision to impose hardship on an offender (e.g. positive retributivism 
and societal protection). This provides a ‘theoretical safety net’ – i.e. even if positive 
retributivism fails to deliver an adequate justification for imposing hardship, the 
decision may still be justified on the basis of societal protection and vice versa. The 
consensus approach minimises the risk of inflicting unjust harm by only harming 
offenders if there is a reason for doing so in which all theorists can have a high 
degree of credence.  
Both approaches have the same results in practice, i.e. they make the same 
recommendations about when the state may interfere with an offender’s liberty. The 
consensus approach would recommend state interference when an offender has 
already engaged in conduct which constitutes a seriously wrongful infringement of 
the fundamental interests of others and when the offender is, at least partly on that 
basis, judged to be dangerous. The convergence approach would also make this 
recommendation, because, if the state were only to impose hardship on offenders 
when mainstream theories converged on that outcome, then, in effect, state 
intervention would be constrained by those theories which are most likely to object 
to harm imposition (call these ‘harm-restrictive’ theories). These harm-restrictive 
theories are negative retributivism (which would require proof that the offender 
 177 
engaged in seriously wrongful conduct) and incapacitation theory (which would 
require proof of the offender’s dangerousness). 
For ease of exposition, I will continue to refer to my proposal for dealing with moral 
uncertainty about punishment as the ‘convergence requirement’, i.e. the requirement 
that offenders are only punished when mainstream theories agree that this is 
appropriate.  However, it should be noted that this requirement could also, in effect, 
ensure that offenders are only subject to state coercion when there is a single reason 
for doing so that ethical theorists under conditions of moral uncertainty would agree 
on (i.e. when there is ‘consensus’). 
In the next section, I will explain further how precisely the convergence requirement 




How Does The Convergence Requirement 
Minimise the Risk of Punishing Someone 
Unjustifiably? 
The idea that, under conditions of moral uncertainty, it is rational to seek 
convergence among mainstream theories relies on certain assumptions about 
probability. It assumes that the probability of a disjunction as a whole being true is a 
function of the probability of the truth each of its disjuncts taken together with the 
number of those disjuncts. So if retributivism recommends punishing a particular 
person (and retributivism has a certain probability of being true) and 
consequentialism also recommends punishing that person (and consequentialism has 
a certain probability of being true); then the probability that this person ought to be 
punished is higher than if we relied on one of the disjuncts alone. 
This point can be illustrated with the following example: 
Betting Example 
Imagine you have two options: 
Option 1: You win £100 if A turns out to be true. 
Option 2: You win £100 if either A or B turn out to be true. 
Clearly, it would not be rational to bet on Option 1 in preference to option 2. This is 
because of a basic rule of probability theory called the ‘disjunction rule’, which 
states that:  
“….the probability of A-or-B can be smaller than neither the probability of A nor the 
probability of B, since it contains both.”253 
                                                
253 M. Bar-Hillel and E. Neter, ‘How Alike Is It Versus How Likely Is It: A Disjunction Fallacy in 
Probability Judgments’ (1993) 65 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1119, p1119. The 
disjunction rule is a special case of the extension rule, which states that, ‘if A is a subset of B, then the 
probability of A cannot exceed that of B’. Bar-Hillel and Neter, p1119. 
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Furthermore, one can make the stronger claim that the probability of the truth of 
pure-retributivism-or-pure-consequentialism is greater than the probability of the 
truth of pure retributivism, or the probability of pure consequentialism individually. 
This follows from the fact that we have grounds for according a probability greater 
than zero to each of the mainstream theories of punishment and from the ‘restrictive 
disjunction rule’, which states that P(A-or-B) = P(A) + P(B).254 The restrictive 
disjunction rule applies when the options are mutually exclusive, which pure 
retributivism and pure consequentialism are, by definition. (The options can still be 
thought of as mutually exclusive, even if we include a ‘mixed theory’ as one option, 
since, by definition, if a mixed theory is true, then neither pure retributivism, nor 
pure consequentialism can be true.)   
We have grounds for according an epistemic probability significantly greater than 
zero to each of the mainstream justifications of punishment, because they have struck 
people who have thought seriously about the matter and who are well-informed 
about the various arguments (i.e. ‘experts’ on punishment) as being the most 
plausible theories. Relying on one of these theories alone is more likely to result in 
unjust punishment than if we were to adopt the convergence requirement, because it 
is more probable that any one of the most plausible theories will be wrong than that 
every one of them will be wrong.  
This point can also be put in terms of ‘reasonable doubt’. The convergence 
requirement decreases the chance of punishing someone unjustifiably through 
reducing grounds for reasonable doubt about the justifiability of punishing that 
person. All theorists, regardless of their own theoretical commitments, should 
recognise that consequentialism and retributivism are both ‘reasonable’ positions to 
take, in the sense that the tenets of these theories are intellectually respectable, not 
                                                
254 i.e. the probability of A-or-B is equal to the probability of A plus the probability of B. 
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‘fanciful’ or ‘frivolous’. If, one of these theories recommends punishing someone, 
but another theory opposes this, then this latter theory gives rise to a reasonable 
doubt about whether punishing this person is justifiable. However, if the mainstream, 
reasonable theories (i.e. the best theories we have) agree that punishing someone is 
justified, then the overall case for punishing that person can be said to reach the 
beyond reasonable doubt standard. 
 
Uncertainty About The Convergence 
Requirement  
It might be objected that my convergence requirement does not satisfy itself. I have 
argued that we should only punish someone if the moral argument for punishing that 
person is established to a high degree of credibility and that this standard has been 
reached if the main theories of punishment agree that the person should be punished. 
However, this is just one possible approach to moral uncertainty about punishment 
theories and, as I have acknowledged, there is a debate about which theory of moral 
uncertainty is correct.  
Firstly, in response, it is important to emphasise that my convergence requirement is 
not meant to be a requirement that all moral principles must satisfy. Rather it is a 
requirement that arguments for punishment should satisfy. But the convergence 
requirement is itself not an argument for punishment.  It is a constraint on 
punishment. It is therefore not obvious that it needs to satisfy itself. 
Secondly, if second order uncertainty  (i.e. uncertainty about which theory of moral 
uncertainty is correct) is a problem for my approach, it is also a problem for every 
theory of punishment, since all punishment theorists must necessarily adopt some 
theory of moral uncertainty. All punishment theorists must recognise the grounds for 
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being uncertain about which theory of punishment is correct (unless they are 
epistemically arrogant). Given this recognition, any approach that the punishment 
theorist then advocates is a response to moral uncertainty. Even if she advocates the 
‘simple approach’ of acting on her preferred theory of punishment, despite the 
uncertainty about its soundness, this is itself a response to moral uncertainty. By 
default, the most common approach to moral uncertainty is the simple approach. 
However, the simple approach often involves internal inconsistency. As I have noted, 
many punishment theorists have an even higher degree of credence in the beyond 
reasonable doubt standard and in the proposition that punishment requires strong 
justification, than the degree of credence they have in their own substantive theory of 
punishment, e.g. retributivism. If they advocate acting on retributivism, despite the 
doubts about its soundness, they are ignoring principles in which they have an even 
higher degree of credence. So they are deviating from their own approach to moral 
uncertainty: that one should act on those principles in which one has the highest 
degree of credence. 
Thirdly, my approach seems to be more internally consistent that the simple 
approach (which is currently the dominant approach). My approach recommends 
seeking convergence between theories of punishment and there is convergence on at 
least part of my theory of moral uncertainty itself. Most punishment theorists agree 
that punishment requires considerable justification, even though they disagree about 
which theory of punishment is the best. They also agree about the beyond reasonable 
doubt standard. My convergence requirement, unlike the simple approach, 
incorporates these agreed elements.  
Who Counts As An Expert On Punishment? 
I argue that we ought to minimise the risk of punishing someone unjustifiably and 
that, given the moral uncertainty about which theory of punishment is correct, it is 
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unacceptably risky to punish someone based on a single theory of punishment alone. 
I claim that we have firmer grounds for believing that it is justifiable to punish 
someone if experts on the subject agree that punishing that person is justifiable. In 
order to defend this claim, I need to say more about the idea of an ‘expert’.  
 
Alvin Goldman sets out a number of plausible criteria for identifying who should 
count as an expert within a certain domain of knowledge (the ‘E-domain’). His first 
criterion relies on the idea that the concept of expertise is partly comparative: 
1. An expert must have ‘more beliefs (or higher degrees of belief) in true propositions 
and/or fewer beliefs in false propositions within that domain than…the vast majority 
of people do.’255  
However, expertise (in an objective sense) is not entirely comparative. If the vast 
majority of people’s thinking about a certain matter is entirely riddled with false 
beliefs and the putative ‘expert’ is superior to them in having a slightly smaller 
number of false beliefs, she still does not count as a genuine expert in the matter, in 
an objective sense. So Goldman’s second requirement for a person to qualify as an 
expert is: 
2. The possession of ‘a substantial body of true beliefs’ in the E-domain.256  
In addition to having this body of accurate information, an expert must also have: 
3. The disposition and set of skills necessary to use this information to form true beliefs 
in answer to new questions about the E-domain.257 
                                                
255  A. Goldman, ‘Experts: which ones should you trust’ (2001) 63 (1) Philosophy and 




It might be objected at this point that the second criterion poses a problem for my 
approach. Given the (seeming) incompatibility between various theories of 
punishment (say, a pure consequentialist theory versus a pure retributive theory), 
presumably punishment theorists from opposing camps cannot all be right. It might 
therefore be thought that some of these theorists must lack a ‘substantial body of true 
beliefs’ about the justification of punishment and cannot qualify as experts. Given 
the uncertainty about which theory is right, there would seem to be a corresponding 
uncertainty about who would count as an expert, and hence it might be claimed that 
relying on the notion of expertise, as part of my strategy for minimising this 
uncertainty, is problematic.  
In response to this objection, it is helpful to clarify the second criterion by invoking 
Goldman’s distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ questions in a domain of 
expertise.258 Primary questions are the main, substantive questions that researchers 
on a topic are ultimately trying to find answers to (e.g. what are the prerequisites for 
criminal responsibility and fitness for punishment; what aims should a system of 
punishment serve etc.?). Secondary questions concern the arguments or evidence that 
are relevant to answering the primary questions (e.g. the various arguments for and 
against the compatibility of determinism and retributive responsibility; people’s 
intuitions about punishing the innocent etc.). Secondary questions also concern the 
views of the leading researchers in the field about such arguments and evidence (e.g. 
what do prominent theorists of punishment say on the issue of 
compatibilism/incompatibilism; or the significance of intuitions about punishing the 
innocent). 
To count as an ‘expert’ for the purposes of my argument, a punishment theorist must 
have a substantial body of true beliefs about the secondary questions about 
                                                
258 ibid. 
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punishment, i.e. she must be familiar with the main arguments and evidence for the 
different positions and the views of prominent researchers about such arguments and 
evidence. The views of two opposing camps of theorists may sharply diverge 
regarding some of the conclusions that these arguments and this evidence support 
(i.e. they diverge about some of the primary questions) and yet both sets of theorists 
remain experts. In addition, even though the ultimate primary question (what is the 
correct justification of punishment?) is unsolved and hence at least one camp of 
opposing experts must lack true beliefs about this question, all of the theorists have 
true beliefs about some of the primary questions. These include conclusions about 
what characteristics a system of punishment should not have, e.g. that people should 
not be punished purely because of morally irrelevant characteristics such as poverty 
or height. In addition, as I have emphasised in this thesis, there is considerable 
agreement between theorists about certain conclusions about justified punishment – 
i.e. which specific people should be punished. Therefore, the mere fact that experts 
hold opposite views about theories of punishment does not mean that their views 
about the justifiability of punishing specific individuals will conflict, and therefore 
they could all be right about these conclusions. 
 
Implementing The Convergence Requirement 
The main aim of this thesis is to make the moral case for taking seriously the 
uncertainty about the soundness of retributive responsibility and about theories of 
punishment more generally. I have attempted to show that, in principle, the 
convergence requirement is one promising response to this uncertainty. There is not 
scope within this thesis to discuss the numerous practical issues that would need to 
be addressed to demonstrate precisely how the requirement should be implemented. 
Instead, in this section, I will lay the foundations for future work by briefly outlining 
some considerations which are relevant to deciding at which stages of the criminal 
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justice process the convergence requirement should be taken into account and how it 
should be applied at each stage. Part 3 will then examine in more depth the practical 
implications of my approach for one specific example of a possible response to 
criminal behaviour – the use of direct brain interventions in rehabilitation 
programmes. 
Sentencing 
The convergence requirement is relevant at the sentencing stage, since at this stage 
serious hardship may be imposed on offenders. Some of the most severe forms of 
punishment, such as the death penalty, should be ruled out entirely, because a 
number of mainstream theories fundamentally reject these forms of punishment. 
Some mainstream theories also oppose confining offenders under the harsh 
conditions that currently prevail in American and British prisons.259  However, 
agreement could be reached on the permissibility of subjecting certain offenders to 
confinement under less severe conditions.  
1) Confinement 
As, indicated above, incapacitation theories (of the kind advanced by Derk 
Pereboom) and negative retributivism are the theories that are most likely to object to 
a proposal to deprive an offender of liberty. Negative retributivists would require 
that, for confinement of a (sane) offender to be permissible, the offender must have 
committed a sufficiently serious offence and must have met the retributivist’s criteria 
for moral responsibility. Negative retributivists would oppose consequentialist 
arguments for confining sane individuals who have not met these responsibility 
criteria, who have committed no offence, or whose offence is minor. Negative 
                                                
259 For a discussion of the effects of harsh prison conditions on offenders see: D Bierie, ‘Is Tougher 
Better? The Impact of Physical Prison Conditions on Inmate Violence’ (2012) 56 International 
Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 338. Regarding conditions in English 
prisons see: C Kruttschnitt  and A Dirkzwager, ‘Are There Still Contrasts in Tolerance? Imprisonment 
in the Netherlands and England 20 Years Later’ (2011) 13(3) Punishment and Society 283-306. 
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retributivists would also oppose confinements that were lengthier or imposed more 
physical or psychological hardship than the offender deserved. Incapacitation 
theorists would oppose consequentialist or retributive proposals to confine non-
dangerous individuals. Incapacitation theorists would also reject proposals to confine 
individuals for longer than is necessary to prevent them from reoffending, or under 
conditions that are designed to be harsh. Therefore, with certain qualifications, the 
convergence requirement implies that confinement is only permissible in the 
following circumstances: 1) the offender meets the retributivist’s responsibility 
criteria (something that should be determined at the conviction stage, discussed 
below); 2) the offender is dangerous; 3) the confinement is not a disproportionately 
severe response to the wrong the offender committed; and 4) the confinement is not 
longer than needed to prevent the offender from being a danger to society and the 
conditions of confinement, in themselves, are not designed to inflict severe physical 
or psychological suffering. 
 
One qualification that should be added at this point is that the convergence 
requirement must be balanced against the need to preserve society. One might worry 
that a system that confined offenders under relatively benign conditions would lack a 
deterrent effect and that this might seriously threaten society by leading to a drastic 
increase in offending and widespread chaos. If implementing the convergence 
requirement strictly would seriously threaten the existence or functioning of civilised 
society then the requirement should be diluted. We should seek the greatest level of 
agreement on decisions to inflict severe hardship on offenders that is compatible with 
the need to preserve society. If insisting on unanimity between mainstream theories 
is incompatible with the preservation of society, then my approach would 
recommend seeking a level of agreement short of unanimity. Placing importance on 
the need to preserve civilised society is consistent with my general approach to moral 
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uncertainty. I have proposed that when deliberating under conditions of moral 
uncertainty we should recognise that there are some ethical considerations about 
whose importance there is a relatively high level of certainty and that we should 
privilege these considerations in our decision-making. We can be very certain that 
there is a strong reason against seriously harming others and that we should only 
override that reason if the justification for doing so has reached a very high standard 
of credibility. However, we can be equally certain that it is important that serious 
crime does not escalate to a level where society is at risk of disintegration. Therefore, 
we should not hold justifications for imposing hardship on offenders to such a high 
standard that this scenario would occur.260 
 
Having said this, it is doubtful that the reduction in the use and severity of 
confinement that would result from the convergence requirement would seriously 
threaten society. As Pereboom points out, people generally place such a high value 
on their liberty that the fear of being deprived of it would probably be an adequate 
deterrent, even if the conditions of confinement were relatively benign. Furthermore, 
evidence from numerous studies indicates that a potential offender’s belief in the 
likelihood of being caught is much more important in deterring crime than the 
severity of the sanctions that would be imposed if he were convicted.261 If these 
studies are correct, they provide a reason for diverting the resources that are currently 
spent on keeping offenders in prison for very long periods into policies that increase 
the likelihood that those who fit the criteria for confinement are apprehended. It 
should also be noted that Scandinavian criminal justice systems have more benign 
prison regimes and lower rates of imprisonment than many other Western countries. 
                                                
260 For an example of the ‘social disintegration’ objection to hard incompatibilism see: Smilansky, S, 
‘Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical Reductio’ (2011) 30 Law and Philosophy 353. 
261 For an overview of such evidence see: D Nagin, ‘Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century’ (2013) 
41(1) Crime and Justice 199. For a hard incompatibilist reply, see: N Levy, ‘Skepticism and Sanction: 
The Benefits of Rejecting Moral Responsibility’ (2012) 31 Law and Philosophy 477. 
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Yet these policies have not resulted in high levels of crime in Scandinavian 
countries.262  
 
Another qualification concerns how to assess the ‘severity’ of the confinement. 
Prima facie, a longer period of confinement seems more severe than a shorter period. 
However, it is important to take account of the conditions under which an offender is 
confined, including the presence of rehabilitative/therapeutic interventions, and the 
effect that such interventions may have on the length of confinement necessary to 
protect society. A particular rehabilitative intervention might allow offenders to be 
released earlier into society, but may adversely affect offenders in other ways.  Part 
Three of this thesis will address this issue, focussing on the example of neurological 
interventions. 
 
One criticism that has been made of Pereboom’s hard incompatibilist model of 
responding to criminal behaviour is that it recommends incapacitating offenders until 
they are judged to be no longer dangerous.263 This seems to imply the use of 
indeterminate sentences. Such sentences may be thought unjust (because they are 
potentially disproportionate to the offence) and it may be thought unfair or inhumane 
to leave offenders in a state of complete uncertainty as to when they may be released. 
Unlike Pereboom’s model, the convergence requirement would suggest that a 
determinate maximum limit should be set on an offender’s period of confinement 
and that the offender should be informed of this when the sentence is passed. This is 
because the convergence requirement takes account of the possibility that negative 
retributivism might be sound and therefore requires that the sentence of confinement 
                                                
262 See e.g. T Lappi-Seppala,  and M Tonry, ‘Crime, Criminal Justice and Criminology in the Nordic 
Countries’ (2011) 40 (1) Crime and Justice 1. 
 
263 M Corrado, ‘Why Do We Resist Hard Incompatibilism? Thoughts on Freedom and Punishment’ in 
T Nadelhoffer (ed.) The Future of Punishment, ed. Thomas Nadelhoffer (Oxford OUP 2013) 
 189 
is not a disproportionately severe response to the wrong the offender committed. 
However, the offender should be released early, if he is no longer dangerous. 
2) Rehabilitation and Community Service 
Participation in rehabilitation programmes or community service may be ordered 
instead of confinement. The convergence requirement implies that a more lenient 
sentence (e.g. a non-custodial one) should be preferred to a harsher one (e.g. 
confinement) where a more lenient sentence would sufficiently reduce the chance of 
the offender reoffending. Such rehabilitation programmes or community service 
orders may involve an element of moral communication. For instance, they may be 
designed to bring the offender to recognise the wrong he has done; to reflect on the 
psychological dispositions that led him to commit that wrong; to attempt to modify 
those dispositions; and, where appropriate, to make symbolic reparation to his 
victims. As will be explained below, when discussing the conviction stage, such 
moral communication can be acceptable to hard incompatibilitsts, since their theory 
does not object to holding others morally responsible in the ‘moral appraisability’ 
sense.  
 
Furthermore, the cautious approach to punishment defended in this thesis would 
recommend measures that involve an element of moral communication over ones 
that do not. This is because the cautious approach to punishment is designed to 
protect the interests of the individual who may be subject to punishment (or similar 
coercive measures). Among the key interests people have is that they are not made to 
suffer and that they are not deprived of their liberty. Hence arguments for infringing 
such interests must be justified to a high standard of credibility. However, offenders 
plausibly have other interests that are worthy of protection. These include their 
interest in being respected as a rational agent. Rehabilitation programmes can show 
respect for offenders’ rational agency by explaining to offenders why their liberty 
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needs to be interfered with (e.g. by pointing out the impact of criminal conduct on 
victims) and which present offenders with good reasons why they should not 
reoffend. (I will discuss the idea of respecting rational agency further in Part 3.) 
3) Fines 
Since mainstream theories of dealing with criminal behaviour tend to endorse the use 
of fines in some circumstances, it seems that this measure could, in principle, satisfy 
the convergence requirement. If a fine can prevent an offender from reoffending, 
then theories that restrict the use of confinement to incapacitation of the dangerous 
would recommend fines over confinement. Pereboom defends one such 
incapacitation theory. He goes even further than this and suggests that fines may 
even be imposed for reasons of general deterrence. It might be wondered whether 
this suggestion is compatible with his rationale for using coercive measures against 
offenders (which, as I mentioned earlier, relies on an analogy with quarantining 
carriers of infectious diseases). He objects to imprisoning people to deter others, 
because this involves ‘using’ them, but claims that incapacitating those who pose a 
threat to others is an exception to the prohibition on using people, if it is done strictly 
to eliminate that threat.264 However, he defends imposing fines for reasons of general 
deterrence on the basis that this is fairly minor infringement of the prohibition on 
using others, given that the right to property is less weighty than the right to freedom 
of movement. This seems plausible provided that limits are set on the levels of fines 
that take into account the offender’s income, so that the fine does not inflict harm 
                                                
264 D Pereboom, Living without Free Will (CUP, Cambridge 2001), chapter 6. On Tadros’s theory, in 
contrast, harming direct threats does not violate the prohibition on using people as a means at all. 
Such harm involves ‘eliminating’ the threat they pose. Tadros’s argument is plausible, since ‘use’ is 
most closely associated with ‘manipulation’ or ‘exploitation’, whereas eliminating the harm posed by 
a direct threat does not seem to be accurately described by those terms. V Tadros, The Ends of Harm: 
The Moral Foundations of the Criminal Law (OUP, Oxford 2011). Similarly, Quinn argues that it is 
not plausible to classify eliminating a threat as an example of ‘using’ someone. According to Quinn, 
using someone is typically ‘opportunistic’. The ‘user’ sees the other person as presenting an 
opportunity positively to further the user’s goals – the user benefits from the presence of the person 
who is used. In contrast, when someone eliminates a direct threat, they are removing an obstacle to 
their goals. W Quinn, ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect’ (1989) 
98 (4) Philosophy and Public Affairs 334. 
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severe enough to jeopardise the offender’s chance of leading a ‘reasonably good 
life’.265 This should not be too controversial, since it would be unreasonable to hold 
that the prohibition on using people is absolute.  For example, if an attacker wielding 
a weapon were pursuing someone, it would be wrong for the intended victim to grab 
a bystander and use him as a human shield  - resulting in the bystander being stabbed 
to death; but it would not be wrong to push a bystander over, merely causing him a 
minor injury, if this were the only means by which the intended victim could save his 
own life. To prohibit, on the basis of the means principle, pushing the bystander over 
would seem fanatical. 
Conviction 
I have said that one implication of the convergence requirement is that the state 
should only punish those individuals who appear to have satisfied the retributivist’s 
responsibility criteria. It seems sensible for this to be determined at the conviction 
stage. I now need to clarify what would satisfy the retributivist’s responsibility 
criteria. I argued in Part 1 that, strictly speaking, there is good reason to doubt 
whether the criteria for retributive responsibility can ever be satisfied. I argued that 
retributive responsibility requires libertarian free will and there is little evidence that 
we have this kind of free will. However, as I noted earlier in the present chapter, the 
possibility that retributivism is sound and that the kind of responsibility it requires 
exists provides a reason against harming people who clearly could not be 
retributively responsible for an offence – which most obviously includes those who 
have committed no offence at all. Most libertarians believe that possessing free will 
in the compatibilist sense is also necessary for moral responsibility.  In addition, 
most libertarians seem to assume that those who have compatibilist free will also 
have libertarian free will. When I refer to ‘the retributivist’s criteria for 
responsibility’ I am referring to the compatibilist responsibility criteria, which are 
                                                
265 Pereboom, ibid, p177. 
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clearly capable of being satisfied in many cases. The convergence requirement thus 
protects those whom all retributivists would regard as non-responsible. It is 
submitted that this way of framing the convergence requirement gives appropriate 
weight to the concerns of negative retributivism. 
The next question is whether the forward-looking aspect of the convergence 
requirement should be taken into account at the conviction stage. So far, I have 
argued that the serious hardship involved in punishment should only be inflicted if 
the main theories of punishment agree that this is appropriate. Usually, a conviction 
is a precursor to the infliction of punishment. However, a conviction, in itself, 
involves intentionally imposing a hardship on someone (since identifying someone 
as a wrongdoer is a hardship); even if that person is then spared punishment 
altogether. It is therefore important to consider under what circumstances forward-
looking theories of punishment will agree with retributive ones that a conviction is 
appropriate.  
The conviction by itself is an act of communication. It is a public declaration that the 
offender has committed a criminal offence. This involves declaring that the offender 
committed a serious moral wrong, since the offence-definition must specify a serious 
moral wrong in order to meet the retributivist’s demand that only wrongdoers are 
convicted and punished. Making such a declaration can also serve forward-looking 
purposes. It allows society to express and reinforce their commitment to the values 
that have been breached, it helps the community to develop its understanding of 
those values and it can help criminals to reform, by bringing them to recognise the 
wrong that they have done.  
Under what circumstances might a forward-looking theorist object to the conviction 
(considered by itself, leaving aside the issue of punishment) of serious wrongdoers? 
It might be thought that hard incompatibilists would object to convicting offenders to 
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the extent that this involves holding them morally responsible. However, in fact, hard 
incompatibilists would not oppose holding offenders responsible, provided that 
responsibility is understood in the sense of ‘moral appraisability’. Although there is 
fierce controversy (and considerable grounds for uncertainty) about the justification 
of punishment, there is very widespread agreement about the appropriateness of 
morally appraising the conduct of offenders. Pereboom, who is at the most sceptical 
extreme of the spectrum of views on free will, claims that the arguments against free 
will (while undermining retributivism) give us no reason to doubt our right to 
morally criticise wrongdoers’ conduct. Free will sceptics accept the legitimacy of 
engaging the wrongdoer in dialogue about the moral quality of his actions and about 
his reasons for performing them; evaluating what these actions reveal about his 
attitudes or character traits; and demanding that he engages in self-reflection and 
apologises for his behaviour. Pereboom writes: 
 
“The moral responsibility invoked here has been called the 
moral answerability or the fittingness of providing a moral 
explanation sense, and it is the variety of moral responsibility 
that is most thoroughly ingrained in our practice and least 
controversial… It may well characterise human interactions 
across cultures…The main thread of the historical free will 
debate does not pose determinism as a challenge to moral 
responsibility as answerability, and free will sceptics accept 
that we are morally responsible in this sense.”266 
 
Hard incompatibilists would only object to the practice of condemning offenders 
purely in order to make them experience psychological suffering. However, if 
                                                
266 Pereboom, ‘Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Punishment’, p51. Pereboom recognises that his 
conception of moral answerability cannot justify the ‘hard treatment’ aspect of punishment, without 
relying on retributive ideas that he rejects. In line with his incapacitation theory, Pereboom proposes 
that non-dangerous ‘criminals’ should be allowed to go free, but he does not say whether, in his view, 
they should be ‘acquitted’. Indeed he does not mention how we are to determine whether an 
individual is a ‘criminal’ – through a trial or through some other procedure. It is submitted that in 
most cases the forward-looking benefits that can flow from morally appraising offenders at the 
conviction stage, justify convicting offenders who have committed serious moral wrongs, even if they 
are not dangerous. This conclusion seems to be consistent with Pereboom’s overall position. (See the 
text regarding convictions that would produce very bad consequences.) 
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convicting offenders serves the forward-looking purposes just described, as well as 
applying only to those whom retributivists regard as responsible, then this would 
satisfy the convergence requirement. 
 
Prosecution 
In some cases where a trial and conviction would clearly fail to meet the 
convergence requirement (e.g. because it would produce very bad consequences) 
prosecutorial discretion could be exercised so that the case was not tried.  
 
Criminalisation 
Legislators should take into account the convergence requirement when deciding 
whether to criminalise behaviour (since enacting a criminal law renders individuals 
liable to punishment if they breach it) and when deciding what criminal penalties to 
provide for in legislation. Legislators should consider both i.) whether the legislation 
identifies individuals who would be deserving of punishment in the retributive sense 
(if retributivism were sound) and ii.) whether interfering with the liberty of those 
individuals is necessary in order to remove the threat which they pose to society. 
Even if the legislature has attempted to take the convergence requirement into 
account at the criminalisation stage, and has succeeded in drafting an offence that, in 
general, only applies to individuals whose punishment would satisfy the convergence 
requirement, there will almost certainly be exceptional cases that the legislature has 
not foreseen. For instance, the accused may have personal characteristics or 
circumstances which mean that, in this particular case, the consequentialist rationale 
for punishment is not satisfied.  The judge should be able to take this into account at 
the sentencing stage, and even impose no punishment on the individual, if one 




In this chapter I have defended the convergence requirement – the idea that we 
should try to reduce the risk of inflicting unjustified punishment by only punishing 
someone if the main theories of punishment agree that punishing that person is 
appropriate. This chapter began by explaining why people from different theoretical 
perspectives have reason to endorse my convergence requirement, rather than simply 
relying on their own favoured theory of punishment. I argued that theorists from 
different philosophical perspectives have somewhat different reasons for endorsing 
the convergence requirement. Non-consequentialists have the reasons outlined in the 
previous chapter for holding arguments for punishment to a high standard of 
credibility. Retributivists and consequentialists each have some reasons for adopting 
the convergence requirement, because, due to human fallibility, acting on a single, 
unconstrained theory of punishment may fail to serve the aims of either theory. 
However, the main argument this chapter advanced in favour of the convergence 
requirement was a meta-theoretical argument. After clarifying why exactly the 
convergence requirement minimises the risk of unjustified punishment, this chapter 
addressed two potential objections to my view. One challenge stemmed from the 
existence of uncertainty about which theory of moral uncertainty is sound. The other 
potential objection concerned my reliance on the idea of agreement among ‘experts’ 
on punishment. The final section briefly outlined some issues that are relevant to the 
implementation of the convergence requirement in practice.  
The convergence requirement is designed to protect individuals from unjustified state 
coercion. It assumes that punishment (and related coercive responses to criminal 
behaviour) infringes these individuals’ interests – in particular their interest in not 
being seriously harmed - and therefore requires strong justification. This chapter 
primarily considered the question of which individuals should be subject to coercive 
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measures at all. The answer it proposed was: only those individuals whom 
mainstream theories of punishment agree should be subject to such measures. Part 
Three will explore the following issue: what should be done when mainstream 
theories agree that an individual should be subject to some sort of coercive measures, 
but disagree as to which specific measures are appropriate? This question is 
complicated by the fact that offenders have a number of different interests that 
should be protected, but these interests can sometimes pull in different directions. In 
general, offenders have an interest in not being deprived of liberty. Therefore, where 
one mainstream theory recommends a sentence that involves less interference with 
liberty, that sentence should usually be preferred. However, I have also indicated that 
offenders have an interest in being treated as rational agents. Certain rehabilitative 
interventions might allow offenders to be released earlier into society, but may fail to 
respect the offender as a rational agent. This problem arises most acutely in 
connection with the possibility of using direct brain interventions to modify criminal 
behaviour. Therefore, Part Three will be devoted to examining this example in detail.  
It is also important to explore this topic, since it is of particular relevance to the 
arguments for free will scepticism which I advanced in Part One, when raising 
doubts about the justifiability of relying solely on a retributive theory punishment. It 
is tempting to try to explain why certain direct brain interventions are troubling by 
claiming that they threaten free will. If free will scepticism implied an acceptance of 
these troubling interventions then this could undermine free will scepticism and 
could possibly strengthen the case for a retributive system that stressed the 
importance of free will. However, in Part Three I will argue that, in fact, the 
objectionable nature of certain direct brain interventions has very little to do with 






Part Three: Free Will 
and ‘Manipulative’ 
Responses to Criminal 
Behaviour  
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Part Three: Overview 
Part Two focussed mainly on the following two questions: ‘Which individuals may 
the state subject to coercive measures within the criminal justice system?’ and ‘on 
what basis are such measures justified?’ This section focuses on the question of 
which methods of responding to criminal behaviour are morally acceptable. Theorists 
often express the concern that without the notions of ‘free will’ and ‘retributive 
responsibility’ we would be unable to explain what is wrong with measures that are 
intuitively ‘manipulative’  (e.g. attempting to control the offender’s behaviour using 
biomedical means, such as direct brain interventions).  This part of my thesis aims to 
show how a non-retributive, hard incompatibilist approach to criminal behaviour can 
be both just and humane. 
In Chapter Seven, I argue that the objectionable nature of certain direct brain 
interventions cannot persuasively be explained in terms of the interventions’ effect 
on free will (regardless of whether ‘free will’ is understood in a libertarian or a 
compatibilist sense). In Chapter Eight, I argue that certain forms of biomedical 
interventions are objectionable and should not be used within the criminal justice 
system. Unlike many traditional approaches to the issue, my objection to such 
interventions does not rely on the idea that they necessarily violate the offender’s 
free will (conceived of as a capacity that we can identify just by examining the 
individual’s psychology and actions carefully enough). Instead, the objection is 
based on the problematic nature of the relationship between the intervener and the 
subject of the intervention. I argue that the state’s way of dealing with offenders 
must be constrained by the principle that the offender must not be objectified, and 
that his personhood must be respected. Objectifying a group of people typically 
involves creating a division between ‘them’ and ‘us’, which excludes the objectified 
group and which portrays them as radically deficient in some fundamental respect. 
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The distinction between objectification (in this sense) and respecting personhood is 
not an ‘all-or-nothing’ matter. The state’s coercive response to offenders inevitably 
excludes them to some extent and inevitably highlights differences between offenders 
and other citizens. But the state should not entirely exclude offenders and should 
emphasise commonalities between the offender and other citizens as well as 
differences. I argue that entirely medicalising the problem of criminal behaviour and 
attempting to re-shape offenders’ values/goals via biomedical means would fall too 
much towards the objectification end of the spectrum. Rather, attempts to reform 
offenders should involve engaging the offender in rational dialogue, for example 
through victim-offender mediation programmes.  
I specifically oppose the idea of using biomedical interventions to deal with 
offenders who are basically rational in an attempt to ensure that the offender adopts 
one particular set of values rather than another. However, I do not oppose the use of 
all biomedical interventions within the criminal justice system. For instance, such 
techniques might legitimately be used in order to treat offenders who have mental 
illnesses. A more controversial question is whether biomedical interventions 
(including neurological interventions) might be used to enhance the rational 
capacities of basically normal offenders so that they are better able to decide for 
themselves which goals they should pursue, or which values they should endorse.  
In Chapter Nine, I argue that, in principle, it would be morally permissible for the 
state to employ certain types of biomedical interventions (such as ‘cognitive 
enhancements’) in a limited way within the criminal justice system, provided that 
effective enhancements can be developed in the future that have minimal side-
effects. This chapter sets out the considerations that need to be balanced when 
deciding which types of techniques should be permissible and under what 
circumstances they may be used. It argues that offenders have three main interests 
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that should be taken into account here. Firstly, the offender’s rationality should be 
respected. This, I argue, requires that the offender gives informed consent to any 
enhancement and that enhancements are only permissible if they are reversible at the 
request of the offender. Furthermore, techniques are only permissible if they do not 
restrict (but rather aim to positively enhance) the offender’s capacities for critical 
reflection. Secondly, the offender should be treated as a member of the moral 
community. This entails that reforming offenders should occur primarily through 
relationships with others. Biomedical interventions should never be used to 
circumvent the need for dialogue with the offender, but rather to enable effective 
dialogue to occur. Finally, the offender has an interest in not being made to suffer 
unnecessarily. This may be a consideration in favour of employing biomedical 
interventions. Attempts to reform criminals that do not involve such interventions 
may be much more burdensome to the criminal (e.g. requiring a longer time of 
incarceration) than if these interventions were used. However, this consideration, can 
also count against the use of biomedical interventions that might expose the 
individual to (possibly unknown) side-effects.  
Chapter Nine then goes on to discuss how we can distinguish techniques that 
enhance rational capacities from interventions that fundamentally change the 
person's character, and the extent to which this distinction matters. Examples of 
particular interventions which I consider include methods of reducing the strength of 
an offender’s violent urges and increasing control over these urges, treatments for 
sex offenders and techniques for enhancing offenders’ empathy. Finally, I consider 
under what conditions a valid, informed consent to such interventions may be 




Chapter Seven: Direct Brain Interventions 
and Free Will 
Introduction 
A seemingly obvious objection to attempting to alter criminals’ thought-processes 
through direct brain interventions is the idea that such interventions would deprive 
the offender of free will. Free will theorists, however, have found the issue of brain 
interventions surprisingly problematic. This chapter begins by briefly explaining why 
the libertarian conception of free will does not provide a secure basis for objecting to 
direct brain interventions. The remainder of this chapter focuses on compatibilist 
accounts of freedom since compatibilism is probably the dominant approach to free 
will among philosophers.267 According to compatibilists, a person can still have free 
will even though all of her thoughts, values and choices are entirely determined by 
forces beyond her control (e.g. the facts of the remote past and the laws of nature); 
forces that completely guarantee that she would have precisely those thoughts and 
values and make precisely those choices.268 Compatibilists persuasively argue that, 
even if determinism is true, many agents still possess a number of characteristics and 
abilities that are necessary for free will (some of which are discussed below). One 
can imagine certain forms of brain manipulation that clearly deprive agents of these 
characteristics and abilities. However, not all brain interventions have this effect. Yet 
even in these latter cases, using these techniques to modify behaviour can still seem 
problematic. This chapter aims briefly to summarise some of the main trends in 
compatibilist thinking and to explain why it is not always possible to use 
                                                
267  Bourget D and Chalmers D (eds.) The Philpapers Survey 2009, available at 
http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl Accessed 31st May 2011. 
268 Compatibilists maintain that even if a person lacks control over the factors that determine her 
action, she may still control the action itself. 
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compatibilist accounts of free will as the basis for distinguishing ‘normal’ agents 
from those who have been subject to troubling types of intervention.  
Libertarian Freedom and Direct Brain 
Interventions 
Most libertarians would oppose any type of direct intervention that guaranteed that 
the agent would act in one particular way. For most libertarians, freedom consists 
partly in the ability to choose between different alternatives for action, without the 
outcome of one’s decision being guaranteed in advance by prior events.  
In a very recent article, John Harris has developed an argument against using direct 
neurological interventions to morally enhance offenders, which seems to rely on 
libertarianism. He begins by referring to the image of a forking path, stressing that if 
an agent is genuinely free then it is possible to choose to go down any one of the 
available paths. After quoting a passage from Paradise Lost, he, agrees with Milton 
that for an agent to be capable of virtue it must be possible for him to do wrong or to 
‘fall’. He writes: 
 
‘Without the freedom to fall, good cannot be a choice; and 
freedom disappears and along with it virtue. There is no virtue 
in doing what you must....  
....[Liberty could be] threatened by any measures that make 
the freedom to do immoral things impossible....sufficiency to 
stand is worthless, literally morally bankrupt, without freedom 
to fall....’269 
Determinism entails that, given the facts of the past and the laws of nature, nobody 
could have acted differently from the way in which they actually did act. If a person 
actually refrained from doing an immoral thing, then given these facts and laws, it 
was physically impossible for them to have done the immoral thing. Harris’s 
arguments seem to imply that causal determinism is incompatible with true virtue, 
                                                
269 J Harris, ‘Moral Enhancement and Freedom’ (2011) 25 (2) Bioethics 102, pp.105-111.   
 204 
because virtue requires that it was genuinely possible for the agent to have been 
vicious. There are, of course, compatibilist interpretations of alternatives possibilities 
(which will be discussed below). However, Harris’s arguments against direct 
interventions only seem to make sense on a libertarian interpretation. He states that it 
is a conceptual truth that God himself could not have guaranteed that human beings 
would behave virtuously and still have left us free. 270  This is implied by 
libertarianism, which states that nothing, not even God, can ensure in advance that a 
free agent will decide to do one thing rather than another – the future is open right up 
until the agent makes her choice. However, according to compatibilism, individuals 
who are predetermined to behave virtuously are still free (all that matters on this 
compatibilist view is that in some hypothetical scenario the agent would have 
behaved differently). It seems perfectly conceptually possible to imagine a world 
which God had created in such a way that every individual was guaranteed to 
develop into a virtuous agent and yet retained freedom in the compatibilist sense.271  
There are various reasons why it is problematic to rely on libertarianism as one’s 
only basis for opposing intuitively objectionable types of direct intervention. Firstly, 
Libertarian free will requires that certain empirical facts obtain. It requires that 
human deliberations are (at least sometimes) undetermined. It also requires that they 
are undetermined in a way that does not merely introduce randomness into our 
deliberations. Most libertarians themselves concede that we lack epistemic 
justification for these beliefs.272 Libertarianism therefore makes the question of 
whether anyone ever has free will a hostage to empirical fortune. For this reason, 
                                                
270 Ibid, p105. 
271 For a discussion of determinism and Christian theology, see: Pereboom D, ‘Free Will, Evil, and 
Divine Providence’, in Chignell A and Dole A (eds) God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in 
Philosophy of Religion (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 77. 
 
272 R Double ‘The Moral Hardness of Libertarians’ (2002) 5 (2) Philo 226. 
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many philosophers and legal theorists do not wish to rely on the libertarian notion of 
free will.  
A second difficulty with libertarianism is that it is far from obvious that the ‘freedom 
to fall’ is as crucially important as libertarians make it out to be. If someone does 
good things (e.g. helping others, telling the truth, speaking out against injustice etc.) 
because they genuinely recognise that there are good moral reasons for doing the 
right thing then it does not seem wholly inappropriate to call them ‘virtuous’, without 
enquiring into whether they were capable of doing morally obnoxious deeds. It may 
be that certain people have such a vivid awareness of the good (due perhaps to 
having received an inspiring moral education) that leading an immoral life is not a 
genuine psychological option for them. It does not seem obvious that such people 
necessarily lack a freedom that is really worth having. 
Compatibilism Part One: The Rational 
Flexibility Approach 
Compatibilist accounts of freedom often emphasise that intentions, beliefs, desires, 
motives, decisions etc can still have an important role in explaining our actions even 
if determinism is true. As I explained in the introduction to this thesis, determinism 
just implies that, if our actions are to be explained by reference to such psychological 
phenomena as mentioned above, then these phenomena were themselves produced 
by prior events that were causally sufficient for the occurrence of those 
psychological phenomena and that those prior events were themselves produced in 
the same manner by even earlier events etc. in an unbroken chain of cause and effect 
that can be traced back to before the person was even born. Determinism does not 
imply that people will not modify their behaviour in response to good reasons for 
doing so. It merely implies that whether a person recognises and responds to one 
particular reason for action rather than another at any given time is determined by 
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prior events in the manner described above. Flexibility – the ability to adapt oneʼs 
behaviour in an appropriate way to changes in circumstances – is generally agreed to 
be a hallmark of rationality.273 If a person would perform a particular action (e.g. 
eating lunch) no matter what reasons there were against this (e.g. she knew the meal 
was poisoned, the house was on fire etc.) one would question her rationality. 
Determinism implies that given the actual circumstances it is inevitable that the 
agent will behave in one particular way. However, determinism does not imply that 
the agent must be irrationally inflexible, because there may still be a range of 
considerations that would induce the person to behave differently if those 
considerations were present.274 This capacity to respond to relevant reasons lies at 
the heart of several influential compatibilist accounts of freedom.275  
Certain types of direct intervention may undermine rational flexibility. For instance, 
a person might have been subjected to conditioning that was so intense that it 
instilled in her a literally irresistible desire – one which she would not resist under 
any circumstances. Or the intervention may impair/destroy her understanding so that 
she cannot grasp any sane reasons for action, or understand how reasons relate to 
each other (e.g. why one reason is more weighty than another). 
However, it is possible to imagine certain intuitively troubling types of intervention 
that seem to leave rational flexibility intact. For example imagine that the intervener 
instils a particular desire in the offender. The intervener ensures that the desire is not 
irresistible. There is a range of incentives that would induce the offender to resist the 
                                                
273 See D Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (OUP, Oxford 1984). 
274 Strictly speaking, Fischer and Ravizza emphasise that, in order for the agent to be free, it must be 
true that the ‘mechanism’ underlying the agent’s action would react to at least one reason for behaving 
differently, rather than that the agent herself would react to that reason (although, in most cases, if the 
mechanism would react then the agent herself would also react). The text in the next section contains 
further discussion of mechanisms.  See J Fischer and M Ravizza, Responsibility and control: A theory 
of moral responsibility. (CUP, Cambridge 1998) [henceforth: ‘Fischer and Ravizza 1998’]. 
275See, e.g. Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Vihvelin K, ‘Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account’ 
(2004) 32 Philosophical Topics 427. 
 207 
desire. However, imagine that the intervener herself has selected which incentives 
(w, x, y and z) will induce the offender to resist the desire. 276 The intervener also 
ensures that the offender believes that the presence of w, x, y and z would be 
sufficient reasons against acting on the desire and that the offender has no insane 
beliefs or insane methods of ‘reasoning’. The intervener has made sure that no other 
incentives (apart from w, x y and z) will induce the agent to resist the desire. The 
offender will definitely act on the desire when she is in situations where none of the 
incentives selected by the intervener are present.  
Now it seems plausible that the offender still has rational flexibility, since she is not 
prey to irresistible impulses or obviously distorted, ‘crazy’ thinking. However, the 
intervener has interfered with her in a manner that many would find disturbing. 
There are three possible ways in which one might try to explain what is wrong with 
this kind of intervention: Firstly, one might insist that a sufficiently refined account 
of rational flexibility would show that such interventions actually do deprive the 
agent of rational flexibility. However, even some leading compatibilists have come 
to acknowledge that this approach is unlikely to be able to deal with all kinds of 
problematic interventions. 277 Secondly, one might argue that rational flexibility is 
not sufficient (although it is perhaps necessary) for free will and that such 
interventions are wrong because they interfere with some other aspect of free will, 
apart from rational flexibility. I will shortly consider and reject various other types of 
free-will-based objection to direct interventions. The third option is to argue that 
                                                
276 In this example there are only four possible considerations that would induce the agent to act 
differently. But the intervention would still be troubling even if the intervener had selected a larger 
number of considerations. It should be noted, however, that it would be unreasonable to demand that 
the agent must be responsive to a very wide range of considerations for acting differently. Many 
normal agents adhere to certain courses of action in a very rigid way, and would only depart from 
their course under fairly extreme conditions, and yet are considered free (if sometimes fanatical, or 
sometimes principled). They may even be blamed or praised for their rigidity. Fischer and Ravizza 
1998, p70 stipulate that it is only necessary for there to be one consideration that would cause the 
agent’s mechanism to react differently.  
277  See e.g. Fischer and Ravizza 1998 pp230-231: ‘...ahistorical....accounts cannot adequately treat 
such cases... What seems relevant is not only the fact that the mechanism issuing in the action is 
suitably reasons-responsive; what also matters is how that mechanism has been put in place.” 
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these interventions are wrong for some reason that is not connected with free will. 
This is the approach that I will ultimately defend in chapter 2. 
Compatibilism Part Two: Freedom as 
Authenticity 
i) Authenticity and Psychological Coherence 
The ‘freedom as authenticity’ approach defines free will in terms of whether the 
agent’s actions express her ‘real self’. Compatibilists differ over which psychological 
states are to be identified with the agent’s ‘real self’. Probably the most influential 
real self view was developed by Harry Frankfurt.278 Frankfurt defined free will in 
terms of whether the agent’s first order desires ‘cohered’ with the agent’s second 
order desires. First order desires are desires to perform actions, e.g. the offender may 
want to lash out violently. Second order desires have first order desires as their 
objects, e.g. the offender might want to have his violent impulses; he endorses them. 
According to Frankfurt, in order to be free, an action must flow from a desire that the 
agent wants to have and which she wants to be executed in action. She must 
‘wholeheartedly identify’ with the desire that results in her action. Other 
compatibilists, such as Gary Watson, focus instead on coherence between the agent’s 
desires and values, rather than between different orders of desire.279  
Direct interventions could undermine an offender’s psychological coherence.  An 
intervention might cause the offender to have strong desires or aversions which jar 
with his values or second-order desires. For example, the intervention might cause 
the offender to experience powerful feelings of disgust at the idea of re-offending. 
The offender may not endorse or identify with these feelings of disgust. This kind of 
intervention creates an internal conflict between fundamental constituents of the 
                                                
278 E.g. H Frankfurt,  ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’ (1969) 66 Journal of 
Philosophy 829. [Henceforth: ‘Frankfurt 1969’] 
279 G Watson, ‘Free Agency’ in G Watson (ed), Free Will (OUP, Oxford 1982). 
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person’s agency – between his values and his desires/feelings. Alienation from his 
desires and feelings can threaten the person’s identity, as it seems that an important 
part of his mental life is not truly his own.  
It is important to remember, however, that direct interventions need not create 
psychological conflict within the offender. The offender may welcome the change in 
his motivations. In fact, a direct intervention might enhance an offender’s 
psychological coherence, by bringing his feelings and desires more into line with his 
values. For instance, prior to intervention, the offender may have felt deeply 
ashamed of his violent impulses and may feel that interventions which reduce the 
strength of those impulses help him to become the sort of person he wants to be.  
Furthermore, if we define ‘free will’ in terms of psychological coherence, then it 
seems that the following approach would preserve the offender’s free will: employ 
direct interventions in order to modify both the offender’s first-order desires and his 
second-order desires and values, in a way that ensures psychological harmony. Some 
philosophers, such as Harry Frankfurt, accept this conclusion.280 Yet it would strike 
many people as counterintuitive to suggest that interfering to a greater extent in an 
individual’s mental life and modifying aspects of the person that are particularly 
central to the individual’s agency (i.e. their values) allows the individual more free 
will than interventions that only affect first-order desires/aversions. Some 
compatibilists have tried to avoid this counterintuitive conclusion by including a 
historical dimension in their theories. 
ii) Historical Authenticity 
According to historical compatibilists, whether a person’s mental states are 
authentically hers at a given time depends on how she came to have those mental 
states. Her current mental states are only authentic, on this view, if they are 
                                                
280 Frankfurt 1969. 
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connected in an appropriate way to the agent’s earlier mental states. Thus, even if a 
direct intervention left the agent with a set of desires, beliefs and values etc. that 
were coherent and not in conflict, historical compatibilists might still find the 
intervention objectionable if the individual’s post-intervention mental states were not 
appropriately connected to her prior mental states. What counts as an appropriate 
connection? At least three different types of connection have been suggested. 
1) Similarity with previous mental states 
Historical compatibilists often focus on cases where a significant alteration to the 
brain brings about a very sudden, dramatic change in the agent’s motivations. Many 
different scenarios have been discussed, including: a very good woman who, after 
being manipulated by an evil neuroscientist, acquires the values of a serial killer281 
and a saintly nurse who, after receiving a blow to the head becomes cruel and 
reckless towards her patients.282 They cite these examples as central cases where the 
individual’s free will has been eliminated. There are also documented real-life 
examples of sudden personality changes, e.g. acquired paedophilia283 and acquired 
sociopathy.284 
Now, historical compatibilists acknowledge that sometimes ordinary people, whom 
we normally regard as possessing ‘free will’, undergo fundamental changes in their 
character, values, and desires. However, when such fundamental changes occur, they 
typically emerge gradually over time. Even if a person’s motivational set-up when 
the agent is twenty years old differs considerably from her motivational-set-up at 
fifty years old, this often is the result of a very gradual transformation where each 
incremental stage in the person’s development resembles the previous stage in 
                                                
281 A Mele, Free Will and Luck (Oxford University Press, New York 2006). 
282 V Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (OUP, Oxford 2005). 
283See J Burns and R Swerdlow, ‘Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with Pedophilia Symptom and 
Constructional Apraxia Sign’ (2003) 60 Archives of Neurology 437-440. 
284A Damasio, Descartes’s Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (Putnam, New York 1994). 
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important respects, but where the final stage in the series is very different from the 
initial stage. 
There are two problems with this version of historical compatibilism. Firstly, there 
are cases of individuals who undergo very fundamental changes in their values over 
quite a short period of time, and are still considered to be free. For instance, the 
individual may have a ‘road to Damascus experience’ – an inspired insight into 
important moral truths, which lead her to reject her previous values. This suggests 
that incremental change is not, in fact, a necessary condition for free will. Therefore, 
the fact that a direct intervention brings about a sudden change in the offender’s 
values does not in itself render the offender unfree. Secondly it is possible to imagine 
a type of direct intervention that successfully alters the offender’s values but which 
takes effect gradually over time. This version of historical compatibilism lacks the 
resources to explain why such an intervention is intuitively objectionable. 
2) A connection in terms of deliberation 
On this view, if an agent’s values alter, the agent’s new value is only authentic if the 
acquisition of this value was preceded by deliberation in the light of the person’s 
prior value system.285  However, road to Damascus cases provide a challenge for this 
view as well. Imagine that an agent, Denise, was a thoroughly selfish person with a 
corrupt value-system. One day a natural disaster strikes her town. She is unharmed 
but encounters numerous victims of the disaster. Denise experiences an unfamiliar 
experience of compassion accompanied by a sudden insight into the reasons for 
helping others. She acts on her new moral insight and performs some good deeds. 
However, she did not deliberate about her new insight in the ‘light’ of her old corrupt 
value-system. The new moral insight just displaced the old corrupt values. Is 
                                                
285 Haji I and Cuypers S, ‘Magical Agents, Global Induction and the Internalism/Externalism Debate’ 
(2007) 85 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 343. 
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Denise’s insight therefore inauthentic and are her subsequent actions unfree? It does 
not look that way. 
Imagine Denise’s community decides to present her with a medal for her good deeds. 
At the awards ceremony, a psychologist stands up and says, ‘As part of my research 
into why people perform heroic acts, I have looked very carefully into Denise’s case. 
I discovered that when Denise acquired her new, emotionally-charged awareness of 
the need to alleviate human suffering, she did not evaluate this insight in the light of 
her earlier corrupt value-system. In fact, her corrupt evaluative scheme was 
completely idle! Hence her new good moral values are inauthentic and the actions 
that flowed from them were not an exercise of free will. Denise therefore does not 
deserve a medal.’ This reaction would seem bizarre. The ‘deliberation connection’ 
does not seem to be a necessary condition for free will and the supposed absence of 
this connection per se cannot provide a convincing basis for objecting to direct 
neurological interventions. 
It might be objected that the sudden change in Denise’s attitudes was still a response 
to a reason, whereas changes that occur due to direct interventions by-pass the 
agent’s rational faculties. In the above example the rush of empathy was caused by 
something that could provide an appropriate basis for it – i.e. the sight of human 
suffering. However, a person’s pro-attitudes can change even though she is not 
presented with a new reason for changing. Consider a person who on one occasion 
comes to feel the force of a consideration of which he had long been aware, but 
which had never moved him before. He may suddenly feel that now he ‘gets it’. A 
person might have this experience because of a non-rational factor, such as an 
alteration in hormones or neurotransmitters.286 These factors might, for instance, 
                                                
286 N Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (OUP, Oxford 2003). 
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make the consideration more emotionally salient.287 But if all such experiences were 
considered to result in lack of freedom and authenticity then many ordinary people 
would have to be described as unfree and inauthentic – which seems implausible. 
Therefore, a change in pro-attitudes cannot be considered inauthentic and freedom-
undermining just because it was brought about partly by non-rational factors.288 A 
direct intervention might conceivably operate in a similar way to the case of the 
ordinary person who suddenly ‘gets it’. If the intervener knew that a person was on 
the verge of changing his mind, if only the relevant consideration was a bit more 
emotionally salient, the intervener might alter the person’s brain accordingly. 
Intervening in another’s mind in this manner remains intuitively troubling, yet for the 
reasons already given, authenticity approaches have difficulty accounting for this.  
3) Mental states connected in virtue of sharing the ‘same kind of 
mechanism’ 
In response to some of the problems with the rational flexibility approach discussed 
above, Fischer and Ravizza added a ‘historical’ dimension to their account of free 
                                                
287 Or indeed non-rational factors could influence behaviour by making certain factors less salient. It 
is conceivable that a reduction in testosterone might somewhat reduce an individual’s attraction to 
anti-social behaviour (relative to their other desires) and this might on a particular occasion ‘tip the 
scales’ for an individual, causing them to decide to engage in a more law abiding activity instead. For 
instance, there is some evidence that testosterone levels can influence pro-attitudes connected with 
anti-social behaviour. It has been suggested that a natural decline in testosterone in men as they age 
may sometimes partly account for a reduced inclination to reoffend, or a reduction in certain kinds of 
sexual reoffending in particular. See, respectively: Barbaree H, Blanchard R, and Langton C, ‘The 
Development of Sexual Aggression Through The Life Span. The Effect Of Age On Sexual Arousal 
And Recidivism Among Sex Offenders’, (2003) 989 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 
59-71; Quinsey V, Evolutionary Theory and Criminal Behaviour (2002) 7 (1) Legal and 
Criminological Psychology 1. If it turns out that fluctuating testosterone levels do indeed influence 
pro-attitudes, this surely does not by itself show that the individuals concerned lack free will. It is 
therefore implausible to suggest that influencing a person’s behaviour partly through a non-rational 
means necessarily deprives them of free will. 
288 In the example I envisage, the change in pro-attitudes is only partly brought about by non-rational 
factors, because it is also partly explained by factors such as the presence of the consideration that the 
person now ‘gets’. The non-rational factor (e.g. alteration in hormones) by itself is not sufficient to 
bring about the new pro-attitude in the absence of the consideration. However, the person was aware 
of (and unmoved by) the consideration before the alteration in hormones occurred, the agent would 
not have been moved by the consideration if not for the alteration in hormones, and the awareness of 
the consideration itself did not bring about the alteration in hormones. 
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will.289 According to their theory, in order for an agent’s actions to be genuinely her 
own, the agent must have previously ‘taken responsibility’ for the mechanisms from 
which her actions arise, by viewing herself as being responsible for actions that flow 
from these mechanisms. By ‘mechanisms’, they mean the features of her agency that 
play a causal role in her actions (including, but not limited to, mental states such as 
intentions, desires and beliefs). On Fischer and Ravizza’s view, when an agent, at a 
particular time, comes to take responsibility for a certain type of mechanism, she 
thereby takes responsibility for her future behaviour that results from the same kind 
of mechanism. They claim that motivations resulting from direct neurological 
interventions (almost invariably) involve a different kind of mechanism from 
ordinary motivations. Therefore, they maintain, when an individual takes 
responsibility for her ordinary mechanisms she does not thereby typically take 
responsibility for motivations or actions that arise from neurological interventions. 
 
Yet Fischer and Ravizza’s account still attributes free will to individuals who have 
received intuitively troubling kinds of direct interventions. For instance, they appear 
to argue that merely telling a person that she has been manipulated can restore her 
free will. They write: 
 
‘[Imagine that a] scientist induces (via his direct manipulation 
of Judith’s brain).... a desire [to punch Jane] that is not literally 
irresistible but is nevertheless extremely strong [1998, 
p232].... Now it is possible that Judith becomes aware of the 
stimulation of her brain by the scientist. She thus can 
understand the provenance of her previously inexplicable 
desire to punch. She now has two choices. Presumably, she 
will modify her desire so that she returns to her normal state 
(antecedent to the implantation of the desire). Alternatively, it 
is conceivable that she will decide to keep the new desire, 
upon reflection. (Perhaps she will have decided that she likes 
it.) Either way, awareness and reflection returns Judith to the 
                                                
289 Fischer and Ravizza 1998. 
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mechanism of ordinary practical reasoning, and she can 
subsequently be held morally responsible. Awareness and 
reflection of a certain sort returns Judith to a situation in which 
she is acting from her own mechanism.’290  
The above passage implies that a person is still responsible, even if she does not 
endorse the effects of the treatment. Apparently, as soon as she is aware of the 
manipulation she is free again, free to reject or accept the desire, and she is 
responsible, regardless of which choice she makes. Fischer and Ravizza assert that 
‘awareness’ of the treatment will (somehow) enable the person to ‘return to her 
normal state’, provided there are no literally irresistible impulses.   
Fischer and Ravizza’s ownership requirement (as they have defined it) cannot be 
relied upon to object to the use of intuitively troubling kinds of direct intervention. 
There are legitimate worries about the state using brain interventions to instil 
‘extremely strong’ desires in offenders (particularly desires of the kind mentioned by 
Fischer and Ravizza - desires so strong that they will only be resisted if the offender 
knows that large numbers of innocent people will die if she acts on the desire). Such 
interventions would not automatically violate Fischer and Ravizza’s ownership 
requirement, provided the agent is made aware of the intervention from the start. 291 
 Another, more fundamental problem arises when Fischer and Ravizza try to explain 
what makes a mechanism belong to one ‘kind’ rather than another. They do not 
simply maintain that actions which flow from psychological states like ‘desires’, 
‘beliefs’ and ‘intentions’ arise from one type of mechanism and actions that have 
nothing to do with such psychological states (such as epileptic seizures) belong in a 
different category. If they settled for this simple account then it would not help them 
                                                
290 Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p235, emphasis added. 
291 Fischer and Ravizza 1998, pp235-236 do acknowledge that a person is non-responsible if she has 
received further manipulation designed to make her endorse the desires that have been implanted in 
her. However, I think that implanting extremely strong desires in offenders can be objectionable per 
se whether or not the offender has been programmed to endorse them. 
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to differentiate reliably between cases of ‘ordinary’ mechanisms and mechanisms 
produced by intuitively objectionable types of direct interventions. For it is possible 
to imagine mental states such as desires and beliefs being induced by direct 
interventions. Fischer and Ravizza rely heavily on intuition to differentiate between 
different kinds of mechanism. 292  They maintain that, intuitively, motivations 
resulting from direct stimulation of the brain belong (in most cases) to a different 
kind of mechanism from motivations that are determined in the ‘ordinary’ way by 
one’s genes and environment. This approach is open to challenge. For it seems that 
the notion of ‘different mechanisms’ is no longer doing the work it was supposed to 
do. This notion was meant to help explain why we intuitively feel that certain types 
of direct intervention are problematic. But instead it seems that our intuitions that 
certain types of direct interventions are problematic dictate whether one mechanism 
counts as belonging to a ‘different kind’ of mechanism from another. In order for the 
notion of ‘different mechanisms’ to have explanatory power, Fischer and Ravizza 
need to have a principled basis for individuating mechanisms, which is derived from 
‘independent reflection on the nature of these mechanisms’.293 Otherwise, it seems 
that they are merely stipulating that certain mechanisms are different from others in 
an ad hoc way in order to generate the conclusions they want about direct 
interventions. Unfortunately, it is far from obvious that truly independent criteria for 
individuating mechanisms (e.g. derived from psychology, or neurology) will produce 
the results that Fischer and Ravizza desire. 
So far I have criticised various attempts to distinguish agents whom we normally 
regard as free from agents who have been subject to intuitively troubling brain 
manipulation. I will now critique a final compatibilist strategy that has gained recent 
                                                
292 Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p40. 
293 D Pereboom, ‘Reasons-Responsiveness, Alternative Possibililities, and Manipulation Arguments 
Against Compatibilism:  Reflections on John Martin Fischer’s My Way’ (2006) 47 Philosophical 
Books 198, p200. See also, M McKenna, ‘Book Review: Responsibility and Control: A Theory of 
Moral Responsibility, by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’ (2001) 98 Journal of Philosophy 93. 
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attention, before defending an alternative type of objection to direct interventions 
that is firmer than free-will based objections. 
 
Compatibilism Part 3: the Nature/Person 
Distinction 
One simple response to the problem of direct interventions is to argue that it is just a 
basic moral fact that ‘normal’ influences on a person’s psychology (e.g. stemming 
from one’s genes and standard environmental influences) do not undermine free will, 
whereas free will is undermined by direct brain interventions by other human beings 
who are trying to shape the person’s psychology to suit their own ends. On this view, 
the source of the influence on the individual’s psychology is the crucial factor, even 
if the actual impact that these influences have are identical. Free will theorists have 
generally tried to avoid adopting this approach, because of its seeming arbitrariness. 
However, versions of this response have recently been defended against this charge. I 
will argue that although these attempts ultimately fail, nevertheless, they point 
towards something that is important. 
a) The Responsibility-Shifting Defence 
One rationale for the nature/person distinction294 is based on the idea that when one 
person intervenes in the mind of another using brain interventions the former takes 
over responsibility for the results. However, if a person’s mind is shaped by ‘natural’ 
causes then there is no particular individual who can relieve her of responsibility. 
Therefore, on this view, responsibility for her actions must rest entirely on her own 
shoulders. 295 This position is defended by Jan Christoph Bublitz and Reinhard 
Merkel: 
                                                
294 The term is taken from Bublitz and Merkel (2009) 
295 Daniel Dennett calls a similar line of argument “The Principle of Default Responsibility” which 
states that “If no other agent is responsible for your condition and the acts that flow from it, you are. 
The buck stops there, if you are competent.” (Dennett 2011, p11, emphasis in original). 
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‘Some claim that pro-attitudes transformed by direct brain 
interventions such as neuroenhancements derive from 
mechanisms that are not the agent’s own; hence, the resulting 
actions are nonautonomous. This is plausible only insofar as 
agents are manipulated by other agents who then bear primary 
responsibility, thus exempting the manipulated agent.’296  
It is important to note that, according to Bublitz and Merkel, what the manipulator 
actually does to the manipulated person is not intrinsically freedom-undermining. 
They launch a powerful attack on the notion of ‘authenticity’, arguing that a person 
is not rendered unfree even if she undergoes a radical transformation due to a process 
that bypasses her rationality. They state that  
 
‘Having self-arranged for all of these bypassing 
transformations is too demanding a condition [for free will]. If 
we take that criterion seriously, then the majority of our pro-
attitudes would have to be declared inauthentic and all the 
resulting actions nonautonomous. There is no self-creation ex 
nihilo. From one’s sex and other bodily constitutions through 
to moods, core character traits, behavioural dispositions, social 
environments and natural endowments, there exist myriad 
influences on the formation of pro-attitudes that bypass 
rational control, depend on natural contingencies and are not 
self-arranged.’297   
Bublitz and Merkel even go so far as to say that a person who takes prescribed 
medication that (as an entirely unforeseen side effect) drastically alters her character 
and values remains free and responsible provided that she satisfies Harry Frankfurt’s 
requirement – that she identifies with her new desires. Given these views, Bublitz 
and Merkel’s approach to manipulation seems rather odd. It seems to involve the 
claim that manipulators function as ‘blame magnets’.298 If a person is ‘lucky’ enough 
to have been influenced by a blame magnet then she can violate norms with impunity 
- the responsibility for all these acts sticks to the blame magnet. However, if a person 
                                                
296 J Bublitz, and R Merkel, ‘Autonomy and Authenticity of Enhanced Personality Traits’ (2009) 
23(6) Bioethics 360-74, p373. 
297 Ibid, p371. 
298 My term. 
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is unlucky enough to have been influenced by forces not manipulated by a blame 
magnet (forces that may have been equally powerful and equally outwith her 
control), then she must take all the blame.  It is also puzzling why the fact that the 
manipulator bears some degree of responsibility should thereby relieve the 
manipulated person of responsibility. Why cannot they both be held fully 
responsible?  
A further problem arises if there is any question over whether the manipulator herself 
possessed the capacities that are required for responsibility. Perhaps the manipulator 
was mentally ill. In this case it does not seem as if she can function as a blame 
magnet, because she is an inappropriate candidate for blame. We therefore get the 
paradoxical conclusion that the question of whether X (the manipulated person) is 
responsible for her actions depends on whether Y (the manipulator) was sane. One 
would have to assess the capacities of Y in order to establish the responsibility status 
of X!299 
b) Do existing practices support the nature/person distinction? 
According to Bublitz and Merkel “from a normative perspective, there is a widely 
agreed difference” between nature and persons.300 Bublitz and Merkel are of course 
correct in this assertion. In fact, there are many widely agreed differences between 
nature and persons. For instance, you cannot reason with a storm about whether it is 
a good idea to damage people’s property and you cannot deter a volcano from 
erupting by threatening to punish it unless it behaves itself. But Bublitz and Merkel’s 
                                                
299  It might be objected that the victim of manipulation is non-responsible regardless of whether the 
manipulator was sane or insane. However, the objector must then explain why an insane manipulator 
is relevantly different from ‘ordinary’ deterministic forces. The objector cannot use Bublitz and 
Merkel’s argument that the manipulator’s own culpability deflects blame away from the manipulated 
agent. 
300 Supra, p372. 
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case will only be persuasive if they can identify a difference between nature and 
persons that is relevant to their argument. Here are the examples they rely on:  
 
Case 1 
“Doctor D asks patient P for consent to remove his cancerous 
kidney – otherwise, it is certain that P will shortly die, say 
within the next month. P consents and the kidney is 
removed.”301 Here P’s consent is valid. 
Case 2 
“Being held at gunpoint, P is ‘asked’ to consent to the removal 
of his kidney in order to transplant it to the coercer’s son; 
otherwise P will die with a bullet through his head. P consents 
and the kidney is removed.”302 Here P’s consent is invalid. 
These examples would be relevant to Bublitz and Merkel’s argument if the examples 
could bear the following interpretation: In case 1, the patient is still exercising his 
free will when he agrees to receive medical treatment, despite the fact that his 
consent arises from an intense pressure, whereas the patient in case 2 is not 
exercising his free will, despite the fact that the pressure to which he is subjected is 
of no greater intensity. On this interpretation, what makes the difference between the 
patient being free in case 1 and lacking freedom in case 2 is the source of the 
pressure that they are under – nature in the first case, a person in the second. This 
appears to be the conclusion that Bublitz and Merkel want us to draw from their 
examples. In support of their argument, they invoke Joel Feinberg’s view that 
pressures from nature are usually just “background conditions” and do not deprive 
the person of free will or voluntariness, whereas a human threat amounts to an 
“intervening force, rendering his decision involuntary”.303  
However, this is not the correct way to analyse these examples. It is a mistake to 
infer that P’s consent in case 2 is necessarily invalid because it was involuntary. 
Lack of voluntariness is one ground on which consent may be invalidated, but it is 
                                                
301 Ibid. 
302 Ibid. 
303 J Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others (OUP 1989). 
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not the only ground. To see what other grounds there may be it is necessary to 
consider what role a valid consent serves in cases such as the kidney transplant 
examples. In such cases, a valid consent provides the doctor with a defence to 
assault. If the patient’s consent to treatment is valid, the doctor has not wronged the 
patient by treating him. Why does consent serve this function? By acting with the 
patient’s consent, the doctor shows respect for the patient’s preferences. The doctor 
treats the patient as a being worthy of moral consideration and does not treat him 
‘merely as a means’.304  
Sometimes a person completely lacks the capacities necessary for free 
will/voluntariness: for instance he might be insane, so that any apparent ‘consent’ he 
gives is not valid. Typically the best way to respect such a person’s status as a being 
with moral worth is to act in the person’s ‘best interests’. On other occasions, 
voluntariness is severely restricted, although not completely lacking. In such cases, 
giving weight to the degree of voluntariness that still exists can show respect for the 
person as an end in himself. Consent can then be used as a defence. However, 
sometimes the person who wishes to rely on the consent is not genuinely showing 
respect for the degree of voluntariness that exists, but, rather, has associated herself 
with the restriction on voluntariness.  
In case 1 the patient’s freedom is severely restricted by the threat of death from the 
kidney disease, but his consent is not entirely involuntary (assuming that he is not so 
overwhelmed by the fear of death that he is incapable of rational thought.) The 
doctor, however, has not associated herself with the restriction on the patient’s 
voluntariness – the doctor is not responsible for it, nor is she exploiting it. She is 
showing respect for the patient as a being worthy of moral consideration, both by 
paying attention to his preferences and by trying to save his life. In case 2, the patient 
                                                
304 I Kant, H Paton (tr), The Moral Law: Groundwork of The Metaphysic of Morals (Routledge, 
London 1948). 
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has the same degree of voluntariness as in case 1 (again assuming that he is not so 
overwhelmed by the fear of death that he is incapable of rational thought.) However, 
the gunman stands in a different relation to the patient’s voluntariness from the 
doctor. The gunman has associated himself with the restriction on voluntariness – he 
was responsible for it. The gunman cannot rely on the degree of voluntariness that 
the patient still has as a defence, because the gunman is not showing respect for the 
patient as an end in himself. 
On my interpretation of the above cases, the source of the restriction on X’s 
voluntariness is relevant to whether Y can rely on the degree of voluntariness that X 
still has as a defence. If Y is the source of the restriction, then Y is barred from 
defending herself by saying “look, X’s decision was restricted but not entirely 
involuntary, and I respected what little freedom X had left”, because Y has already 
shown immense disrespect for X by being the cause of the illegitimate restriction on 
X’s freedom. The approach defended in this chapter explains the difference between 
case 1 and case 2 in a way that makes sense and which appeals to an already widely 
accepted principle – the idea that people should be respected as ends in 
themselves.305 
 In contrast, the approach advocated by Bublitz and Merkel (and Feinberg) relies on 
a counter-intuitive stipulation - the idea that the presence or absence of a person’s 
free will depends on whether the person is being influenced by a human pressure or a 
                                                
305 I do not claim that this is the only basis for deciding whether or not someone can rely on another 
person’s apparent consent. The rules governing consent vary depending on the context, e.g. whether 
consent is being used as a criminal defence, or in the context of the validity of different types of 
contract. Public policy considerations may often be influential, e.g. the idea that it is important not to 
undermine stable contractual relationships by too frequent challenges concerning the freedom of the 
contracting parties. It may be argued that certain constraints on freedom are so widespread that it 
would be impossible for any contract to be relied on if these constraints were allowed to render the 
contract invalid. Yet these pragmatic considerations cannot shed light on whether people subjected to 
such constraints really are free or unfree. It is impossible within the scope of this thesis to give a full 
discussion of all the different considerations that may have a bearing on the validity of consent in 
every context. However, the proponents of the nature/person distinction have not produced an 
example which clearly supports their position. 
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natural one. By what mysterious alchemy does a human pressure render a decision 
unfree which would otherwise be free if only the pressure came from a natural 
source? Normally we consider free will, or voluntariness, to depend on capacities 
and opportunities. But natural pressures can affect a person’s capacities and 
opportunities just as much as human pressures and natural pressures can be just as 
much beyond the individual’s control as pressures from other human beings. There 
are many contexts in which it is obvious that the nature/person distinction makes no 
difference to a person’s freedom. If a person is paralysed, her freedom is just as 
constrained whether the paralysis arose from an attack by another person or from a 
disease. If a person commits a crime and argues that she should be excused because 
she was threatened with death or serious injury, the success of her defence does not 
depend on whether the threat arose from nature (necessity) or from a human being 
(coercion).  
For the reasons stated above, examples involving the issue of valid consent do not 
appear to provide support for the claimed significance of the nature/person 
distinction. This distinction seems a shaky basis for objecting to directly intervening 
in the minds of others. An intervention is no more likely to turn someone into a 
puppet merely because it is caused by a human being rather than nature. However, 
the consent examples do point to another basis for objecting to direct interventions. 
They suggest that the reason why a person may not rely on another’s consent 
sometimes depends on the nature of the relationship between the people concerned 
rather than on the fact that the ‘consenting’ person entirely lacked free will.  The 
basis of my objections to certain types of direct interventions (discussed in the next 
chapter) is also concerned with the relationship between the intervener and the 




Chapter Eight: Objectionable Types of 
Brain Intervention 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I argue that certain forms of biomedical intervention are 
objectionable and should not be used within the criminal justice system. I 
specifically oppose the idea of using biomedical interventions to deal with offenders 
who are basically rational in an attempt to ensure that the offender adopts one 
particular set of values rather than another. Unlike many traditional approaches to the 
issue, my objection to such interventions does not rely on the idea that they 
necessarily violate the offender’s free will. Instead, the objection is based on the 
problematic nature of the relationship between the intervener and the subject of the 
intervention. I argue that the state’s way of dealing with offenders must be 
constrained by the principle that the offender must not be objectified, and that his 
personhood must be respected. 
 
A Thought Experiment 
Consider the following thought experiment: One day an angel appears on earth. The 
angel possesses a magic flute. Anyone who hears the flute will suddenly have a 
powerful insight into fundamental moral truths. This vivid recognition of the reasons 
for behaving morally will motivate the agent to act in accordance with these reasons. 
Flute in hand, the angel marches off to the nearest prison. The authorities get to hear 
about this before the angel reaches the prison. What should they do? It seems that the 
free-will-based objections to direct interventions would apply equally to the magic 
flute scenario –if the recognition of moral reasons and the subsequent commitment to 
act accordingly, guarantees that the offender will act virtuously (in the actual world) 
then this violates incompatibilist freedom; if the offender’s new values are 
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disconnected from her prior values (in any of the senses of ‘disconnection’ 
mentioned above) then this violates a version of ‘freedom as authenticity’; given that 
a causal factor behind the change of values (listening to the flute music) does not 
provide the agent with any new reason for changing her behaviour, then this arguably 
goes against a rationality-based conception of free will. If these approaches to free 
will are correct, then it seems that the authorities have great cause for concern - the 
free will of a large number of offenders is in jeopardy. Yet it seems counter-intuitive 
to suggest that the authorities would have a pressing obligation to rush to prevent the 
offenders from being affected by the music’s reformative powers, or that it would be 
such a terrible thing if the authorities failed to take action in time to prevent the 
prisoners from being reformed. 
The ‘magic flute’ thought experiment is intended to cast doubt on the claim that 
changing an offender’s values using direct interventions, rather than moral dialogue, 
necessarily violates the offender’s free will in an objectionable way. This thought 
experiment features a means of altering values that does not involve moral dialogue 
and yet does not seem to violate the offenders’ free will, or even if it does so, it does 
not seem seriously morally objectionable. However, this thought experiment does not 
show that it is all right for us to use interventions other than moral dialogue. It is 
submitted that ordinary human beings do not have the moral status to directly re-
shape a person’s values or goals using means other than rational persuasion. The 
objection to direct interventions presented in this thesis does not rely on the idea that 
these interventions violate the offender’s ‘free will’, conceived of as a capacity that 
we can identify just by examining the individual’s psychology and actions carefully 
enough. Rather, it is submitted that an objection to such interventions can be based 
on the problematic nature of the relationship between the intervener and the subject 
of the intervention. It is possible to identify the objectionable features of this 
relationship by highlighting the ways in which it departs from a model of an 
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appropriate type of relationship between the state and offenders. I will not attempt to 
fully describe and defend such a model within the scope of this thesis. Rather, I will 
present certain principles concerning how the state ought to relate to offenders, 
which have some intuitive plausibility. If my account is accepted, it provides a basis 
for objecting to certain kinds of direct neurological intervention, which does not rely 
on the notion that these interventions violate the offender’s free will.  
Objectification, Personhood and Dialogue 
In order to see why some direct interventions are objectionable it is useful to return 
to the idea that a person who has been subjected to direct brain interventions is 
transformed into a mere ‘puppet’, an ‘automaton’ or a ‘robot’. I have argued that to 
the extent that this charge is meant to convey the idea that the person now has as 
little free will as a puppet then this is inaccurate. However, it is sometimes true that 
subjecting a person to direct brain interventions would amount to treating her as if 
she were a puppet, an automaton or a robot – as something less than human. In other 
words it would ‘objectify’ her. 
The term ‘objectification’ can be used in different ways. The conception of 
objectification that this thesis adopts is influenced by discussions of the ways in 
which disfavoured groups within society have historically been objectified.306 This 
kind of objectification typically involves creating a division between ‘them’ and ‘us’ 
which excludes the objectified group. It also typically involves portraying the 
disfavoured group as radically deficient in some fundamental respect. This idea of 
objectification can be usefully contrasted with the idea of respecting personhood. 
Personhood can be respected by preserving connections between the group in 
question and other members of society and by highlighting commonalities between 
members of the group and other citizens. There is a danger that society’s (often) 
                                                
306 S Reicher , ‘Saving Bulgaria’s Jews: An Analysis of Social Identity and the Mobilisation of Social 
Solidarity’ (2006) 36 European Journal of Social Psychology 49. 
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justified horror at and condemnation of criminal acts will lead to objectification of 
offenders. It is therefore particularly important to have clear restrictions on the ways 
in which the state may treat offenders, in order that society does not lose sight of 
their personhood. 
Respect for an offender’s personhood can be shown through engaging rationally with 
the offender as he is, and by challenging his mistaken views with arguments, without 
using direct neurological interventions to fundamentally re-shape his values. There 
are several ways in which rational dialogue affirms commonalities between offenders 
and other moral agents. 
Dialogue and Equality 
Engaging in dialogue with the offender includes him within the moral community by 
allowing the offender to voice his criticisms of the community’s norms, which can 
potentially contribute to a shift in those norms. Dialogue leaves open the possibility 
that either party may change the other. As Lawrence Stern writes: 
 “[Dialogue] involves the recognition of a certain equality between oneself and the 
other. There is, in general, no point in reasoning unless the other person is capable of 
seeing reason, getting the point. If he can do that, he can also correct me if I am 
mistaken.”307  
In contrast, attempting to re-shape the offender’s values using direct neurological 
interventions is a one-way street. It seeks only to change the offender, to ensure that 
he will think and act in a particular way. 
The most appropriate way for members of a moral community to attempt to change 
one another’s values is through dialogue. Engaging offenders in dialogue, rather than 
re-shaping their values through direct interventions, assumes that there is a 
                                                
307 L Stern , ‘Freedom, blame, and moral community’ (1974) 71 The Journal of Philosophy 72, p75. 
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commonality between the offender and other moral agents. It implicitly 
acknowledges that the authorities (and majority opinion) are fallible, as is the 
offender. It allows that the offender (as he is, without neurological modification) may 
have useful insights, as other agents do. It also allows for the fact that the pursuit of 
moral understanding is a shared process. People need to interact with other people 
and to consider different points of view before they can form reliable judgements 
about how they should act.  
The above considerations do not apply to the case of the angel in the thought 
experiment. The angel, as the embodiment of rationality and virtue, never stands in 
need of ‘correction’. In contrast, the authorities do not have the moral status to 
portray themselves as the embodiment of rationality and virtue. Re-shaping 
offenders’ values through direct neurological interventions replaces the 
acknowledgement that the authorities (like the offender) are human and fallible with 
the inappropriate assumption that the authorities are absolutely certain about what 
the ‘right’ values are. Furthermore, the angel is not a fellow member of the 
offender’s human community, so the lack of dialogue between the angel and the 
offender does not convey the message that the offender is excluded from the 
community. However, if other human beings were to re-shape offenders’ values 
through direct neurological interventions, rather than engaging them in dialogue, this 
would be an act of excluding offenders from the moral community. 
Focussing on the principles that should govern the relationship between the state and 
the offender, helps to explain why the use of direct interventions by the state is more 
intuitively troubling than the intervention employed by the angel in the thought 
experiment. The relationship-based approach also produces other intuitively-
appealing results. Unlike some of the free-will-based approaches discussed above, 
the relationship-based approach implies that more extensive modifications of the 
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offender’s motivations are worse than less extensive interventions. For instance, 
interventions that just enhance the offender’s control over his violent impulses, or 
reduce the strength of those impulses do not alter the offender’s values, and so leave 
open the possibility that he will criticise the authorities on the basis of those 
values.308 Modifying the offender’s values precludes this possibility. Modifying the 
offender’s values also sends out the strong message that the authorities view 
themselves as having hugely privileged access to knowledge of what the ‘right’ 
values are. 
It might be objected that I have taken an unrealistic view of the potential for 
offenders to make a valuable contribution through moral dialogue to society’s 
understanding of moral norms. Surely the authorities can be very confident that some 
offenders are completely in the wrong and that some of society’s norms are very 
well-founded. In response, it is important to remember that, historically, a number of 
values which society has now come to reject once seemed self-evidently sound and 
that individuals who were very widely condemned by the rest of society have 
ultimately been vindicated. 
Furthermore, instituting a policy of trying to instil acceptable moral values in 
offenders through direct neurological modification would create a disturbing 
relationship between the state and offenders, even if the policy were restricted to 
offenders who were genuinely in the wrong, and even if it succeeded in instilling 
values that were genuinely well-founded. Such a policy would mark a huge shift 
towards characterising these offenders as ‘the other’ and thus towards objectifying 
them. It would express the attitude that they are a group of people to whom we need 
not listen, (or at least that we need not listen to them until we have modified their 
                                                
308 Although dialogue has an advantage over even this technique, in that dialogue, unlike direct 
interventions, positively reaffirms the offender’s status as a moral agent and includes him within the 
moral community. 
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brains such that they are likely to tell us what we want to hear). If all attempts to 
change offender’s values involve entering into a relationship with the offender, rather 
than relying on direct neurological interventions, then society is less likely to lose 
sight of the personhood of the offender. In addition, even if society’s condemnation 
of a particular offender is justified and the offender is completely in the wrong, 
dialogue with the offender can still make a useful contribution to other agents’ moral 
understanding. For the attempt, through rational dialogue, to reform a wrongdoer 
who is very unwilling to be persuaded can cause the would-be reformer to try to 
make his arguments as compelling as possible, which can lead to a clearer 
understanding of the justification for society’s norms.  
It might also be objected that this chapter adopts an excessively rosy view of the 
available alternatives to direct interventions. No society responds to criminal 
behaviour by relying on dialogue alone.  A prison sentence, for instance, ‘is more 
than an appeal to sweet reason and morality’.309 Furthermore, it might be argued, 
punishing criminals necessarily involves highlighting the differences (rather than 
commonalities) between offenders and law-abiding citizens, by condemning the 
offender as a wrongdoer. Punishment also excludes offenders from the community. It 
can do this in terms of the moral stigma that attaches to a criminal conviction and 
sentence. It can also physically exclude the offender from the community, e.g. by 
putting him in prison.  
It should be acknowledged that society’s response to criminal behaviour does 
involve coercion, exclusion and the highlighting of differences between offenders 
and law-abiding citizens. It is perhaps impossible to conceive of a practicable 
approach to the problem of crime which does not involve these elements to some 
degree. But it is submitted that society’s response to criminal behaviour can and 
                                                
309 Ibid, p82. 
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should also involve dialogue (and not just coercion); that it should emphasise the 
commonalities between offender and other moral agents (and not just the 
differences); and that it should preserve some connections between the offender and 
the rest of the community (and not exclude the offender entirely). 
It is important to emphasise that this thesis is not a defence of our current system of 
punishment and rehabilitation. Some of our current approaches to dealing with 
criminal behaviour are objectionable and fail to treat the offender as a member of the 
moral community. In order for our practices to be justifiable they would have to 
include much more sustained attempts to engage with offenders, to present them with 
moral reasons for changing their behaviour and to re-integrate them into the 
community.310 
Nevertheless, measures that interfere with offenders’ liberty, such as restrictions 
placed on their freedom of movement, can be compatible with continuing to view 
offenders as members of the moral community, provided that, among other things, 
these measures still permit the offender to challenge the authorities on the basis of 
his pre-existing value-system. In contrast, as argued above, the technique of re-
shaping the neurological basis for offenders’ values would take a significant step 
towards characterising the offender as ‘the other’. It would vastly increase the 
(already considerable) powers for controlling offenders’ behaviour which the 
authorities have at their disposal. This would set the authorities on a completely 
different plane from offenders, greatly increasing the inequality of power between 
them. 
                                                
310 For some criticism of the current system and for one account of ways in which it should be 
reformed which emphasises the importance of moral dialogue with offenders see R Duff, Punishment, 
Communication and Community (OUP, Oxford University Press 2001). 
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Dialogue and Offenders’ Better Natures 
There is a further way in which attempting to change offenders’ values through 
dialogue rather than through direct brain interventions, emphasises the 
commonalities between the offender and the rest of the community. Dialogue aimed 
at persuading offenders to reform typically involves appealing to the offender’s 
‘better nature’. This presupposes that, in common with most law-abiding citizens, the 
offender has certain positive qualities and that, although he committed a serious 
wrong, he is not completely corrupt.311 In contrast, altering values via direct brain 
Interventions imply that offenders are different from law-abiding individuals in a 
very fundamental way. It implies that offenders are so inferior to the rest of the 
community in terms of their moral characters that these offenders will not respond 
appropriately to the most compelling moral reasons for changing their behaviour 
(unless the offenders receive radical neurological modifications). Most moral agents 
assume that, even though they may have certain vices and may sometimes behave 
wrongly, they would respond to really compelling reasons for improving their 
behaviour, provided that they were given sufficient time to reflect on the matter, that 
the reasons were put to them persuasively enough and the issue at stake was really 
important. They further assume that responding in this way is possible for them 
because they are not thoroughly bad; that they respond to these compelling moral 
reasons because they already have certain good qualities, which are brought out by 
sufficiently persuasive arguments. Viewing oneself in this way is particularly 
valuable, because it provides an important basis for self-respect. The preparedness to 
re-shape offenders’ values through direct neurological interventions suggests that 
offenders lack the qualities that provide this basis for self-respect. 
It should be noted that possessing these positive moral qualities is not the same thing 
as ‘having free will’.  It is conceivable that an individual might improve his 
                                                
311 A similar point is made in Duff, Trials and Punishments (CUP, Cambridge 1986).p. 266. 
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behaviour of his own free will, even if hitherto he had been thoroughly corrupt. It is 
not essential to the common sense notion of free will that a person’s moral 
improvement was partly caused by the fact that the individual already had certain 
good moral qualities. But, as a matter of fact, most instances of moral improvement 
probably do build on pre-existing good qualities and it is part of a positive self-
conception to view one’s moral development in this way. Extensively re-shaping an 
offender’s values through direct neurological interventions strongly suggests that the 
authorities consider the offender’s existing character to be so comprehensively 
morally inadequate that positive moral change is unlikely to emerge from it. This 
carries the message that offenders are fundamentally not like ‘us’. This message is 
much more extreme than the alternative message (conveyed by moral dialogue) that 
the offender behaved wrongly on a particular occasion, or that he demonstrated a 
particular vice. 
A critic of my view might raise the following objection. My argument stresses that 
membership of the moral community is valuable. It also accepts that, in some cases it 
seems fairly likely that the offender’s capacities for practical reasoning are such that 
they will never lead the offender to be reformed and to be genuinely restored to the 
moral community. Yet, if this is the case, then it would surely benefit such an 
offender if it were possible to use direct neurological interventions to re-shape his 
psychology such that he is much more likely to fully grasp and take to heart the 
moral reasons for reforming. Would not increasing the probability that the offender 
will actually be restored to the moral community in this way be better for the 
offender than maintaining the fiction that it is possible that he will reform, when in 
fact it seems that he never will? 
In response, while it may be true that the individual offender might benefit from this 
kind of intervention, my objection to re-shaping offenders’ values through direct 
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interventions is not based primarily on the idea that this violates the individual’s 
rights or interests in every case. Rather, this chapter argues that the use of certain 
types of direct intervention would create a troubling relationship between different 
groups within society. A policy of employing direct interventions to re-shape 
offenders’ values would be based on the assumption that these offenders’ existing 
capacities for moral agency are so fundamentally inferior to the capacities of the rest 
of the moral community that these offenders will not respond appropriately to the 
most compelling reasons for changing their behaviour. Basing social practices and 
institutions on the assumption that a particular group of individuals are radically 
incomplete as moral agents goes against the ideal that the moral community should 
be as inclusive as possible and that it should emphasise its members’ common 
humanity. Incorporating into our social structures the message that a particular group 
is so different from the rest of us that they require radical neurological modification 
to enable them to be part of the moral community is prima facie objectionable even 
if such a system would end up (in a sense) benefitting certain offenders.  
For the reasons stated above, it is also submitted that altering an offender’s values 
using direct neurological interventions would be unacceptable even if the offender 
requested such treatment. The offender’s consent could not legitimise this practice 
because the practice affects society’s stance towards offenders as a group. The very 
act of offering this type of intervention to offenders would send out the message that 
all offenders who are offered the intervention stand in need of it, whether or not they 
ultimately agree to it. This practice has the potential to be socially divisive and its 
effects are not limited to those offenders who give their consent. Therefore the 
offender’s consent is not sufficient to make it morally acceptable. 
 235 
Conclusion 
These considerations suggest that the state should not use neurotechnologies to try to 
ensure that the offender adopts the state’s favoured values. Direct interventions 
should not be employed in an attempt to create citizens who are models of 
‘responsibility’ in the virtue sense.312 Efforts to reform the offender should be 
through rational dialogue. However, I am not suggesting that we should oppose the 
use of all direct interventions within the criminal justice system. Neurotechnologies 
could potentially play a role in enabling certain offenders to engage in moral 
dialogue and could help the offender to become reintegrated back into the 
community. However, clear limitations must be imposed on the use of such 
technologies. First, they should only be used in order to increase the offender’s 
capacity responsibility by restoring/enhancing his ability to engage in moral dialogue 
and practical reasoning, and should never aim to restrict his powers of critical 
reflection, or to directly re-shape his values. Secondly, brain interventions should 
never replace attempts to engage the offender in human relationships. Thirdly, direct 
interventions are only permissible with the offender’s consent. 
This proposal raises the following questions: 1) to what extent is it possible to 
distinguish between interventions that enhance an offender’s capacities and those 
that re-shape his values? 2) Is it possible to obtain valid consent to direct 
interventions within the coercive context of the criminal justice system?313 These 
issues will be addressed in Chapter Nine. 
  
                                                
312 (For more on the importance of this distinction, see N Vincent, ‘Capacitarianism, responsibility 
and restored mental capacities’ in B van den Berg and L Klaming (eds), Technologies on the Stand: 
Legal and Ethical Questions in Neuroscience and Robotics (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2011) 
pp41-65. 
313 My position on this second issue is informed by L Bomann-Larsen, ‘Voluntary Rehabilitation? On 
Neurotechnological Behavioural Treatment, Valid Consent and (In)appropriate Offers’ (2011) 
Neuroethics (Online First) doi:10.1007/s1215201191059. 
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Chapter Nine: A Role for Direct Brain 
Interventions? 
Examples of potentially useful enhancements 
Increasing Empathy 
As noted above there is some evidence to suggest that the ability to empathize is key 
to understanding moral norms.314 For example, individuals with markedly reduced 
levels of empathy have exhibited difficulties in distinguishing conventional rules 
(such as rules of etiquette) from moral rules and in ranking wrongs in order of 
seriousness. Philosophers differ as to whether empathy is essential for moral 
understanding. However, even those who believe that it is not essential, often 
maintain that it is indirectly helpful in moral development. If techniques were 
produced which increased empathy in individuals who appear to be deficient in it, 
then this might play a useful role in reforming offenders. 
Decreasing Violent Urges 
Certain offenders may experience repetitive violent fantasies and powerful surges of 
anger which they find difficult to control. As discussed in greater detail below, these 
factors can impair offenders’ ability to think clearly about how they should act and 
may distort their moral judgments. Research is beginning to uncover certain 
neurological factors that seem to have an impact on individuals’ dispositions to anger 
and violence. There is some evidence that selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
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(SSRI’s) may reduce aggression315. It may become possible in the medium term 
future to develop techniques which can reduce the strength of offenders’ volatile 
impulses or which increase their control over these impulses. John Harris argues that 
such developments may not be morally desirable (Harris 2011). He cites an example 
of an individual who attacked a terrorist who was about to detonate a bomb, thereby 
rescuing a plane full of people. According to Harris, if the rescuer had been given 
SSRI’s to reduce his aggression he might not have managed to save the plane. Harris 
does highlight a genuine concern – moral understanding and morally-motivated 
behavior are complex phenomena. Even the well-intentioned use of biomedical 
interventions risks causing undesirable consequences. However, when assessing 
whether offenders should receive such interventions, it is important to take into 
account the likelihood of the relevant scenarios occurring. In the case of many 
violent offenders, the risk that the intervention will prevent them from heroically 
rescuing a crowd of innocent people may seem relatively small compared with the 
risk that without the intervention they will reoffend. 
Anti-libidinal medication 
Drugs have already been developed to help reduce deviant sexual urges and 
thoughts. This can create an opportunity for offenders to concentrate on the reasons 
why they should change their behavior and the steps they need to take, without being 
distracted by their impulses. These medications are already being used to some 
extent within the criminal justice system.316 
                                                
315 P Ferari  et al, ‘Escalated Aggressive Behavior: Dopamine, Serotonin and GABA’, (2005) 526 
European Journal of Pharmacology 51; T Douglas, ‘Moral Enhancement’ (2008) 25 (3) Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 228; M Crockett et al, ‘Serotonin Selectively Influences Moral Judgment and 
Behavior Through Effects on Harm Aversion’ (2010) 107 (40) Psychological and Cognitive Sciences 
17433.   
316  Regarding the use  of these medications in Scotland see: 
http://www.forensicnetwork.scot.nhs.uk/Medication%20for%20Sex%20Offenders/medication%20for
%20sex%20offenders%20protocol.pdf   Regarding the use of these medications in England see: 
http://www.insidetime.org/resources/Publications/Use-of-Med-to-treat-SexOff_PSJ176.pdf 
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Decreasing Racist Sentiments 
Certain individuals experience a strong negative emotional reaction to members of 
different races. Such emotional reactions may stem from early childhood 
experiences, e.g. parents who taught them to fear members of a different race. Such 
deeply-rooted emotional reactions may help to fuel racially motivated crimes and 
may interfere with the racist’s ability to see why racism is wrong. Some research has 
been undertaken into the neural basis for racial stereotyping.317 Potentially this might 
lead to interventions which could attenuate such emotional responses. Harris has 
criticized this proposal on the basis that racism is likely to involve a complex 
network of beliefs and not merely emotional reactions.318 Although this is almost 
certainly true, it does not demonstrate that ingrained emotional reactions do not 
contribute to the tendency to hold stubbornly onto ill-founded beliefs in the face of 
the evidence. Attenuating such emotional responses might help the offender to assess 
the issues dispassionately and realize that his racist views are ill-founded. 
Delaying gratification 
Difficulties with delaying gratification may lie behind some individuals’ tendency to 
break the law. Cognitive enhancements could potentially help to rehabilitate 
criminals through enabling them to work out and implement strategies to delay 
gratification.319 
Increasing the ability to focus on relevant issues 
Recent studies suggest that individuals who score highly on measures for 
psychopathy may suffer from a kind of attention-deficit disorder which may help to 
                                                
317 A Hart et al, ‘Differential Response in the Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup Vs. Ingroup Face 
Stimuli’, (2000) 11 ‘Neuroreport: For Rapid Communication of Neuroscience Research’ 2355. 
318 J Harris,  ‘Moral Enhancement and Freedom’ (2011) 25 (2) Bioethics 102.   
319 This issue is discussed in J Kennett ‘Do Psychopaths Really Threaten Moral Rationalism?’ (2006) 
9(1) philosophical Explorations 69.; E Phelps  et al, ‘Performance on Indirect Measures of Race 
Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation’ (2000) 12 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 729; W 
Cunningham  et al, ‘Separable Neural Components In The Processing Of Black And White Faces’ ( 
2004) 15 Psychological Science 806. 
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explain their characteristic anti-social behavior.320 It seems that when presented with 
incentives for performing an action these individuals lose sight of the reasons against 
performing the action. Cognitive enhancements might enable these individuals to 
focus on all the relevant considerations (and in particular the reasons against 
breaking the law). 
The need to take into account the interests of 
the offender 
My approach places considerable weight on protecting the interests of the offender. 
Some theorists may object that it gives the offender’s interests too much weight. It 
might be thought that the criminal has (to a large extent) forfeited his right to our 
moral concern. I do not accept this forfeiture view, partly because of the 
considerations that I mentioned earlier about free will and determinism. However, 
my arguments in the rest of this chapter do not depend on any particular position 
about free will. Whatever their views on free will, many people will find it intuitive 
that certain basic rights are inalienable, held in virtue of being human.321 A society 
which regards certain members as worthless, not only wrongs those individuals but 
also degrades itself by treating them as worthless. The remainder of this chapter 
considers three ways in which society must respect offenders’ moral worth – by 
treating them as members of the moral community, by recognizing their status as 
rational agents and by refusing to subject them to needless suffering. 
Membership of the Moral Community 
Society’s response to criminal behaviour should recognize that offenders are 
members of the moral community, albeit members who have breached the 
community’s norms. This principle is supported by the intuition that the state should 
                                                
320 J Newman  et al, ‘Attention Moderates the Fearlessness of Psychopathic Offenders’ (2010) 67 
Biological Psychiatry 66. 
321 For a defense of this idea from the point of view of a free will sceptic see: B Vilhauer , ‘Free Will 
and Reasonable Doubt’ (2009) 46 (2) American Philosophical Quarterly 131. 
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not ‘objectify’ law-breakers – that offenders should be treated as persons. 
Objectifying a group of people can involve emphasizing that ‘they’ are 
fundamentally unlike ‘us’. It can involve focusing on the idea that a deep division 
exists between the objectified group and the rest of society. One way of respecting 
offenders’ membership of the moral community is to preserve connections between 
the offender and other moral agents. This suggests that reforming offenders should 
occur primarily through relationships with others. Cognitive enhancements should 
never be used to circumvent the need for dialogue with the offender, but rather to 
enable effective dialogue to occur. 
In order to treat the offender as a member of the moral community, limits must be set 
on the types of biomedical intervention that are permissible. Interventions that 
attempt to radically re-shape the offender’s basic character, goals or values are 
morally impermissible. The ability to employ such interventions would vastly 
increase the authorities’ (already considerable) powers for controlling offenders’ 
behavior. It would give the authorities a significant level of control over the 
individual’s inner life. This obviously has potential for abuse, e.g. it could be used to 
suppress legitimate dissenters. Even if this technique were only used to prevent 
offenders from engaging in uncontroversially wrongful activities it would still be 
morally objectionable because of the troubling relationship that would be created 
between the state and offenders. It would set the authorities on a completely different 
plane from offenders, greatly widening the inequality of power between them. It 
would imply that the offender is so radically morally deficient, and so unlike the rest 
of ‘us’, that the state needs to take over control of fundamental aspects of the 
offender’s personality. Such a policy would mark a huge shift towards characterizing 
offenders as ‘the other’ and thus towards objectifying them.  
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In contrast, interventions that merely reduce the strength of the offender’s impulses, 
or increase his capacity for self control, or increase his capacity to empathize with 
others seem less likely to interfere with the core of the offender’s personality. They 
do not instil in him particular values, or deprive him of the ability to decide for 
himself what values and beliefs he should adopt. Rather, a person who has become 
less impulsive and more self controlled seems to be in a better position to think about 
what his values really are and to translate those beliefs into action. The capacity for 
empathy could also put him in a better position to appreciate the reasons that are 
relevant to such decisions. He can criticize the authorities on the basis of his values 
and beliefs. The more limited interventions that this chapter advocates do not give 
the state the power to guarantee that the offender will behave in one particular way. 
The aim of these interventions is just to put the offender in a better position to 
understand the relevant reasons for changing his behaviour and to act effectively on 
these decisions. 
One potential objection to my view states that using biomedical interventions to help 
change offenders’ conduct inappropriately ‘medicalizes’ the problem of crime. 
According to this objection, medicalizing criminal behaviour implicitly separates 
criminals from the rest of the community – sending out the message that the problem 
is with ‘them’ and not with the rest of ‘us’ and that offenders are the only ones who 
need to change. Criminal behaviour is partly caused by social factors. It might be 
thought that giving cognitive enhancement to offenders obscures this fact, by sending 
out the message that the causes of crime lie solely within the individual (perhaps 
stemming from a biological defect) rather being the product of the offender’s 
circumstances. This, it may be argued absolves the rest of the community from 
responsibility for helping to create or failing to alleviate these unfortunate 
circumstances.  
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In response, while it is important to acknowledge and seek to remedy the social 
causes of crime, this should not lead us to ignore the factors that can make particular 
individuals likely to reoffend. Pretending that these factors do not exist would distort 
the truth and would disadvantage the offender and wider society by putting obstacles 
in the way of effective rehabilitation. 
Respecting the offender’s personhood and 
rationality 
It is essential that any attempt to change offenders’ behavior respects the offender’s 
status as a rational human being. This chapter only endorses those biomedical 
interventions that do not restrict (but rather aim to positively enhance) the offender’s 
capacities for critical reflection. 
 Furthermore, cognitive enhancements should only be used if the offender gives his 
free and informed consent. By according weight to the offender’s preferences, the 
state treats the offender as a person who still has moral worth and whose wishes are 
not completely discounted. The state shows respect for the offender’s rationality, by 
allowing him to weigh the advantages and disadvantages for him of enhancement 
versus, for instance, spending a longer time in prison, and trusting that he is able to 
make an appropriate decision. I will argue, below, that the state should inflict no 
more distress on the offender than is needed to achieve its legitimate aims. Where 
such aims can be achieved by different methods, it is appropriate to give the offender 
some choice between those methods. Provided he is given adequate information, the 
offender is best placed to determine which method is likely to cause him more 
distress. 
 It might be objected that even if an offender agreed to accept cognitive 
enhancements in preference to other methods of reform/rehabilitation, this would not 
amount to genuine, free consent, given the coercive situation in which the offender 
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finds himself. In response, it is submitted that allowing the offender some say in the 
matter still shows respect for his preferences, even though the offender’s options are 
limited. For the reasons stated in the previous section, limiting the offender’s options 
can be justified by the need to protect society and by the value of reforming the 
offender and restoring him to the community. The ‘consent requirement’ strikes a 
balance between these interests and the offender’s interests in not being forced to 
receive biomedical interventions. Provided officials do not exert additional pressure 
on offenders to receive biomedical interventions (rather than longer detention or 
other modes of rehabilitation), the fact that the offenders’ options are limited does 
not seem to render their consent involuntary. After all, patients are often faced with 
hard choices where none of the available options are attractive and yet this does not 
make voluntary consent impossible. Some offenders have reported desperately 
wanting biomedical interventions, e.g. to help control destructive thoughts and urges, 
and have fought hard to have access to such medication.322 If an offender voluntarily 
requests a biomedical intervention it seems more disrespectful to the offender’s 
autonomy to refuse this request than to grant it.323  
Some theorists still find such interventions troubling, regardless of whether the 
offender consents. They claim that the use of biomedical interventions treats the 
offender as a being without rights and not as a rational agent. Eric Matthews raises 
this type of objection to biomedical interventions designed to suppress offenders’ 
violent or deviant sexual impulses. He writes:  
 
‘The harm done to [the offender] would be that of treating him 
like a thing, not a human being.... He would have been 
reduced to the level of a robot... People’s bad behaviour can be 
legitimately changed only by persuasion to see that what they 
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have been doing or proposing to do is unacceptable....Even if 
[the offender] chose to undergo this treatment, that would not 
necessarily make it morally tolerable. To choose to be 
dehumanized is choosing to be in a state where one can make 
no more choices, where one’s existence is determined not by 
one’s own will but by the requirements of others, and that does 
not seem like a morally legitimate choice to make. A sex 
offender or someone prone to outbursts of anger can 
legitimately seek help in learning to control his own impulses, 
but not treatment designed to remove those impulses 
altogether: the former is compatible with his continuing 
humanity, the latter is not.’324 
Matthews seems to begin by taking an absolutist stance against using any form of 
biomedical means of trying to reform criminals. He states that persuasion is the 
‘only’ morally acceptable technique. However, the arguments he then goes on to 
produce do not support such an absolutist position. According to Matthews, 
biomedical interventions dehumanize offenders by putting them in a state where they 
can ‘make no more choices’. This is simply not true of all types of biomedical 
interventions and particularly not those that can be classed as forms of ‘cognitive 
enhancement’.  
For one thing, suppressing an offender’s urges to commit violent or sexual crimes 
would not thereby deprive him of the ability to make choices concerning all of his 
other activities. If the offender were released into the community after receiving this 
intervention, he would certainly have greater scope for making choices about how to 
lead his life than if he remained in prison. Furthermore, biomedical interventions 
which aim to suppress offenders’ destructive impulses can actually increase the 
accused’s ability to make informed and meaningful choices, by reducing the 
impediments to effective practical reasoning. Frequent, intense surges of violent 
anger can cloud an individual’s judgment making it extremely difficult for him to 
assess issues such as whether or not his anger is justified and to appreciate the 
                                                
324 E Matthews, Body-Subjects And Disordered Minds. Treating The Whole Person in Psychiatry 
(OUP, Oxford 2007), pp181-182. 
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reasons why he should control himself. It can also make it difficult for him to enter 
into the kinds of relationships that are crucial to bringing home to him the 
wrongfulness of criminal conduct and to assisting him to lead a law-abiding 
productive lifestyle in future. He may alienate those who are trying to help him, or he 
may not take on board their advice because he is overwhelmed by the feeling that 
they are a threat to him that must be warded off. Reducing the offender’s volatility 
through biomedical interventions can help him to focus more clearly on what he 
needs to do to improve his conduct. 
Matthews’s critique of using biomedical interventions in the criminal justice system 
relies on a dubious conception of what it means to be ‘human’ as opposed to being a 
‘thing’ or a ‘robot’. According to Matthews, an offender who received medication to 
suppress his urges to commit violent or sexual offences would be ‘dehumanized’. 
But is a person really ‘reduced to the level of a robot’ just because she lacks a 
powerful urge to commit horrific crimes of violence or sexual exploitation? Many 
individuals, by nature, find the idea of performing these acts utterly repulsive and 
disturbing. Their failure ever to experience temptations to commit such crimes does 
not render these individuals robot-like or less than human. 
There are alternative, more plausible conceptions of what capacities are important to 
leading a full, human life. Distinctively human capacities include the power to 
accord appropriate weight to relevant reasons for action and to conform one’s actions 
to one’s considered judgments about what is the best thing to do. Biomedical 
interventions, including those that reduce offender’s destructive urges, could 
potentially enhance these capacities. It shows respect for the offender’s existing 
rational capacities to allow him to decide for himself whether to avail himself of 
these enhancements. Giving him this choice treats him as an agent and not as a being 
without rights. 
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The following comments by a perpetrator of violent sexual offences illustrate these 
points. He vividly explains how powerful urges can interfere with an individual’s 
thoughts and reasoning powers and how medication can help to restore the offender 
to a freer, more rational, and more human state. 
 
‘Basically, I am plagued by repetitive thoughts, urges, and 
fantasies.... I cannot get those thoughts out of my mind.... The 
best way for the average person to try to understand this is to 
remember a time when a song played over and over again in 
your head. Even if you liked the melody, its constant repetition 
was quite annoying, and the harder you tried to drive it out of 
your head, the harder it seemed to stick. Now replace that 
sweet melody with noxious thoughts of degradation, rape and 
murder and you will begin – and only just begin – to 
understand what was running rampant through my mind 
uncontrollably....I was tired of being tormented by my 
own...mind. So unbelievably tired.....Having those thoughts 
and urges is like living with an obnoxious roommate. You 
cannot get away from him because he is always there. What 
Depo-Provera325 did was to move that roommate down the hall 
to his own apartment. The problem was still there, but it was a 
whole lot easier to deal with because it wasn’t always in the 
foreground. He didn’t control me anymore – I was in control 
of him. It was an unbelievable sense of freedom. It made me 
feel as if I were a human being again, instead of some sort of 
horrible monster.’326 
A critic of biomedical interventions might concede that a person would not be in a 
robot-like state just because some of his negative urges were suppressed by 
medication. Nevertheless, the critic might object to giving this medication to the 
offender, because doing so would involve a failure to recognize the offender’s 
humanity. On this view, the only way to treat an offender like a human being is by 
                                                
325 Depo-Provera is a branded drug that was originally developed as a progesterone-only female 
contraceptive. The active ingredient is medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA). It is given as an injection 
every three months. When used in males, it can reduce compulsive sexual fantasies and sex drive. (B 
B Maltzky and Field G, ‘The Biological Treatment Of Dangerous Sexual Offenders, A Review And 
Preliminary Report Of The Oregon Pilot Depo-Provera Program.’ (2008) 8 Aggression and Violent 
Behavior 391. 
B Maltzky, A Tolan and B McFarland B, ‘The Oregon depo-provera program: A five-year follow-up’ 
(2006) 18 Sex Abuse 303. 
 who also list possible side-effects.) 
326 Michael Ross, quoted in Fischer 2006, pp. 2-3. 
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seeking to reform him using the power of rational argument alone, rather than trying 
to give him a chemical fix as if he were a broken ‘machine’ (Freedman 2000, p136). 
Traditional techniques of reform and rehabilitation, such as victim-offender 
mediation present him with reasons to change his behavior, e.g. by trying to convince 
him that his behavior cannot be justified and by showing him the suffering of those 
affected by his crime. In contrast, biomedical interventions, it is claimed, alter the 
offender’s thought-processes and/or behavior by directly affecting how his brain 
works without giving the offender any additional reason to think or act differently. 
This criticism would have some force if biomedical enhancements were used as a 
substitute for reasoning with the offender. The idea of treating someone like a 
‘machine’ sounds so sinister mainly because it suggests that the individual is being 
excluded from rational dialogue and from relationships with others. However, this 
chapter advocates using cognitive enhancements to enable or facilitate rational 
dialogue to take place. Without the aid of cognitive enhancements the offender may 
never fully access certain reasons for action and may be cut off from relationships 
which could help him to develop as a rational human being. Furthermore, it is 
implausible to suggest that any method of altering behavior that does not involve 
rational argument is necessarily morally intolerable. Imagine that there was good 
evidence that putting offenders on a regular exercise regime would help to reform 
them, by increasing their serotonin levels, enabling them to feel more empathetic and 
less defensive. Imagine that this opens up a window of opportunity for offenders to 
enter into relationships that they had been emotionally resistant to entering, e.g. 
victim-offender mediation schemes. Having begun such relationships, the offenders 
could become better able to appreciate why their criminal actions were wrong and 
why they should change their conduct. The exercise regime per se would not give 
offenders a reason for changing their behavior. But this does not seem to make it 
morally intolerable. 
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Showing compassion to an individual by helping to alleviate his distress can surely 
be an important way of treating him as a fellow human being. As I will discuss in the 
next section, cognitive enhancements have the potential to spare individuals needless 
suffering. 
Suffering 
In the future, cognitive enhancements may have the potential to reduce the offender’s 
suffering significantly. As noted above, the offender himself may find the factors that 
impede his practical reasoning, such as repetitive thoughts and powerful, irrational 
urges intensely distressing. Cognitive enhancements might help to relieve this 
distress. Such interventions may also make the process of reform and rehabilitation 
itself less burdensome to the criminal. For instance, attempts to reform criminals that 
do not involve enhancements may require a longer time of incarceration than if 
enhancements were used. However, the offender’s interest in not being made to 
suffer can count against using enhancements that might expose the individual to 
serious side-effects.327 
But why should the state prefer methods of dealing with criminal behavior that 
involve less suffering for the law-breaker? According to retributivists, it is 
intrinsically good that the offender is made to suffer in proportion to his moral guilt. 
Retributivists would oppose giving enhancements to offenders if doing so would 
diminish the distress involved in punishment to a level that is lower than the amount 
of suffering that the offenders’ ‘deserve’. In response, it should be recalled that 
retributivism faces considerable difficulties for the reasons indicated in Chapters One 
                                                
327 Loss of bone density is one possible long-term side-effect of anti-androgens that are currently 
given to sex offenders: H Greely, ‘Direct Brain Interventions to ‘Treat’ Disfavored Human Behaviors: 
Ethical and Social Issues’ (2012) 91(2) Clinical Pharmacology & Therapy 163. As Greely notes, the 
possibility of this side-effect is known due to studies on the use of this medication as a form of birth 
control for women -‘Sex offenders receive the drug at much higher doses. What is 
effect on their bones? No one knows, as it was never tested on men, and because 
the recipients are sex offenders, almost no one cares.’ P 163. 
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and Two. Secondly, many of those who believe in retribution also believe that this is 
only one of the functions of the criminal justice system, alongside reform and 
rehabilitation. Once the offender has served the part of his sentence that is designed 
to inflict the suffering he deserves, there is no reason, on this view, why the part of 
the sentence which is aimed at reform and rehabilitation should purposely aim to 
impose still more suffering on the criminal. 
Pure consequentialist theories place certain limitations on the amount of suffering 
which should be imposed on offenders. They state that the offender should only 
suffer to the extent that this is necessary in order to prevent crime, or to promote the 
general welfare in some other way.328 This is sometimes referred to as ‘economical 
prevention’. However, the protection that this principle affords to the offenders’ 
interests does not seem to go far enough. The principle of economical prevention is 
compatible with inflicting levels of suffering on offenders which are intuitively far 
too severe. It is compatible with inflicting an extremely harsh penalty on the offender 
if this will prevent each of very many other people from suffering some very slight 
hardship. What matters for the consequentialist is the total level of distress to be 
prevented. For example, if subjecting a group of offenders to an extremely 
distressing form of treatment would prevent a much larger number of people from 
each suffering a tiny inconvenience, then the total amount of distress to be prevented 
could, according to the utilitarian calculation, be enough to justify forcing the 
offenders to undergo the painful treatment. 
This chapter advocates providing greater protection for the offender’s interests than 
that implied by traditional consequentialism. It is unacceptable to impose a sentence 
on the offender which would cause him much greater distress than the distress which 
any particular individual would suffer if the sentence were not imposed. The 
                                                
328 J Bentham, Principles of Penal Law (ebooks@adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia 2011), available 
at: http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/b/bentham/jeremy/principles_of_penal_law/. Accessed 26 June 2012. 
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proposed level of protection is justified by considerations of equality. It is prima 
facie wrong to create a situation where individuals suffer grossly unequal levels of 
distress (I will refer to this as ‘the equality principle’). 329 This principle could have a 
similar effect to the retributive principle that the severity of the penalty must be 
proportionate to the gravity of the crime. For instance, both principles imply that 
more burdensome interventions may be imposed on dangerous violent offenders than 
on shoplifters. However, the ‘equality principle’ has a distinctly different basis from 
the retributive doctrine. Unlike retributivism, the principle that I advocate is not 
based on the moral responsibility of the individuals concerned. For instance, the 
equality principle applies even if the law-breaker is mentally ill. It is permissible to 
detain dangerous psychotic individuals in an institution for relatively long periods of 
time, despite the fact that they are not morally responsible, if this is necessary in 
order to prevent them from being seriously violent to those around them. However, it 
would not be justifiable to take such an extreme measure to prevent a mentally ill 
person from committing relatively minor disturbances. This can be explained by the 
equality principle. It is better that each of a larger number of individuals should 
suffer a slight hardship than that one individual should bear an extremely heavy 
burden in order to prevent others from suffering this slight hardship. This principle 
should act as a constraint when deciding between more or less burdensome methods 
of reform and rehabilitation. 
 Some theorists may be concerned that attempting to limit the amount of suffering 
which the offender undergoes may prevent him from genuinely reforming. 
Experiencing remorse, it may be argued, which is necessarily painful, is an essential 
element of the process of true reform. In reply, it should be acknowledged that, in 
order to achieve the legitimate aim of bringing the offender to recognize that his 
actions were wrongful and that he needs to change, it will indeed be necessary for the 
                                                
329 This principle is defended in Honderich 1984, p. 78. 
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offender to experience some distress. Cognitive enhancements could potentially play 
an important role in helping some offenders to appreciate the wrongfulness of their 
conduct and to experience remorse. It should also be noted that certain offenders 
experience greater distress than others, not because they have greater cause to feel 
remorseful for their crimes, but because the process of reform and rehabilitation is 
more prolonged and difficult for them due to factors which impede their powers of 
practical reasoning. Cognitive enhancements could reduce these impediments, 
helping to ensure that offenders go through no more distress than is necessary for 
genuine reform. 
It might be objected that if the process of reform and rehabilitation is more difficult 
for some offenders (e.g. because they are prone to outbursts of anger) this is due to 
their own moral shortcomings and so it is fair that they suffer more distress than 
more even-tempered offenders. In response, this claim seems to rest on the 
assumption that individuals are responsible for creating their own flawed characters. 
For the reasons indicated in Chapter Two, this is a dubious claim. Furthermore, it is 
important to bear in mind that it can be an extremely difficult and slow process to try 
to undo character traits that have been laid down early in life – a process with many 
relapses along the way and which in some cases, despite the individual’s 
considerable efforts, is never wholly successful. While the offender is learning to 
control his anger without medication, those around him may be at risk from or 
actually suffering the consequences of his outbursts. An offender who seeks to 
receive cognitive enhancements to facilitate the process of rehabilitation, rather than 
expose others to this increased risk shows a willingness to take responsibility for his 
conduct, which ought to be encouraged.  
A related concern is the idea that the experience of struggling with conflicting 
desires, and resisting temptation is intrinsically valuable, and that this might be lost if 
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biomedical interventions were used in order to reduce the strength of offenders’ 
urges. JM Olsen writes: 
 
‘So, then, what is inherently valuable in moral effort? The 
answer is that moral effort is required if we are to have 
morality at all. Morality, I maintain, requires agency, and if no 
moral action ever requires any effort, then we would be, in 
Kantian terms, mere slaves of inclination. Put another way, 
there is something inherently valuable about agency, but 
agency is empty without resistance—that is, temptation.’330 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that it is highly unlikely for it to become 
technically possible to eliminate all of an individual’s temptations to do wrong. The 
question is whether it is permissible to use biomedical interventions to reduce 
somewhat the force or number of these temptations, or to increase the ability of the 
offender to deal with them. As noted above, many people due to their upbringing 
and/or natural predispositions experience little or no temptation to commit serious 
crimes. This does not seem to indicate that their agency is somehow deficient in 
comparison with someone who feels strong temptations to break the law. 
Furthermore, Olsen puts forward a doubtful interpretation of the Kantian idea of 
being a slave to inclination.  Olsen suggests that a person’s good deeds are morally 
‘empty’ unless she feels tempted to perform bad actions. Kant, in contrast, required 
that, to have moral worth, a good deed must not be motivated merely by an 
inclination to do it, but by the recognition that it is the right thing to do. If this 
recognition is sufficient to motivate the agent to do the good deed, then she does not 
seem to be enslaved to her inclinations. Feeling tempted to do bad actions, however, 
does not seem to be strictly necessary to enable the agent to recognize or be 
motivated by the reasons for doing good actions. 
 
                                                
330 JM Olsen, ‘Depression, ‘SSRIs, and the Supposed Obligation to Suffer Mentally’ (2006) 16 (3) 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 283, p289. 
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To summarise the argument so far: It is possible to identify several kinds of cognitive 
enhancement which may in the future, if sufficiently refined, play a useful role in 
reforming and rehabilitating offenders. However, certain restrictions must be placed 
on the means which state may employ to achieve its rehabilitative goals. Society’s 
approach to dealing with criminal behavior must treat the offender as a member of 
the moral community and a rational agent and must respect the offender’s interests in 
not being made to suffer unnecessarily. 
 
Distinguishing Values from Capacities 
So far I have argued that the state should not attempt to control an offender’s values 
using direct interventions, but that it may be permissible to enhance his capacity to 
grasp the relevant considerations, so that he is better able to decide for himself which 
values to adopt. The next question is how this distinction between enhancing 
capacities and re-shaping values is to be drawn in practice. 
a) Re-shaping Values – Central cases 
It is possible to imagine certain types of intervention that clearly aim to re-shape the 
offender’s values. For instance, the state might try to influence offenders by sending 
out subliminal messages promoting the state’s favoured values, while the offender is 
watching TV in his cell. Or it might, in the future, become possible to develop a 
device which transmits such messages that might be installed in the offender’s brain. 
Another clearly unacceptable technique would be to try to modify the offender’s 
brain to make him very suggestible, impair his powers of critical reflection and then 
bombard him with propaganda. (Even more extreme interventions have been 
discussed in the free will literature –e.g. assuming that psychological properties such 
as those that are involved in valuing are identical with or are nomically paired with 
brain states, it is conceivable that the authorities could operate on the offender’s 
brain in order to render his values qualitatively identical to the values of a ‘model 
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citizen’. However, thankfully, it seems unlikely that knowledge of the brain will 
advance enough to make that technically possible in the foreseeable future.) 
b) Enhancing Capacities – Central Cases 
Certain types of intervention seem to be relatively straightforward instances of 
enhancing capacities. One example is the idea of increasing the offender’s power of 
attention. As, I mentioned earlier, recent studies suggest that individuals who score 
highly on measures for psychopathy may suffer from a kind of attention-deficit 
disorder that may help to explain their characteristic anti-social behaviour. 331 
Neurological enhancements might enable these individuals to focus on all the 
relevant considerations (and in particular the reasons against breaking the law). 
Neurological enhancements may also potentially help to rehabilitate criminals 
through enhancing their ability to delay gratification. 332 
Certain offenders seem to lack the normal bodily responses to stimuli. There is some 
evidence to suggest that the emotional quality of an experience (e.g. whether it was 
rewarding or aversive) is normally ‘remembered’ by the body and when the person is 
contemplating facing the stimulus again they experience a bodily reaction in 
anticipation of the stimulus, like a kind of warning system. People whose warning 
system is lacking or defective may be more likely repeatedly to engage in self-
defeating behaviour, and may also be more likely to reoffend.333 Direct interventions 
aimed at helping such people seem to fall into the enhancing capacities category. 
 
                                                
331 For an interesting discussion of this issue see J Newman et al, ‘Attention Moderates the 
Fearlessness of Psychopathic Offenders’ (2010) 67 Biological Psychiatry 66. 
332 This issue is discussed in J Kennett (2006). 
333 Blair et al, The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain (Blackwell, Oxford 2005). 
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c) Borderline Cases 
There is not always a razor sharp line between using neurotechnologies to directly 
re-shape offenders’ values and the use of these techniques to enhance offenders’ 
capacities for responsible agency. For example, an intervention might reduce the 
strength of an offender’s violent and/or deviant sexual impulses. It might be argued 
that this is a method of enhancing offenders’ rational capacities, because intense, 
repetitive urges or fantasies can cloud an individual’s judgement, making practical 
reasoning difficult. Reducing the strength and frequency of these urges could put the 
offender in a better position to focus on the reasons that are relevant to his decision 
about how he should act. Alternatively, it might be argued that interfering with 
offenders’ urges is a method of directly re-shaping their values, because an offender 
who values violence or deviant sexual conduct might do so partly as a result of 
experiencing these impulses and urges.  
Another borderline case is the capacity for empathy. There are both conceptual and 
empirical reasons for thinking that this capacity is necessary genuinely to appreciate 
what is wrong about harming others.  For instance, individuals with markedly 
reduced levels of empathy have exhibited difficulties in distinguishing conventional 
rules (such as rules of etiquette) from moral rules and in ranking wrongs in order of 
seriousness.334 However, it also seems likely that one’s degree of empathy plays a 
role in moral motivation (as well as understanding) and in which values one ends up 
adopting.  
d) Dealing with Borderline Cases 
The issue of borderline cases can be decided partly on the basis of the principles that 
I have already outlined in the previous two chapters. One relevant consideration is 
the amount of control which the intervention would allow the state to exert over the 
                                                
334 J Blair et al, The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain (Blackwell, Oxford 2005), p57-59. 
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agent’s decisions about what he should do. The greater the state’s level of control, 
the greater the inequality between the offender and the rest of the community. 
Interventions which merely reduce the strength of an offender’s violent impulses do 
not give the state the power to ensure that the offender endorses the state’s favoured 
values. The offender may still reject societyʼs demands. Similarly, it seems unlikely 
that interventions that increase a person’s empathy to within normal levels would 
thereby determine which values the individual will adopt. People with normal levels 
of empathy often behave callously and have less than caring values. One possible 
objection to enhancing the capacity for empathy is that there are some situations 
when the person cannot help but exercise this capacity. However, there are many 
capacities of which this is true, such as the capacity to read or to understand a 
language. People rarely raise objections to literacy courses in prisons or to teaching 
non-native speakers English. Furthermore, exercising such skills can also plausibly 
affect people’s values, perhaps allowing them to become more integrated in the 
community. There are also various ways in which people can repress their capacity 
for empathy.  But such interventions are less troubling than interventions that allow 
the state to shape the offender’s behaviour and inner life to a greater extent.  
Interventions that would alter an attribute which is central to who the person is, as an 
agent, are particularly troubling. A particularly fundamental alteration sends out a 
strong message that the offender is radically defective, and unlike the rest of ‘us’. 
Again, it is submitted that a momentary impulse or urge is less central to the 
offender’s agency than, say, a firm commitment to a particular principle or course of 
action. Interventions that directly target ‘second order desires’ are also particularly 
problematic. It is plausible that second order desires are at least partly constitutive of 
values, since they concern what kind of person the agent wants himself to be. Bublitz 
and Merkel note that some pharmaceuticals seem to promote a positive view of 
oneself and an experience of authenticity – a feeling of ‘really being oneself’. If an 
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intervention instilled new first-order desires, and was accompanied by authenticity-
enhancing medication, then this could cause the individual to identify with his new 
first order desires. This could amount to an objectionable interference with the 
offender’s second order desires.  
Even interventions which only target first order desires may give the state an 
unacceptable level of control over the agent’s values and character if the agent’s first 
order desires are extensively altered. For instance, imagine an offender who has a 
corrupt value system according to which acts of terrible cruelty are morally 
permissible. This offender also, by nature, has an aggressive temperament and has 
always been extremely insensitive to others’ distress.  Imagine that the state 
managed, through direct interventions, greatly to reduce his aggressive feelings, so 
that he became more placid than most non-criminals, and that direct interventions 
were also used in order to greatly increase his empathy so that he could not bear the 
slightest sign that another was suffering. Such a course of treatment seems to go 
beyond an attempt to put the offender in a better position to understand what is 
wrong about harming others. It seems likely that this use of direct interventions could 
have a significant impact on his higher order desires and values, even though this is 
not inevitable (an even-tempered person who does not like to witness violence first-
hand could still endorse cruelty and violence). Furthermore, the fact that the 
offender’s aggressiveness and empathy have both shifted from one end of the 
spectrum to the other suggests that he has undergone a fundamental personality 
change and, as argued above, implementing extreme changes to the offender’s 
character sends out a stronger message that the offender’s pre-existing character is 
fundamentally defective and that the offender is incapable of change through normal 
social interaction.  
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Nicole Vincent is sceptical about whether we are currently able to distinguish 
reliably between capacities and fundamental character traits/values. She is 
particularly concerned that altering offenders’ values/character traits might 
undermine the offender’s authenticity or even transform the offender into a different 
‘self’. She concedes that we cannot be certain that direct interventions would have 
this effect. However, she insists that we do not need certainty about this in order to 
be justified in ruling out the use of direct interventions to modify ‘borderline traits’. 
She writes: 
 
‘...we currently have no way to distinguish character flaws 
from capacity deficits, and thus ... to be on the safe side we 
should abstain from ‘treating’ people with direct brain 
interventions until we have gathered more empirical data on 
this topic and analysed the conceptual basis of the distinction 
between capacity and character.’335 
Despite the critique of the notion of authenticity presented in Chapter 1, Vincent is 
right to insist that all such arguments still leave room for doubt. (Furthermore, some 
idea of authenticity may still be of value even if it is not essential for free will.) 
Granted that this area involves uncertainty, it is less clear that abstaining from all 
direct interventions amounts to staying on the ‘safe side’. A number of different 
interests need to be balanced.  Given that offenders are liable to state interference of 
some sort, it may be difficult to determine whether treatment or traditional 
punishment is the safer option. What is safer for the offender may not be safer for the 
public. Even if we give more weight to the offender’s interests than to the interests of 
the state, it is far from clear that abstaining from direct interventions would be safer 
than, say, prison. As Lawrence Stern notes: “It is true that prison does not aim to 
subvert rational or moral capacity... But it can break a man. A man can emerge from 
                                                
335 N Vincent, ‘Capacitarianism, responsibility and restored mental capacities’ in B van den Berg  and 
LKlaming  (eds), Technologies on the Stand: Legal and Ethical Questions in Neuroscience and 
Robotics (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2011)  41-65, p52. 
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prison no more able to commit a crime than to walk into a fire.”336  Even if we are 
concerned primarily with promoting the authenticity of the offender, there are 
compelling reasons in favour of treatments such as empathy enhancement, or 
treatment to reduce impulsivity or violent urges.  
On one plausible interpretation of authenticity, an authentic individual has an 
appropriate degree of self-knowledge. If someone is completely deluded about such 
things as her own virtues, vices, abilities and limitations, that seems to undermine her 
authenticity. For instance, the character Cordelia in Rebecca West’s novel, The 
Fountain Overflows is deluded that she is a talented violinist.337 She has tremendous 
technical skill and perfect pitch but she is deeply unmusical – her skill is merely 
mechanical, she lacks musical sensitivity. Her life is centred around her supposed 
musical talent and the sycophantic people who pretend to admire it. Imagine that one 
day she ‘wakes up’ from her delusion, realises that she will never be a great violinist 
but then discovers she has a genuine talent for something else and builds on that. Her 
new life would seem more authentic than her old lifestyle. 
 This emphasis on the self-discovery element of authenticity fits with the experience 
of some patients with ADHD who have reported feeling that taking Ritalin to reduce 
their impulsivity helped them to feel authentic. Bolt and Scherner provide the 
following examples: 
 
One respondent said ...“It’s not that you’re not yourself 
anymore. I believe I have always been myself, but because the 
medication makes you more tranquil you start to look 
differently at yourself. You take more time for yourself. And 
you discover things that you did not expect of yourself.” In 
fact, she discovered that she was a good painter and enjoyed 
painting a lot. Another respondent also said that he felt more 
‘himself’ on medication. He was more able to control his 
impulses and his life moved more smoothly. He also felt 
                                                
336 L Stern, ‘Freedom, blame, and moral community’ (1974) 71 The Journal of Philosophy 72, pp84-
85. 
337 R West, The Fountain Overflows (Virago Press, London 1984). 
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calmer on medication and this gave him more ‘time for 
himself’: “I haven’t read a book in years because I couldn’t 
concentrate. But now I’m reading again. I used to read a lot 
when I was younger”.338  
Enhancing an offender’s empathy is likely to increase her self-knowledge. People 
who are deficient in empathy frequently have limited self-understanding since they 
are unable to see themselves as others see them. Some such people also seem to have 
a limited conception of who they are due to a related inability to put themselves in 
the shoes of their future selves.  
Conclusion 
I have argued that compatibilists face considerable difficulties in objecting to direct 
interventions on the basis that they violate free will. However, there is an alternative 
objection to certain types of intervention, which does not rely on an account of free 
will. Attempting to enhance virtue responsibility by using neurological interventions 
to modify offenders’ values would risk creating the wrong kind of relationship 
between the state and offenders. However, I have not argued that we should oppose 
all neurological interventions within the criminal justice system, and I have outlined 
some relevant considerations for assessing techniques that may emerge in the future. 
 
  
                                                
338  I Bolt and M Scherner, ‘Psychopharmaceutical Enhancers: Enhancing Identity?’ (2009) 2 







Part Four: Free Will 




Part Four: Overview 
Part Four will discuss some of the practical implications of my approach for the 
criminal law. The arguments presented in this thesis suggest that any aspects of the 
criminal law whose only justification depends on the concepts of free will and 
retribution should be revised. Chapter 10 examines the criminal law’s current 
position on the questions of free will and retributive responsibility. It argues that the 
dominant view among criminal law theorists  - that the criminal law is thoroughly 
compatibilist - rests on dubious arguments. There is at least as much reason for 
thinking that principles of criminal law embody libertarian, incompatibilist 
assumptions as there is for thinking that they make only compatibilist assumptions. 
Chapter 11 examines what revisions to criminal law doctrines would enable these 
doctrines to be justifiable even if retributivism (and the notion of free will on which 
it depends) were regarded as unsound. It suggests several changes to our 
understanding of the rationale for the provocation defence, self-defence and mental 
disorder defences; and for the overall structure of criminal defences. My intention in 
Part Four is not to give a comprehensive treatment of these topics, but rather to lay 
the groundwork for future work.  
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Chapter Ten: The Criminal Law’s Current 
Position on Free Will 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate two rival accounts of the criminal law. 
According to one account, the current law presupposes a conception of responsibility 
that is entirely compatible with determinism. The other account represents the law as 
endorsing incompatibilism. There is no clear legal rule that explicitly supports either 
side in this debate. However, this chapter aims to provide some reasons for thinking 
that those rules which concern retributive responsibility implicitly rest on principles 
that are incompatible with determinism. It is important to consider this issue for two 
reasons. Firstly, the argument that retributivism is compatible with determinism 
would be strengthened if it could be shown that determinism is completely irrelevant 
to the legal doctrines according to which individuals are currently excused from or 
subjected to retributive punishment. So this claim should be challenged in order to 
make a convincing case that, in the light of the free will debate, the soundness of 
retributivism is genuinely uncertain. Secondly, this chapter aims to lay the 
groundwork for the final chapter which will consider what reforms would be needed 
in order to make the criminal law compatible with determinism. In order to do this, it 
is relevant to examine the extent to which existing legal doctrines are compatible 
with determinism. 
The greatest impact that the free will debate has had on criminal law theory is in 
relation to the ‘causal theory of excuses’.  (‘Excuse’ in this context is used in a broad 
sense to refer to situations where an actor is considered not to be blameworthy, even 
though her behaviour was prohibited and was not justified. The term is used in the 
literature on causal theory to cover certain defences that some writers do not regard 
as ‘true’ excuses, including defences which involve denying that the accused had 
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mens rea or that her behaviour constituted an ‘action’, or that the accused possessed 
the general capacities necessary to qualify as a moral agent.339) According to causal 
theory, the criminal law presumes that agents generally have libertarian free will.340 
However, causal theory continues, the law recognises that, on rare occasions, factors 
outwith the agent’s control are either causally sufficient to produce the agent’s 
behaviour or exert such a heavy causal influence on her conduct that she is not 
blameworthy for that conduct. (Examples often cited by the causal theorist include 
reflex ‘actions’ and coercion.) On such occasions the accused does not deserve 
retributive punishment and (to the extent that the law upholds retributivism) the law 
does not hold the agent criminally responsible. 
The opponents of causal theory – compatibilists - vary in their positive accounts of 
criminal responsibility and excuse, but they all agree that causal determinism has 
nothing to do with liability to retributive punishment.341 ‘Choice’ theorists, for 
instance, argue that people are responsible for their choices (even if those choices 
                                                
339 See, e.g., M Moore, ‘Causation and the Excuses’ (1985) 73(4) California Law Review 1091. 
340 The following writers endorse this view. On English law: A Ashworth, ‘Justifying the Grounds of 
Mitigation’ (1994) 13 Criminal Justice Ethics 5, p 8, stating that ‘there are a few defences in which 
elements of determinism play a significant role (involuntariness, duress, perhaps insanity)..’. On 
North American law: A Kaye, ‘Resurrecting the Causal Theory of Excuses’ (2005) 83 Nebraska Law 
Review 1116 ; N Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1982). On Scots law: G Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland (W Green, Edinburgh  1984), Volume 
1, pp 118-119, stating that, ‘Voluntary human actions are...regarded as themselves uncaused. This is a 
necessary inference from the doctrine of freewill; and without some form of that doctrine, however 
restricted, there can be no moral responsibility in the sense of praise or blame.’ He cites coerced and 
reflex ‘acts’ as instances where behaviour is regarded as a mere effect of prior causes and where the 
actor is not held legally responsible. However, in an earlier passage he argues that practices of praise, 
blame, reward and punishment can still be justified even if determinism is true, since such practices 
can still be an effective means of improving behaviour (pp51-53). Perhaps the best way of reconciling 
the two passages is to interpret Gordon as arguing that without free will there can be no moral 
responsibility in the sense of praise and blame without pragmatic justification. On Australian law: D 
Hodgson, ‘Criminal Responsibility, Free Will and Neuroscience’ in N Murphy et al (eds), Downward 
Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will (Springer-Verlag, Berlin 2009). 
341 Compatibilist accounts of criminal law include: J. Horder, ‘Determinism, Liberalism and Criminal 
Law’ (1996) 49, Current Legal Problems, 159; P Litton, ‘The Abuse Excuse in Capital Sentencing 
Trials: Is it Relevant to Responsibility, Punishment or Neither?’(2005) 42 American Criminal Law 
Review 1027; M Moore, ‘Causation and the Excuses’ (1985) 73(4) California Law Review 1091; S 
Morse, ‘Culpability and Control’ (1994) 142 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1587; S 
Pilsbury, ‘The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility’ 
(1991) 67 Indiana  Law Journal 719 ; G Vuoso, ‘Background, Responsibility, and Excuse’ (1986) 96 
Yale Law Journal 1661. 
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were the inevitable product of factors beyond their control).342 Behaviour is excused, 
according to this theory, if it is not the result of an agent’s choice; or if the agent was 
not sane, or mature enough to be blamed for her ‘choices’; or if the agent made the 
choice for acceptable reasons, e.g. to avoid a ‘substantial evil’. ‘Character’ theorists 
claim that people are only responsible for actions that reflect their (predetermined) 
characters. On one version of this theory, an action does not reflect an agent’s 
character if it springs from a desire that the agent does not accept in the light of her 
value system.343 According to some character theorists, an agent may be excused if 
her action does reflect on her character, but does not show her character to have 
unacceptable flaws.344 ‘Attitude’ theorists claim that people are punished for actions 
that reflect certain attitudes of hostility/disrespect (regardless of whether the person 
was predetermined by factors outwith her control to have those attitudes). On this 
theory, a person may, for example, be excused if her conduct does not in fact express 
an unacceptable attitude (because, for instance, it was involuntary) or if she is not the 
kind of agent from whom the criminal law demands an attitude of respect (e.g. an 
individual incapable of practical reasoning).345 
According to all of these compatibilist theories the fact that a person’s action was 
determined is entirely irrelevant to whether the person should be excused or 
punished for that action. Clearly, in order to establish this strong claim, 
compatibilists must do more than simply produce a description of the excuses that 
does not mention determinism. For it is possible that in a particular situation where 
an actor is excused there are several factors that are relevant to the question of the 
actor’s responsibility. The compatibilist may have named one or more of these 
                                                
342 E.g., M Moore, Placing Blame (OUP, Oxford 1997). 
343 E.g., V Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (OUP, Oxford 2005). 
344 E.g., J Horder, Excusing Crime (OUP, Oxford 2004). 
345 E.g., P Westen, ‘An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse’ (2006) 25 Law and Philosophy 289. See also P 
Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (1962) 48 Proceedings of the British Academy, 187.  
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factors, but may still have left a relevant factor out of his account, in leaving out 
determinism. The causal theorist can accept that the features of agency that 
compatibilists consider important (such as voluntariness and rationality) really are 
essential to free action and that their absence should result in an excuse. But the 
causal theorist would also insist that certain capacities which are incompatible with 
determinism (such as the ability to do otherwise and the ability to be the ‘originator’ 
of one’s choices) are also required for genuine freedom and responsibility. Factors 
such as insanity, epileptic seizures and coercion could deprive a person of both 
compatibilist and incompatibilist freedom and the absence of both kinds of freedom 
can explain why such a person is excused. After all, one can think of other situations 
where several exculpatory factors exist, each of which being sufficient on its own to 
excuse, e.g. an accused might have been both seriously mentally ill and coerced and 
entitled to an excuse based on either of these factors. 
What would be needed in order to settle the issue conclusively is a case where the 
accused satisfied the compatibilist’s prerequisites for criminal responsibility, but 
where the law clearly acknowledges that the accused lacked the conditions for 
incompatibilist responsibility. If the law holds an accused criminally responsible (on 
a retributive basis) in these circumstances, then this would provide a clear 
counterexample against incompatibilism. If the person is relieved from criminal 
responsibility then this supports the view that the law is in fact incompatibilist. The 
first section of this chapter will argue that purported counterexamples against 
incompatibilism fail. Nor, however, can the incompatibilist point to any real life case 
where an accused is fully responsible in the compatibilist sense, but is excused 
because she lacked incompatibilist freedom. 
A legal positivist might conclude that the lack of a clear rule supporting either 
compatibilism or incompatibilism means that it is impossible to say that the law 
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favours one side over the other. This chapter, however, asks the further question of 
whether there is any legal principle that can settle the issue. According to Ronald 
Dworkin, a legal principle is an explanation of a body of rules that fulfils the 
following requirements: 1) it ‘fits’ best with the legal system’s institutional history 
and 2) it shows the rules which it explains in their best possible moral light.346 The 
second part of this chapter will compare compatibilist and incompatibilist 
explanations for current excuses. It will argue that explanations which include the 
premise that determinism and responsibility are compatible do not satisfy either 
requirement for being a legal principle. Rather, it is much more plausible that our 
legal system includes incompatibilist, libertarian legal principles. 
In assessing whether a principle meets the two criteria for being a legal principle, the 
second part of this chapter will pay particular attention to whether the principle is 
likely to be in accordance with the moral intuitions of those who have shaped, 
applied, accepted and obeyed the laws which the principle seeks to explain. For, to 
say that a principle fits with a system’s ‘institutional history’ does not simply mean 
that it is consistent with the system’s rules. It is also essential to consider whether the 
principle reflects judges’, legislators’ and citizens’ understanding of the rationale 
behind the rules. It is submitted that a moral principle which happens to fit with the 
rules, but which is absent from judicial and political rhetoric and which is completely 
alien to the thinking of ordinary citizens cannot count as belonging to their legal 
system. Furthermore, insisting that such a principle is actually a legal principle is 
unlikely to show the law in a particularly good moral light. If there is no real 
indication of this principle in the rationales that judges and legislators have 
publically given for the rules then this raises serious questions of procedural justice – 
for surely citizens are entitled to know on what principles the laws they are expected 
to obey are based. As Dworkin comments, ‘The political history of the community is 
                                                
346 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1986). 
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pro tanto a better history....if it shows judges making plain to their public, through 
their opinions, the path that later judges ....will follow’.347 In addition, an explanation 
of the rules will tend to reveal the law in a better moral light if it ‘shows judges 
making decisions that give voice as well as effect to convictions about morality that 
are widespread throughout the community’, rather than enforcing a moral view 
which goes ‘against the wishes of the people’.348 This chapter will argue that causal 
theory (the incompatibilist, libertarian account of criminal responsibility) seems to be 
more in tune with widespread convictions about morality than the opposing theory, 
which states that determinism and retributive responsibility are entirely compatible. 
This is not to say, however, that libertarianism is acceptable. On the contrary, as 
explained in the previous chapter, libertarianism faces considerable empirical and 
conceptual difficulties. Nevertheless, it is submitted that, of all the positions in the 
free will debate, the libertarian conception of responsibility seems to be the most 
plausible candidate for being a legal principle, since it probably fits best with 
ordinary people’s moral intuitions. 
 
Counterexamples 
Counterexamples against Incompatibilism 
Compatibilist legal scholars frequently claim to have produced counterexamples 
against the causal theory of excuses. In order to see why these counterexamples fail 
it is necessary to be clear about what causal theory actually is. It is a libertarian 
incompatibilist theory. It is not a hard incompatibilist position. Causal theory holds 
that it is sometimes fair to subject a person to retributive punishment for criminal 
behaviour. However, it maintains that a person does not deserve retributive 
punishment for conduct that was causally determined by factors wholly outwith the 
                                                
347 Ibid, p248. 
348 Ibid, p249. 
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agent’s control. According to causal theory, the law excuses such conduct (or at 
least, if the law fails to do so then it fails to uphold retributivism).  
Causal theory is not essentially committed to an all or nothing view according to 
which a particular piece of behaviour must be either entirely determined or entirely 
free. Causal theorists can also maintain that responsibility is incompatible with or at 
least diminished by ‘near determinism’. In other words, an agent deserves little or no 
retributive blame/punishment for behaviour if the agent were subject to causal 
pressures that were so powerful that they rendered her behaviour extremely probable. 
Whether a person is excused (or partially excused) will, according to causal theory, 
depend partly on how powerful the pressures were. Compatibilists sometimes 
caricature all libertarian theories as dismissing ‘near determinism’ as irrelevant to 
responsibility. For instance, John Martin Fischer represents libertarians as excusing a 
person only if factors outwith the agent’s control 100% guaranteed that her 
behaviour would occur and holding her fully responsible if these factors made her 
behaviour even 99.9999% more likely to occur. Fischer then asks, ‘how could this 
sort of difference (the difference between 100 percent and even 99.9999 percent) 
make such a difference (a difference between being robustly responsible and merely 
responsible in some attenuated sense or not responsible at all)?’.349 However, few (if 
any) libertarians would in fact hold a person fully responsible if causes outwith the 
agent’s control made it 99.9999% certain that she would break the law – i.e. only one 
in a million people subjected to these pressures would have done differently. 
Libertarians do not think that people should be punished for failing to be that one in a 
million – a saint or a hero. Furthermore causal theory does not claim that every 
excuse involves determinism, or near determinism. So pointing to an excuse that has 
nothing to do with determinism is not enough to refute causal theory. 
                                                
349 J Fischer, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Oxford, OUP 2006), p6. 
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Many purported counterexamples against causal theory’s libertarian conception of 
responsibility fail because they do not involve determinism or anything approaching 
determinism. For instance, Steven Morse argues that accomplice liability is 
inconsistent with libertarianism. According to Morse, a libertarian would insist that 
‘the accomplice did not in any way cause the perpetrator to commit the crime, 
because only the perpetrator caused himself or herself to commit the crime... We 
punish accomplices derivatively, however, because we do believe that an 
accomplice’s behavior does or potentially does causally contribute, thus undermining 
a fully libertarian basis for criminal liability.’350 Morse’s comments misrepresent 
libertarianism. Libertarians do not deny that a person can be held responsible even if 
she was, in a sense ‘caused’ to commit her crime - if ‘cause’ simply means that 
another person encouraged her to do the crime, or provided her with the means of 
doing it. Nor does the law view the accomplice’s input as a deterministic (or near 
deterministic) cause of the perpetrator’s behaviour. The accomplice’s input is not, by 
itself, seen as being anything approaching causally sufficient to ensure that the 
perpetrator’s behaviour occurred. On the contrary, it is more plausible that the law 
assumes that the agent’s exercise of free will was an important necessary condition 
for her criminal behaviour. Therefore, accomplice liability is perfectly consistent 
with libertarianism as it does not in any way challenge the view that determinism (or 
near determinism) is incompatible with criminal responsibility. 
Morse repeats the same mistaken strategy when listing other cases which he claims 
refutes causal theory. He writes ‘Consider the following examples, which 
demonstrate the implausibility of the simple causal theory.... Assume that a writer is 
working at her desk by a window as the sunset approaches. When the natural light 
becomes insufficient to continue working she turns on the desk lamp. According to 
any coherent account of causation, her turning on the light was caused primarily by 
                                                
350 M Morse, Reason, Results and Criminal Responsibility (2004) Illinois Law Review 363, p436. 
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her perception of the increasing darkness. Now take an example of an internal, 
psychological cause for the behaviour. Suppose the same writer works straight 
through the usual dinner hour. Later that evening she notices she is very hungry and 
eats something. Her eating is clearly caused. The writer is caused to turn on the lights 
and caused to eat, but there seems no reason to excuse her from responsibility for her 
acts in either case.’351  
 
These attempts to refute causal theory are unsuccessful as they merely describe 
situations where someone is held responsible for an action despite the presence of a 
single ‘but for’ cause of the action which was outwith the agent’s control. True, she 
might not have eaten when she did but for her hunger pangs, or turned on the lamp 
when she did but for the growing darkness. However, it is hardly obvious that the 
darkness guaranteed that the agent would put on the desk lamp rather than, say, 
going to bed, or that the hunger pangs rendered it inevitable that the agent would eat 
then, rather than deciding to diet. No libertarian or causal theorist would take the 
absurd position that a person should be excused just because she did not have 
complete control over every single ‘but for’ cause of her action. What compatibilists 
like Morse need is an example where it is obvious that a person’s action was 
produced by a set of causally sufficient conditions (or something approaching very 
close to it) that was wholly outwith the agent’s control and where it is equally 
obvious that the agent is responsible in the retributive sense. They have not yet found 
such an example.  
Consider also Michael Moore’s attempts to refute causal theory, which exhibit the 
same flaws as Morse’s: ‘Merely because behavior is caused does not mean that the 
                                                
351 S Morse, ‘Psychology, Determinism and Legal Responsibility’ in G Melton (ed) The Law as a 
Behavioural Instrument (University of Nebraska Press, Nebraska ), p48. 
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law will ....excuse it. Suppose, for example, I know that Z has a limited repertoire of 
jokes and that if reminded of one of them in a social setting, he will tell it. Suppose 
further that I trigger one of his known jokes with a paraphrase of its first line. The 
responsibility for telling the bad joke is still Z's (even if it is also mine)....Causation 
is equally irrelevant to other proposed ways of negating voluntary action. Suppose 
high correlations are found between crime and certain environmental factors, or 
between crime and an extra Y chromosome in some men, or between crime and 
premenstrual tension in some women. Suppose that further, it is established that a 
defendant would not have committed a certain crime but for one of these 
“criminogenic” factors. We can then say that the factor caused the crime. We still 
have said nothing relevant...’352 
Moore even uses the term ‘but for’ and yet does not seem willing to acknowledge 
that the debate about determinism is not about mere ‘but for’ causes. He recognises 
that the sense of the word ‘cause’ he relies on might be criticised by the causal 
theorist as being irrelevant, but responds that such a critic is ‘gerrymandering his 
concept of causation in an ad hoc manner so as to include only his examples and to 
exclude counterexamples like those given earlier’.353 This response is very puzzling. 
The difference between a necessary, ‘but for’ cause of an event as opposed to 
conditions that were sufficient for the occurrence of that event is recognised in a 
wide variety of contexts. It is hardly a novel, far-fetched distinction plucked out of 
the air by some desperate causal theorist in a last attempt to save his theory. And yet 
it is surprising that such eminent writers repeatedly come up with examples like 
these.354 It is as if they think that citing a large enough number of cases which only 
                                                
352 M Moore, ‘Causation and the Excuses’ (1985) 73(4) California Law Review 1091, p1115 
353 Ibid, p1134-1135. 
354 Other writers who also seem to rely on such examples include: S Pilsbury, ‘The Meaning of 
Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility’ (1992) 67 Indiana Law 
Journal 719, p729. 
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involve necessary conditions will eventually defeat an argument that is concerned 
with sufficient conditions. The philosopher, Daniel Dennett has suggested one 
possible explanation for why some writers adopt such unpromising strategies when 
arguing about free will and responsibility:  
 ‘Some of them may...be seduced by the following quite reasonable consideration: 
when we consider whether free will is an illusion or reality, we are looking into an 
abyss. What seems to confront us is a plunge into nihilism and despair. Our whole 
reason for living is jeopardized. What to do? If it is really as important as all that, 
perhaps what it would be rational to do is blow more smoke. Whatever you do, don’t 
try to get clear about this! Don’t let the cat out of the bag.’355 
Many legal compatibilists are convinced that a scientific view of the world reveals 
that human actions are really unlikely to be ‘free’ in the indeterministic libertarian 
sense. If the law rests on libertarian intuitions, however, then our practices may need 
to be radically revised. This chapter aims to make it plausible that the law does rest 
on such intuitions (however scientifically dubious they may be). However, this thesis 
attempts to show that a revision of our practices in the light of the free will problem 
should not be such a terrifying prospect. 
 
Counterexamples against Compatibilism 
Counterexamples against compatibilism tend to resemble the ‘Professor Plum’ case, 
discussed in Chapter 2.356 These cases seem genuinely to involve agents who possess 
compatibilist freedom but who lack incompatibilist freedom. Many people find it 
intuitive that such agents are non-responsible. In order to ensure that these 
hypothetical agents truly possess compatibilist freedom, the examples involve 
                                                
355D Dennett, ‘Some Observations on the Psychology of Thinking about Free Will’, in J Baer et al, 
Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will (OUP, Oxford 2008) 
356 D Pereboom, Living without Free Will (CUP, Cambridge 2001) 
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unrealistic science-fiction scenarios (e.g. mad scientists creating human beings).  By 
the very nature of these cases, therefore, they are not the type of thing that comes up 
before the courts. How then could they shed light on whether the law is compatibilist 
or incompatibilist? One might speculate about whether, if Professor Plum were put 
on trial for his crimes, he would be entitled to an excuse under existing law. The 
answer seems to be no. But it is far from clear that this reveals the law to be 
compatibilist. It is important to ask why Professor Plum would be denied an excuse.  
If the causal theory of excuses is correct then some of our current excuses represent 
instances where the law recognises that human behaviour is subjected to 
deterministic or near-deterministic pressures. There is clear empirical evidence that 
certain categories of behaviour (such as reflex responses) constitute such pressures. 
There is obviously no evidence that anyone is actually created in exactly the way that 
Professor Plum was created. So it is not surprising that the law has not developed a 
category of excuses to cover him. Similarly, science has not yet fully revealed the 
mechanisms by which ordinary peoples’ genetics and environment shape (or 
determine) their characters and choices. In the absence of such evidence, the law 
may simply presuppose that, as an empirical fact about the world, people who do not 
fall into the traditional excusatory categories were not predetermined to commit their 
crimes by factors outwith their control. This does not show that the law presupposes 
that it is a moral truth that determinism is compatible with criminal responsibility 
and liability to retributive punishment. 
Although Professor Plum examples do not provide the kind of direct help to the 
causal theorist that real life cases would provide, they are of indirect assistance. To 
the extent that ordinary people find it intuitive to excuse Professor Plum, this 
suggests that ordinary people are incompatibilists. As argued above, if most ordinary 
people within the legal system are incompatibilists, then it is more plausible that the 
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law endorses the principle that criminal responsibility and determinism are 
incompatible, rather than the competing compatibilist principle. 
 
Whether actors within the legal system are compatibilists or incompatibilists is an 
empirical question. A number of studies have been carried out to try to shed light on 
the ‘folk’s’ (i.e. non-philosophers’) beliefs about free will. Unfortunately these 
studies have suffered from a number of serious flaws.357 These flaws include a lack 
of clarity as to the term ‘moral responsibility’. The way the questions are framed do 
not make it clear whether ‘moral responsibility’ is being used in the ‘moral 
appraisability’ sense or in the retributive sense.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the dominant view among criminal law theorists  - that 
the criminal law is thoroughly compatibilist - rests on dubious arguments. There is 
no clear legal rule that explicitly states whether the criminal law is compatibilist or 
incompatibilist. Furthermore, there is no more reason for supposing that the law rests 
on compatibilist principles, than that it relies on libertarian principles. In fact the 
latter supposition may be more plausible than the former. Criminal law theorists 
seem unable to come up with genuine counterexamples against incompatibilism – i.e. 
examples where it is intuitive to hold people legally responsible, despite their 
criminal behaviour being pre-determined by factors outwith their control. Instead, 
purported counterexamples against incompatibilism miss their target, because they 
involve ‘but for’ causes rather than deterministic causes. This tendency among 
compatibilist criminal law theorists to equivocate over the word ‘cause’ instead of 
producing examples that that clearly involve determinism, suggests the difficulty of 
finding examples that elicit the intuition among ordinary readers that determinism 
                                                
357 For an excellent analysis of these shortcomings see: T Sommers, ‘Experimental Philosophy and 
Free Will’ (2010) 5 Philosophy Compass 199–212. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00273.x). 
 276 
and legal responsibility are compatible. In contrast, thought-experiments like the one 
involving Professor Plum, genuinely do challenge compatibilist assumptions and the 
apparent intuitiveness of these thought-experiments suggests that ordinary people 
within the legal system may be libertarian incompatibilists and that the law may 
contain libertarian legal principles. This is an area that needs further empirical 
investigation.   
 277 
Chapter Eleven: The Criminal Law 
without Retributivism 
Introduction 
Non-retributive approaches do not necessarily imply that we should abolish criminal 
trials and stop holding law-breakers criminally responsible for their actions. There 
are forward-looking justifications for these practices. As noted above, moral dialogue 
is an important means of enabling sane offenders to reform themselves. The trial 
process can serve as a vivid form of moral communication, which can help the 
offender to appreciate more fully the impact of her conduct on others and to resolve 
to change her behaviour.358 It also shows respect for the offender’s rationality and 
membership of the moral community to allow her to give an account of her conduct 
in court, before other members of the community.359  
 
However, a non-retributive, hard incompatibilist approach would recommend 
alterations to various legal doctrines. This chapter will suggest several changes that 
such an approach would imply for a) our understanding of the provocation defence, 
self-defence and mental disorder defences; and b) for the overall structure of criminal 
defences. 
Implications for the Rationale behind Certain 
Defences 
Provocation 
According to the currently accepted rationale for the provocation defence, the person 
who kills in response to provocation is partially excused, but in order for the defence 
to succeed the anger that motivated the killing must have been justified. If hard 
incompatibilism is correct then is anger in response to someone’s provocative 
                                                
358 See e.g. R Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (OUP, Oxford 2001). 
359 See Duff (2001). 
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behaviour ever truly justified? ‘Anger’ in the sense of ‘retributive outrage’ cannot be 
justified. However, other similar emotional states can be. If, for instance, a person is 
physically attacked, it is appropriate for the person to feel very upset (as a person 
might not feel if she were hurt by a non-moral being e.g. an animal). In addition, it 
would be appropriate to feel a sense of repulsion at the moral ‘defect’ that led to the 
attacker’s action, even if that defect was not something for which the attacker was 
retributively responsible. It is also appropriate to feel a strong sense of disapproval 
that a moral wrong has been committed. (I have argued that the concepts of moral 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are compatible with determinism, even though the concept of 
‘moral responsibility’ construed in the retributive sense is not.) The provocation 
defence should require that the above types of emotion are justified, but not that 
retributive anger is justified.  
This approach might have the additional advantage of reducing the risk that the 
provocation defence is seen as ‘blaming’ the victim. Retributive anger is only 
appropriate if the victim is blameworthy. So saying that the provoked person’s anger 
is justified implies that the victim deserved blame. However, the negative emotions 
that are justifiable on the hard incompatibilist view do not imply that the victim was 
retributively blameworthy.   
A hard incompatibilist provocation defence would not entail that offenders should be 
excused merely because their offence was due to the effect of intense emotions, 
because it would still be necessary that the circumstances warranted a strong 
emotional reaction of the kind described above. 
Self-defence 
Self-defence theorists are divided over whether it is ever permissible for an attacked 
person to harm/kill an ‘innocent aggressor’. An aggressor may be considered 
innocent if, for instance, he was psychotic, and therefore not morally responsible at 
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the time of the attack. Many theorists maintain that the self-defence justification 
should cover both innocent and responsible offenders alike. However, a few argue 
that harming/ killing an innocent aggressor is never justified, although it may 
sometimes be excusable. A third, ‘compromise’ view holds that harming/killing an 
innocent aggressor is only justified under much more restrictive circumstances than 
when the aggressor is morally responsible. 
Self-defence theorists who consider the ‘innocence’ or ‘culpability’ of the aggressor 
to be morally relevant, often appeal to the following considerations. They may argue 
that innocent aggressors had the bad luck, to be subject to circumstances outwith 
their control which caused them to attack. They may argue that we should therefore 
have particular compassion for innocent aggressors, which should be reflected in the 
legal definition of self-defence. In contrast, the culpable aggressor chose to initiate 
the attack. It may be argued that it is therefore justifiable to use harmful or lethal 
force against the culpable aggressor, because his moral guilt entails that his interests 
are now less valuable than the interests of the attacked person, or because  the 
culpable aggressor ‘forfeited’ his right to life/bodily integrity as a result of his 
immoral actions. 
 This type of account has a distinctively retributive flavour.360 Its judgement about 
the culpable aggressor is strongly reminiscent of PF Strawson’s description of the 
attitude of retributive indignation – an attitude which entails a ‘partial withdrawal of 
goodwill’ towards the wrongdoer and which entails a ‘modification...of the general 
demand that another should, if possible, be spared suffering’. 361  The hard 
incompatibilist could not endorse this type of reasoning, but would insist that all 
                                                
360It is, however, not exactly the same as the retributive justification for punishment. Even theorists 
who place a lot of weight on the aggressor’s ‘guilt’ still accept that the use of self-defensive force 
against an aggressor is justified in order to prevent harm to the attacked person, not in order to punish 
the aggressor for his attack.  
361 P Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (1962) 48 Proceedings of the British Academy, 187. 
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aggressors are ultimately victims of bad luck, even if the aggressor’s behaviour 
flowed from his ‘choice’ to do wrong. For that choice was either completely 
determined by factors wholly outwith the aggressor’s control, or else it was due to a 
random occurrence for which the aggressor was not responsible. 
Would a hard incompatibilist theory of self-defence treat all aggressors equally, 
regardless of whether their attack was the product of psychosis or a rational choice? 
Not necessarily. A hard incompatibilist might distinguish between these different 
types of aggressor if there were non-retributive (e.g. consequentialist) reasons for 
doing so. However, this distinction must not be based on the idea that one type of 
aggressor is merely unlucky and so worthy of special legal protection, whereas 
another type is undeserving of compassion and legal protection, purely because of 
the nature of his act of aggression.  
If all aggressors are unlucky, does this mean that killing/harming an aggressor in 
self-defence is only ever excusable and never justified? Hard incompatibilism does 
not necessarily entail this conclusion either. Many self-defence theorists argue that 
self-defence can be a justification regardless of whether the aggressor’s behaviour 
was the result of circumstances outwith his control. This position accords with 
widespread intuitions. ‘Common sense’ seems to tell us that (all other things being 
equal) people are entitled to defend themselves against an attack which poses an 
immediate threat of significant physical harm or death, regardless of whether the 
attacker made himself into the kind of person who would attack people, or was just 
unlucky to have turned out that way. It seems absurd to suggest that, when faced 
with an aggressor who is in some sense ‘innocent’362, attacked people have a ‘duty of 
                                                
362 (because, e.g., he lacked either libertarian or compatibilist free will) 
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martyrdom’ and should meekly submit to the attack, rather than harm the 
aggressor.363 
However, the hard incompatibilist’s arguments should make us reconsider what 
precisely is meant by saying that self-defence is a ‘justification’ defence. On a 
‘modest’ interpretation, saying that it is justified to use force to defend oneself, 
means that it is morally and legally permissible to use force; that, all things 
considered, the use of force is acceptable. Theorists who adopt this interpretation 
often emphasise that harming/killing someone is always regrettable, but that in 
extreme circumstances it can be the least bad option. In contrast, Boaz Sangero 
argues that self-defence should be portrayed as a ‘real and strong’ justification. He 
writes ‘...private defence should not be viewed as evil, and not even as the lesser evil, 
but as the “best possible good.” It concerns a desirable action...’. 364  Having 
characterised self-defence in this way, Sangero then argues that it should be reserved 
for the killing/harming of ‘guilty’ aggressors, and that it shows a ‘lack of 
compassion’ to allow self-defence to cover the killing/harming of ‘innocent’ 
aggressors, such as a children, or psychotic individuals.  Now, it does indeed seem 
somewhat heartless to characterise harming/killing child-aggressors or psychotic-
aggressors as positively ‘desirable’, or to appear to welcome their injury/death by 
calling it the ‘best possible good’. Nevertheless, it can still be appropriate to say that 
harming/killing such aggressors is ‘justified’ in the more modest sense described 
above. The modest account of justification in terms of an all-things-considered 
judgement of permissibility better captures the moral complexity of this kind of 
situation than Sangero’s description of a justified action as something which is 
unequivocally ‘desirable’. Given the considerations advanced by the hard 
                                                
363 See W Kaufman, ‘Self-Defense, Innocent Aggressors and the Duty of Martyrdom’ (2010) 91 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78. 
364 B Sangero, ‘In Defense of Self-Defence in Criminal Law; and on Killing in Self-Defence – A Reply 
to Fiona Leverick’ (2008) 44 (6) Criminal Law Bulletin 3, p17. 
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incompatibilist, it seems inappropriate to label the killing/injury of any aggressor as 
‘justified’ in Sangero’s sense of the word. All aggressors are victims of bad luck and 
are entitled to compassion. Maintaining that harming/killing another in self-defence 
is only justified as ‘the lesser of two evils’ acknowledges that every life is valuable 
and that causing death or injury is always a terrible thing (even when justified).  
Mental disorder 
The forward-looking approach to dealing with criminal behaviour which is defended 
in this thesis provides a method for determining the scope of mental disorder 
defences. The state should aim (among other things) to communicate to offenders 
that that they have committed a serious wrong, to make clear the reasons why the 
behaviour was wrong and to enter into dialogue with the offender with the aim of 
reforming him. This suggests that offenders who are incapable of engaging in 
genuine dialogue or undergoing reform, should not be held responsible. Other 
theories of punishment often leave the question of the scope of mental disorder 
defences largely down to intuition. E.g. some people have the intuition that an 
offender ‘deserves’ punishment just as long as he ‘knew’ that his behaviour was 
wrong in the sense of being aware what the legal or moral rules are, without any 
depth of understanding. Others have the intuition that a person is only retributively 
blameworthy if he knew the difference between right and wrong in a deeper sense. A 
forward-looking communication theory can help to settle this dispute, by interpreting 
‘knowledge’ in terms of the ability to undergo moral dialogue. This is not an 
advantage that is unique to a hard-incompatibilist communication theory. Duff’s 
retributive theory, for instance, also has this advantage. Nevertheless it is still a merit 
of the approach advanced in this thesis. 
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Implications for the structure of defences 
Currently, defences are organised according to the cause of the accused’s behaviour. 
Coercion involves behaviour was caused by a another’s threats, necessity involves 
behaviour that was caused by a non-human threat, self-defence involves behaviour 
that was caused by fear of an attack, insanity involves behaviour caused by a mental 
illness, automatism involves behaviour caused by an ‘external factor’ (such as a 
spiked drink); provocation involves behaviour caused by anger at another’s 
provocative behaviour. Wider categories of justification, excuse, lack of capacity etc. 
can be imposed on top of this scheme (by academic lawyers).  
The current organisation of defences makes sense (up to a point) if one adopts a 
libertarian perspective. According to libertarianism, it is unfair to punish a person 
whose behaviour was caused by factors outwith the person’s control. So categorising 
the defences according to the cause of the accused’s behaviour does draw our 
attention to something that the libertarian claims to be morally relevant. 
In contrast, if compatibilists or hard incompatibilists had designed the law then the 
key factor to be emphasised would not be the causes of the accused’s behaviour 
(since compatibilists believe that causal determinism should provide no basis for a 
defence). Rather, compatibilists and hard incompatibilists would wish to focus our 
attention on whether the accused lacked morally relevant capacities and on which 
kinds of capacity were impaired (e.g. control, or understanding); or alternatively 
whether the accused was justified. 
I therefore propose that criminal defences should be restructured in a way that 
emphasises factors that would be morally relevant irrespective of the truth of 
determinism. If the best rationale for criminal defences concerns issues like 
‘capacity’ and ‘justification’, rather than causal pressures, then the structure of these 
defences should reflect this. This is necessary in order for these defences to be 
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rational and transparent. The law should not appear to rest on a dubious, libertarian 
conception of free will.  
There are various different ways in which defences could be categorised. An in-
depth treatment of this issue is outwith the scope of this thesis. I merely aim to put 
forward one option that is compatible with the truth of determinism and which is 
more rational than the current approach of categorising defences according to causes 
of behaviour. 
Existing defences could be replaced with the following categories: ‘Justification’ 
(subdivided into different grounds for justification); ‘unjustified behaviour by a non-
culpable agent’ (subdivided into lack of appreciation and lack of control, regardless 
of what caused this); a partial defence of ‘unjustified behaviour by a less than fully 
culpable agent’ (including impaired appreciation or diminished control); and ‘The 
state is barred from punishing’ (e.g. entrapment, or time bar).   
‘Defences’ based on the absence of actus reus or mens rea would remain unaltered, 
except for automatism which would fall into the category of ‘unjustified behaviour 
by a non-culpable agent’. By ‘non-culpable’ I mean that the action does not indicate 
that the agent had a serious moral defect.  This would allow the court to order that 
the individual should be treated (if necessary), rather than simply allowed to go free. 
The current distinction between someone who breaks a law while severely mentally 
disordered and someone who breaks a law while in an automatistic state (although 
philosophically interesting) does not seem to be relevant to how the state should 
respond to such behaviour. In both cases, the behaviour fails to be a genuine 
response to the agent’s reasons. This is what matters when it comes to deciding 
between a response that involves an element of moral communication on the one 
hand; and a non-condemnatory disposal (e.g. treatment or simply releasing the 
person) on the other.   
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Advantages of this Approach 
My proposed approach focuses the court’s attention on issues that are relevant to 
how we should respond to the offender. If the offender knowingly did wrong and 
was in control, then attempts to reform the offender can be useful and appropriate. 
Convicting an offender under these circumstances would send out the message that 
this sort of conduct should not be done. In contrast, if the accused lacked 
understanding or control, then attempts at reform are unnecessary and pointless. 
Acquitting someone based on my proposed ‘non-culpability’ defence would send out 
the appropriate message - that while this behaviour is unjustified, the actor is not in 
need of reform. In contrast, basing excuses on whether the person’s behaviour was 
caused would fail to distinguish between different law-breakers since causal 
determinism may well be true of everyone.  
 
The capacity-based approach also avoids the complex problems involved in 
distinguishing automatism from insanity. It avoids irrelevant disputes about whether 
something counts as a ‘mental disorder’ or whether behaviour was caused by an 
‘external’ or an ‘internal’ source. It just looks at what is morally relevant – 
capacities.  
 
Distinguishing clearly between a ‘non-culpability’ defence and a ‘justification’ 
defence would communicate to citizens something that they really need to know –
whether or not the type of conduct that the accused engaged in was justified (i.e. 
permissible). This is necessary in order for the law properly to fulfil its action-
guiding function.  
 
The traditional approach focused a lot of attention on whether behaviour was due to a 
mental disorder, or whether it was due to ordinary human nature. In contrast, a 
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capacity-based approach does not categorise defences according to whether the 
offender’s behaviour was caused by ‘mental disorder’. Behaviour that is not reasons-
responsive falls into the ‘unjustified conduct, non-culpable agent’ category 
regardless of whether it was caused by a ‘normal’ reaction, such as fear in response 
to a threat, or by a mental disorder. This could also help to reduce the stigma 
associated with mental disorder defences. 
 
My approach does not draw the excuse/exemption distinction advocated by some 
theorists. This distinction purports to draw a line between non-agents who, due to 
their general lack of capacity, are outside the moral community; and persons who 
merely lack understanding or control on a particular occasion. While this might be a 
valid distinction, it is not one that the law should announce. Why flag up the fact that 
a person is not a member of the moral community? This seems cruel, especially with 
regard to people who will never be a full member of the moral community. Even 
regarding children, it is unhelpful because it reinforces the prejudice that children 
cannot have moral insights. Furthermore, publically declaring that children are not 
full members of the moral community does not help to shape children’s behaviour in 
a positive way.  
 
My approach also helps to avoid justificatory drift, e.g. in the context of provocation. 
Instead of merely announcing that the accused received a lesser sentence and was 
convicted of a lesser offence because he was provoked (which people might interpret 
as a justification), the court would explicitly state that the accused’s action was 
unjustified but that he was not fully culpable, because his capacities were 
temporarily impaired. Furthermore, the court would not be forced into the position of 
saying that battered women have an ‘abnormality of mind’ (which is currently a 
defining feature of diminished responsibility). Rather, my proposed partial defence is 
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compatible with the idea that a basically normal person’s capacities can be 
understandably impaired under extreme and abnormal circumstances. The criminal 
actions of a battered woman would also be considered unjustified, but she would not 
be fully culpable. 
 
Categorising defences according to the causes of behaviour makes the law 
excessively inflexible. A person who lacks the morally relevant capacities can be 
denied a defence just because the factors that caused the person to lack these 
capacities do not fall into any of the existing legally recognised categories. For 
instance, it is arguable that in certain (rare cases) an individual from a culture whose 
norms are extremely different from the norms of this society might not have been 
able to appreciate what is wrong with committing a particular crime, at the time he 
committed it. Or perhaps someone who never received any kind of moral education 
at all may have been unable to appreciate what was wrong with committing the crime 
she committed. Such individuals would not be able to rely on existing defences 
because this kind of incapacity must be caused by mental disorder. A capacity-based 
approach would not deny these individuals a defence merely because their lack of 
capacity was not caused by the ‘right’ type of factor. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I argued that a non-retributive, hard incompatibilist approach would 
recommend alterations to various legal doctrines. This chapter suggested several 
changes that such an approach would imply for a) our understanding of the 
provocation defence, self-defence and mental disorder defences; and b) for the 






In Part One of this thesis I argued that there is at least a reasonable doubt about the 
soundness of retributivism (which is probably the dominant theory of punishment 
among contemporary criminal justice theorists). This doubt arises from 
retributivism’s reliance on a hotly contested conception of free will. Chapter One 
provided reasons for doubting that retributivism could justifiably rely on the 
assumption of libertarian free will. Chapter Two provided reasons for doubting the 
adequacy of compatibilist retributivism. Chapter Three responded to an argument for 
retributivism, based on the implications of that theory for our practices: the argument 
that we need retributivism because it is the only theory that implies that accused 
people and offenders should be protected by considerations of justice. I argued that 
in fact there are good reasons for thinking that our practice of upholding these 
principles of justice could be defended on non-retributive grounds. 
 
In Part Two I related the doubts about the soundness of retributivism that I raised in 
Part One to the literature on moral uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty about which moral 
theory should guide our conduct). I pointed out that, in the light of this literature, 
adopting a purely consequentialist theory of punishment would not be a rational 
response to the doubts about the soundness of retributivism since there is also 
uncertainty about the soundness of this consequentialism. Chapter Four presented an 
overview of some of the main theories of moral uncertainty and highlighted some of 
their key shortcomings (at least in relation to dealing with uncertainty about theories 
of punishment). Chapters Five and Six defended my own approach to moral 
uncertainty about theories of punishment. On my approach, the entire moral 
argument for punishing a person should be held to a high standard of credibility. I 
called this the ‘cautious approach to punishment’. In Chapter Five I argued that one 
reason for adopting a cautious approach to punishment stems from the underlying 
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rationale for the beyond reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials – a standard that 
has widespread support. In Chapter Six, I argued that in order to minimise the risk of 
punishing someone unjustifiably, we should only punish that person if the main 
punishment theories agree that doing so is justifiable. I called this ‘the convergence 
requirement’. If the convergence requirement is satisfied, then the state’s argument 
for punishing a person has met the required standard of credibility. I acknowledged 
in Chapter Six that, notwithstanding the arguments against retributivism presented in 
Part One, when we survey the state of the free will debate, there is a strong argument 
for ‘free will agnosticism’ rather than for certainty that we lack free will in the sense 
required for retributive responsibility. 365  Given that the cautious approach 
recommends giving people who may be liable to punishment ‘the benefit of the 
doubt’, such people should only be punished if retributive theories (as well as 
forward-looking theories) would recommend this; i.e. in effect this means that 
punishment should be constrained by negative retributivism. The possibility that 
negative retributivism might be sound therefore provides a reason against such 
intuitively unjust practices such as punishment of the innocent – a reason in addition 
to those non-retributive reasons outlined in Chapter Three. Chapter Six also outlined 
reasons why theorists from different philosophical perspectives should endorse the 
convergence requirement and defended this requirement against certain potential 
objections. 
 
The convergence requirement assumes that punishment infringes the interests of the 
individuals who are punished – in particular their interest in not being seriously 
harmed - and therefore requires strong justification. Part Two focussed primarily on 
which individuals should be punished at all. Part Three addressed the question of 
which method of responding to an individual’s criminal behaviour should be 
                                                
365 S. Kearns, ‘Free Will Agnosticism’ (2013) Nous (Online First). DOI: 10.1111/nous.12032 
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preferred, once it is determined that some response is required, in situations where 
several possible alternatives are available. This question is complicated by the fact 
that offenders have a number of different interests that should be protected, but these 
interests can sometimes pull in different directions. In general, offenders have an 
interest in not being deprived of liberty. Therefore, where one mainstream theory 
recommends a sentence that involves less interference with liberty, that sentence 
should usually be preferred. However, I have also indicated that offenders have an 
interest in being treated as rational agents. Certain rehabilitative interventions might 
allow offenders to be released earlier into society, but may fail to respect the 
offender as a rational agent. This problem arises most acutely in connection with the 
possibility of using direct brain interventions to modify criminal behaviour. 
Therefore, Part Three was devoted to examining this example in detail. It is also 
important to explore this topic, since it is of particular relevance to the arguments for 
free will scepticism which I advanced in Part One, when raising doubts about the 
justifiability of relying solely on a retributive theory punishment. It is tempting to try 
to explain why certain direct brain interventions are troubling by claiming that such 
interventions threaten free will. If free will scepticism implied an acceptance of these 
troubling interventions then this could undermine free will scepticism and could 
possibly strengthen the case for a retributive system that stressed the importance of 
free will. However, in Part Three I argued that, in fact, the objectionable nature of 
certain direct brain interventions has very little to do with free will and that there are 
in fact non-retributive reasons for opposing the most intuitively-objectionable 
interventions. Chapter Seven identified certain forms of biomedical interventions that 
are objectionable and should not be used within the criminal justice system. Chapter 
Eight argued that, in principle, it would be morally permissible for the state to 
employ certain types of biomedical interventions (such as ‘cognitive enhancements’) 
in a limited way within the criminal justice system, provided that effective 
 291 
enhancements can be developed in the future that have minimal side-effects. Chapter 
Nine considered how we can distinguish interventions that enhance rational 
capacities from interventions that fundamentally change the person's character, and 
the extent to which this distinction matters. 
 
In Part Four, I discussed some of the practical implications of my approach for the 
criminal law. Chapter 10 examined the criminal law’s current position on the 
questions of free will and retributive responsibility. It argued that the dominant view 
among criminal law theorists  - that the criminal law is thoroughly compatibilist - 
rests on dubious arguments. There is at least as much reason for thinking that 
principles of criminal law embody libertarian, incompatibilist assumptions as there is 
for thinking that they make only compatibilist assumptions. Chapter 11 examined 
what revisions to criminal law doctrines would enable these doctrines to be 
justifiable even if retributivism (and the notion of free will on which it depends) were 
regarded as unsound. It suggested several changes to our understanding of the 
rationale for the provocation defence, self-defence and mental disorder defences; and 
for the overall structure of criminal defences. My intention in Part Four was to 
provide a general overview of directions for future work that would need to be done 
in order to reconcile criminal law doctrines with hard incompatibilism and not to 
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